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INTRODUCTION TO 
PLEA BARGAINING IN THREE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES 
Plea bargaini is a critic instit the 
administration of justice in Cali nia. Judge , prosecutors 
and defense attorneys, part ts involved the middle of the 
criminal justice system, are vir ly unan us the n n 
that plea bargaining is essential to the prosec t 
adjudication of criminal cases. v t pervasiveness 
acceptance, it is not unreasonable to ue t, to a great 
extent, plea bargaining is Cali n 's system of crim 1 
justice. 
Despite its central role in Cali 's cr 1 
proceedings, there are many unanswered quest ut plea 
bargaining and its consequences. Are innocent persons ing 
conv ted? Are perpetrators of serious cr s being released to 
endanger the public? Is the bargaining system riddled th 
inconsistencies and capricious judgments? Is the ant a 
victim of the bargain, or a shrewd manipulator? Curren y, we 
have to respond to these quer with a simple admittance: We 
don't know. 
The two principal reasons for this 1 of knowledge 
about the actual workings of the plea bargain process are: 
1. Plea bargaining is largely an informal 
process depending on interpersonal agreements 
among individuals; therefore, it is only 
1 
partially documented. 
2. Plea bargaining raises fundamental issues 
concerning justice, 1 guarantees 
and the protection of society. scussions 
of plea bargaining have tended to focus on 
these questions of principle to the exclusion 
of factual inquiry into the actual 
of the process. 
i s 
In a time of increasing public concern about crime, and 
about the effectiveness and cost of the criminal justice system, 
we cannot afford to remain large ignorant about the basic 
workings of existi criminal procedure. In this report the 
Joint Committee for Revision of the Penal Code presents the 
findings of a detailed investigation of a bargaining in three 
California counties. The report is organized around four major 
questions: 
1. The Definition of Plea Bargain What is 
it? 
2. The Results of Plea Bargaining: What 
difference does it make? 
3. The Process of Plea Bargaining: When does it 
happen and who is involved? 
4. Plea Bargaining's Affect on Criminal Justice: 
What implications does it have for 1 
policy? 
2 
I 
PLEA BARGAINING: 
The initial task learni u ea bargaining is 
to arrive at a definition or under tanding term. Just 
what is plea bargaining? Does it 1 e al ts of 
negotiation in the criminal ss or are there def ite 
boundaries which can be drawn aro se f reements 
which qualify as plea barga ? 
There is no simple legal f it of plea bargaining. 
Statutes and case law have indirec ed some definition, 
but the process is still evolving As a result actors who do 
"game" works. 
Definitions by the Principal Part 
Prosecut1ng and Defense Attorneys 
Because plea bargaining an 1 process which 
takes place through discussions between secutors, defense 
attorneys and judges, we can define ea barga ing by the 
experience of the principal tici ts--the attorneys. The 
Joint Committee conducted extensive interv more than 
fifty Deputy District Attorneys and Deputy Public Defenders in 
three California counties. When asked to fine "plea 
bargaining" as they experienced it their jurisdiction, these 
knowledgeable participants indicated a number of different 
3 
definitions of the term. Some of the more tant "themes" 
are: 
1. PLEA BARGAINING IS A PROCESS OF DISCUSS AND AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE PROSECUTOR, DEFENSE ATTORNE , JUDGE, AND 
DEFENDANT.! DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT CONCERN THE CHARGES TO 
WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS WILLING PLEAD LTY OR THE 
SENTENCE WHICH WILL FOLLOW A 
"An agreement reac 
District Attorney and 
approved by the court." 
Deputy Publ i De 
"Bargain in wh 
guilty with awareness 
sentence. The t 
district attorney, 
and the de ndant " 
Deputy 
"It is def 
other jurisd t ; i 
how to settle cases. 11 
Deputy Distr 
"Process wh 
immemorial. Two at 
and, since most fe 
trial, there must 
understanding as to 
plead guilty to." 
t 
tween the 
fend and 
i 
di on 
on i 
discuss a case 
cases don't to 
sort of 
de t 
Deputy Distr t At , Coun B 
lThe defendant is not phys 
however, the defendant's at 
substance of the discussions 
client. 
4 
discussions; 
to convey the 
proposals to his 
I 
I 
I 
2. PLEA BARGAINING IS A PROCESS 
WHICH IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL 
HIEVING AN AGREEMENT 
NEGOTIATING PARTIES 
"An at tempt to 
case is worth 
and sa tis fact 
going to trial. 
secuted in 
we 
Deputy Distr t At 
"We give up perhaps a 1 
might be able to t if 
trial and in return 
which they can decide 
want. 
se te e 
Deputy str t At 
"Essentially i 's 
horse trading. n 
Deputy De 
un 
ist cated 
er, Coun B 
"Opposing s 
to reach mut ly 
uate case and try 
i results " 
Deputy Public De nder, Coun B 
3. PLEA BARGAINING IS A NECESSARY PRODUCT OF NEED TO 
CONSERVE LIMITED RESOURCES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. 
"s ys tern ••• to save tax money. 
Deputy District 
"Plea barga ing 
defendant to the maximum 
with the min amount of 
that can realistically 
, Coun B 
Deputy District Attorney, County B 
"The courts make the cases fit the 
amount of courtrooms available." 
Deputy District Attorney, County A 
5 
4. PLEA BARGAINING IS A RECOGNITION OF THE REALITIES OF THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. 
"Recognition of the fact distr 
attorneys couldn't take to jury all s 
that are filed, nor could defense; and 
recognition that criminal justice and 
evidence are inexact sciences and this is an 
assembly line process." 
Deputy District At , Coun B 
5. PLEA BARGAINING IS A SET OF STRATEGIES USED PROSECUTORS 
OR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, OR BOTH, TO MANIPULATE THE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM. 
"Practice which is used to el inate 
cases we cannot successfully prosecute 
a reasonable doubt." 
Deputy District Attorney, Coun C 
"It is a process through which you find 
out if a case is triable or not." 
Deputy Publ De , County c. 
"The elements of a plea barga are, 
first of all, determining what the charges 
really are, not what has been 'charged'." 
Deputy Public Defender, County B 
"Attempt to resolve case short of 
trial." 
Deputy Public Defender, County B 
"Don't bargain case out unless something 
is wrong." 
Deputy District Attorney, Coun B. 
6 
• 
• 
6. PLEA BARGAINING IS A METHOD FOR INSURING A MINIMUM STANDARD 
OF PUNISHMENT. 
"Getting a guaranteed conviction, short 
of trial, with as close to same sentence as 
you would get if defendant went to trial." 
Deputy District At , Coun B 
7. PLEA BARGAINING IS A METHOD THROUGH WHICH DEFENDANTS 
ARRANGE REDUCED SENTENCES. 
"Whenever anyone pleads 
than they are original 
i less 
th." 
Deputy District Attorney, County B 
8. PLEA BARGAINING IS A PROCESS FOR CONSIDERING ALL RELEVANT 
FACTS IN A CASE • 
"Agreement wher plea of guilty is 
entered after considerat of al ts of 
case and defendant's 
Deputy Public Defender, Coun A 
9. PLEA BARGAINING IS A PROCESS FOR ACHIEVING EQUITY AND 
FAIRNESS IN THE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL CASES. 
"Plea bargaining is the equitable 
disposition of a case to teet [the] 
public, and not to overpunish defendants." 
Deputy District At , County A 
"Process whereby charges are decided on 
[the] basis of all factors involv what 
[a] just result ought to " 
Deputy District Attorney, Coun A 
The foregoing definitions the attorneys lead to 
several conclusions. First, it confirms t great majority 
7 
have ac ea 
s an al 
so ear that 
s t sent a 
1 cr inal 
of prosecutors and defense attor 
bargaining as an empirical fact--it 
component of the criminal just 
plea bargaining includes a var 
significant departure from the 
procedure which emphasizes proc 
before a jury of peers. 
uarantees a a trial 
Plea bargaining in 
justice which the participants 
benefits, the most important of 
--For the prosecutor, 
"win" and is 
uces s 
--For the courts, it 
bargaining meets 
efficiency and fi 
essential to preventi 
courts. 
a lut 
--For defense attorne a 
charges filed st t de 
--For the defendant, it i 
bargaining results 
in sentence. 
a s nif 
--For the interes of 
may permit a finer j 
g 
t 
t 
var ty of 
tees a 
t 
s 
s 
that 
r uction 
a 
t 
to a particular crime than 
application of the law would 
In summation, the definit 
prosecuting and defense at make 
stra ht 
it 
of ea barg 
eas er 
ing b 
define ea 
bargaining by what it is not, than through agreement on it 
is. It is perhaps easier to understand plea a i 
knowing the benefits the ticipants i 
the legal rules by which negot ted eas are reached, and by 
knowing how the actual bargaining done. 
What are the ements and l itat ns which 
define plea b aining? ts of aining can po to a 
long history of judicial recognition of the neces i and the 
propriety of plea bargaining as a modif tion of the "normal" 
procedures of criminal justice which culminate jury trial. 
this section of the report, first the "normal" proc ure is 
outlined as a standard against which plea barga i can be 
In 
compared. Second, the body of California stat and case law 
relating to plea bargaining is iefly reviewed. Th 
commentary is offered regardi the current t 
statutory and case law. 
9 
, some 
of this 
A Brief Descr ion of Criminal Procedure 
Typically, a felony f ant a te 
arrest to trial which has several "dec is points. 11 These 
points may provide an opportunity to exc a ea of guil 
lieu of proceeding to jury trial. 
Upon arrest a defendant is taken to the ten n 
facility where he or she is booked, ssed a 
cell. If the offense is not a i of se, the fendant 
will be afforded an opportunity to gain release from custody by 
posting bail or, upon successful tion, he or she may be 
released on his or her promise to t on the date set 
for arraignment. the def ant to procure release 
from custody, he or must brought be a magistrate 
informed of the charges with two of his or her arrest, 
excluding Sundays and holidays (Pe Code §825). At this t 
the defendant will be told of his or right to be sen ted 
by counsel and, if he or she indigent, court will appo t 
counsel. The defendant will be given the tuni to enter a 
plea, and the case will be set for a el y hearing.2 
Arraignment be a magistrate represents a decis 
point at which, in certain circumstances, the fe process may 
be cut short. For instance, if it is agreed , and sufficient 
evidentiary material is available at arra nment (usually the 
2The indictment process will not be discussed here because it 
was not used for any of the cases this s 
10 
I 
police report and the complaint) ind 
should have been a misdemeanor, c 
te that a felony charge 
will be reduced and 
sent to municipal court; or, in some stances, ndant may 
even enter a plea of guilty to the reduced charge for a 
predetermined sentence. Usually this 
is in custody and, by pleading guil to 
misdemeanor, he or she will be assured of be 
custody either immediately or with o y a v 
sentence and probation. 
s where the defendant 
charge as a 
released from 
county jail 
If the normal felony proc ure is cont ued, there will 
be a preliminary hearing which is an ev entiary hearing to 
establish whether or not there s f 
to hold the defendant to answer to the 
in superior court. The prelim hearing 
point at which the court may reduce the 
filed as either a felony or misdemeanor 
§l7(b)(S). Such a decision may lowed 
1 probable cause 
es against him or her 
is another decision 
e, if it can be 
suant to Penal Code 
a change of plea 
to guilty before the municipal court judge who sat at the 
preliminary hearing. 
If the evidence at the pr inary hearing is 
sufficient to make a finding as to probable cause, the judge, 
sitting in his or her capacity as magistrate, will hold the 
defendant to answer and certify the defendant to superior court. 
The district attorney must file an format 
court within fifteen (15) days from date 
11 
th the superior 
defendant has 
been held to answer.3 
At the defendant's f uper court, 
he or she will again be arra ned The de 11 be 
informed of the charges against h right to 
counsel, and will be g an i the 
defendant had a public defender the mun i 
and still qualifies, the publ er ted to 
represent the defendant super nment in 
superior court is ano juncture process may be 
terminated through a c s not happen, 
the judge will set the case hearing on any 
defense motions. 
At the next court e on the pretrial 
motions will be presented and on them. Next, 
the district attorney the 1 11 have a 
pretrial conference usual s. At the 
pretrial conference, the attempt 
to reach a negotiated settlement to both 
sides and to the judge. set ns are not 
fruitful, the case will usua trial (in 
California court trials are rare level) . If the 
defendant is in custody, case with sixty da 
of his or her arraignment super court ess the defendant 
has personally waived the ht to s tr 1 On the date 
3An information is the accusa 
which sets forth the fel e 
• 
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set for trial, the attorneys can again meet in the judge's 
chambers , if the judge desires, with yet another opportunity to 
settle the case short of trial. Upon conclus n of discuss ns 
in chambers, if no settlement is reached, the attorneys will 
select a jury and commence the trial. Once the trial under 
way, proceedings can still be suspended to allow the defendant to 
plead guilty. 
At the jury trial both sides sent ev ence hrough 
the testimony of witnesses. After all the evidence has been 
presented, the attorneys argue the merits of their case to the 
jury. The judge then instructs the jury as to the applicable law 
and charges them to apply the law to the facts which the jury 
determines existed relevant to the crime. Upon conviction by a 
unanimous verdict of guilty, the judge sets the case over for 
approximately one month for arraignment and sentenc 
Between conviction and sentencing, the defendant is 
interviewed by the probation department, which in turn files its 
report with the court and makes a copy of that report available 
to defense counsel. Letters and other documentary evidence in 
support of a mitigated or aggravated sentence may also be filed 
with the court. By the date of sentencing, the judge has 
reviewed the relevant documents. Before imposing sentence the 
judge asks for comments from counsel and the defendant. Next, 
the defendant is again informed of the crimes of which he or she 
has been convicted and then the sentence is pronounced. After 
sentencing, the defendant is informed of his or her rights of 
13 
appeal. Once sentence is rendered, the defendant i remanded 
into the custody of the te authori to serve his or her 
of incarceration. 
The foregoi descript presents a process ith 
numerous opportunities for d the th a jury tr l. 
It is at these points that ea a occur and r ul t 
in a plea of guilty. This ea rendered ex e for some 
commitment regarding the sentence the de nd i 
The prosecuting and defe se are pr 
negotiators through much of this proc ss, each brings the 
perspectives and obligat ns of his or her ular role to the 
bargaining sessions. 
Mr. Justice White, d United States v. 
Wade (1967) 388 .s. 218, 
contrasted the roles of attorne 
defense as lows: 
14 9, 
e and 
"'Law enforcement off obl at to 
convict the guil and to do not conv t 
the innocent. They must be making the 
criminal trial a procedure the ascertainment of the 
true facts surround the commiss To 
this extent, our so-called adversary 
adversary at all; nor should it 
counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or 
present the truth. Our system assigns a different 
mission. He must be and is terested 
convicting the innocent, but, absent a un plea 
of guilty, we also insist that he fend his t 
whether he is innocent or guilty. The State has the 
obligat n to present the evidence. Defense counsel 
need present nothing, even if he what the truth 
is. He need furnish no witnesses to the ice, reveal 
any confidences of this ient nor furnish any other 
information to help the prosecut n's case If he can 
confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or h 
appear at a disadvantage, unsure or eci ive, that 
will be his normal course. Our tere t not 
convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the 
State to its proof, to put the State's case the 
4 
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worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or 
knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are some 
limits which defense counsel must serve but more 
often than not, de se counsel will eros -examine a 
prosecution witness, and f he can, even if 
he thinks the witness is the truth just as he 
will attempt to destroy a who he thinks is 
lying. In this respect, as part f if 
adversary system and as part of sed on the 
most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or 
require conduct which many s li e if 
any, relation to the search for Ill 
The district attorney is ves t nary power 
to determine whether or not to ute t ar case (Gov. 
Code §26501). It is a quasi-judie l funct n, the courts 
cannot control it using the writ of mandamus. ( 
_.......;:;'----
vs 
Municipal Court, 27 Cal.App. 1 
The defense counsel and the prosecut both have 
authority to enter into plea a t t Any 
proposal of defense counsel must district 
attorney before the court will cons er it. If parties agree 
upon a settlement of the case wh wou i a plea of 
guilty to charges different from se eadings filed 
with the court, or to a lesser d ree of the c es filed, the 
court may conditionally ace g il ea. 
5 
Statutory and Case Authority for Plea Bargaining in California 
Historical Background 
It is generally acce that barga was used, 
but not acknowledged, in the cr inal justice system long before 
its official recognition by the i 
California Legislature. In 1955, the 
Code §§1192.1 and 1192.2 wh it 
ia erne Court and the 
specify the degree of the cr when 
attorney and approved by the court For 
inhabited dwelling during the nightt 
degree. If the burglary occurs the da 
islature enacted Pe 
defendant 1 s ea to 
district 
, burglary of an 
lary of the first 
, it is burglary of 
the second degree. Under Penal Code §§1192 1 nd 1192. 2, a 
defendant who burglarized someone's home during the nighttime can 
enter into an agreement with district attorney to plead 
guilty to second degree b ary and, if t accepts the 
plea, the defendant cannot 
the crime. 
sentenc r a h her degree of 
In 1957, Penal Code §1192.4 was to protect the 
defendant where the plea, pursuant to §§1192 1 or 1192.2, is not 
accepted by the district attorney or by the judge. It 
allows the defendant to withdraw h 
withdrawn plea from being used in 
or special proceeding of any nature. 
After the enactment of Penal 
1192.4, prosecutors at trial wo 
ea and ib its the 
ence any criminal, civil 
§ § 11 9 2. 1, 119 2. 2 and 
move to admit into 
evidence the prior withdrawn plea of guil In some instances 
se, would grant the trial court, over the object of the 
6 
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the prosecution's motion. After conviction and upon appeal the 
defense had to prove not only that the admission of the evidence 
was improper, but that the admission was prejud 1. A line of 
appellate court decisions developed which del ted an 
increasing number of situations which the admission of the 
prior plea of guilty, though improper, was held to be harmless 
error and, therefore, not grounds for reversal. 
In 1964, the California Supreme Court held People vs 
Quinn, 61 Cal.2d 551, that the ission into evidence 
of a prior withdrawn plea was per se reversible error. Before 
the rule in Quinn, the defendant was required to prove that the 
admission into evidence of the prior withdrawn plea was 
prejudicial error in order to gain reversal on appeal. People vs 
Clay, 208 Cal.App.2d 773; People vs Snell, 99 Cal.App.2d 657; 
People vs Ivy, 163 Cal.App.3d 436. 
In 1965, the California Legislature enacted Evidence 
Code §1153 which codified the Quinn case and extended the ruling 
of Quinn by making evidence of an offer to ead guilty to a 
crime, a well as evidence of a previously withdrawn guilty plea, 
inadmissible in any action or proceeding of any nature . 
A major change in plea bargaining occurred 1970, 
when the California Supreme Court decided People vs West, 3 
Cal.3d 595. West extended the concept of charge bargaining, as 
codified in Penal Code §§1192.1 and 1192.2, to sentence 
bargaining and outright dismissal of some charges given in 
exchange for a plea of guilty to other charges. The Supreme 
17 
Court in West suggested procedures to be used pr senting 
--
ea bargain to the court. The se th the fo 
ural guidel s 
1. The plea bargain should be orally sta 
parties and recorded the court reporter; 
2. The plea barga 
the court: 
sho d be t th in the minutes f 
3. The parties should file a written sti at 
terms of the ea bargain; 
4. Counsel or the court 
the recordation of the 
a 
The concepts in West were ified in 1970 with the 
islature's enactment of Penal Code §1192.5. nal Code 
§1192.5 applies to fel eas exce those ing 
violat n of Penal Code §§261(2 , 261(3) 2 1 f 286 28 
288(a)5 and 28 9. Sect 1192.5 re s that the be ta 
during a reg arly sess of court, and that 
be accepted by the distr and the court. 
If se requirements are met, the court may not ta a 
other than the specifi ea, and cannot sentence to a 
ishment more severe than that specif the ea. Sect 
1192.5 requires the cour approval of the ea, to 
the defendant of llow 
1. The court ' s is not bi 
4By force, violence, menace duress or 
harm. 
5 
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ng; 
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2. The court may withdraw its approval, and if it 
does the defendant raw h plea. 
The court has to y and sat sfy itself that 
the defendant's plea is freely and untar ly made and that 
there is a factual basis for such ea. If a fendant•s plea is 
not accepted by the distr t attor and by the court, 
it is deemed withdrawn, with the same proh aga t be 
admitted into evidence as in §1192.4 f Code. 
Present Le~Rules Governing Plea Bargaining 
The general rules as set forth in Code §§1192.1, 
1192.2, 1192.4 and 1192.5 te to al the defendant and the 
prosecutor to negotiate a se ement of case in which the 
defendant agrees to plead guil exchange for any combination 
of one or all of the following: 
a. Dismissal of some of the c 
defendant; 
es filed against 
b. Dismissal of some of the es filed against 
defendant in exchange for a plea f guilty to a 
lesser related chargei 
c. A reduction in the degree of crime; 
d. A sentence less than the maximum prescribed by law. 
If the plea agreed to by the defense and the 
prosecution is accepted by the court, the court is bound by the 
agreement and cannot dispose of the case a manner other than 
as described in the plea ain. However, if the court accepts 
1 
the guilty plea conditionally, the court may reject the plea 
bargain, prior to sentencing, prov ed the de endant is allowed 
the opportunity to withdraw hi gu e 
Since the enactment of ea barga ing statutes, 
particular situations have arisen which have ided the basis 
for a number of appellate cases ti the meaning of 
statutes governing plea bargaining. 
enactments have tried to restr t 
against career criminals st 
999(e), 999(f), and 999(g).) 
so, recent lative 
i cases 
The rules on plea 
juvenile proceedings 
Cal.App.3d 345. The court of 
e applicable to 
--~------~-----------t (1972), 45 
a wer 
al held that a 
juvenile defendant's offer of a ea or thdrawal of a plea, 
could not be introduced as ev ence a j enile court trial. 
In People vs Tanner 19 ), 4 3d 345, the court 
of appeal held that it was revers le error the prosecutor to 
introduce at trial letters the t to the prosecutor 
which discussed the possibility of ea tiations between the 
parties. 
The California erne Court vs Kaonehe 
(1977), 19 Cal.3d 1, permitted a de ant to thdraw a guilty 
plea entered pursuant to a plea 
district attorney and the court, 
breached the agreement after de 
before sentencing. 
0 
h was approved by the 
use the district attorney 
t's en y of ea, but 
I 
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The court's discretion in ea bargain has been 
limited by a number of recent decisions. 
defendant's plea and still reject it pr 
The court can enter the 
to sentenc 
as the defendant is allowed to withdraw his plea. 
Johnson (1974), 10 Cal.3d 868.) 
, so long 
vs 
The trial court need not approve a plea bargain tween 
the defendant and the district attorney which it does not think 
fair, but it cannot change the plea barga tho the consent 
of both parties. (People vs Godfrey (1978), 81 Cal.App.3d 896.) 
A superior court judge's power to reject a plea bargain 
upon certification from municipal court is limited to cases where 
the superior court judge's disagreement is with the plea itself, 
and not the plea bargain. If the court does not think the plea 
bargain is correct, the superior court cannot reject the plea 
bargain made before the magistrate, without allowing the 
defendant to withdraw the plea. (People vs Superior Court 
(1976), 64 Cal.App.3d 710.} 
A magistrate cannot specify the degree of a charge 
without the consent of the district attorney expressed in open 
court. Hence, the magistrate does not have the power to reduce a 
burglary from first to second degree without the district 
attorney's express consent, where the plea is taken pursuant to a 
plea bargain between the defendant and the district attorney. 
(People vs Hawkins (1978), 85 Cal.App.3d 960.) A defendant's 
right to withdraw from a plea bargain agreement includes 
situations where the court's act after sentencing violates the 
21 
terms of the ea barga 
Cal. .3d 192.)6 
The nse cannot ot te a e a 
court when the distr t attor ects 
to accept or reject ea a i cannot 
s stitute itself as the represen f e r i e. 
prosecution. e urt, 
er, to sentence 
defendant. ( 1 2 o. The 
court Felmann he t if the de r ead 
guil or nolo contendere to 1 unts the formation, 
j e, over the d str t attor 's t , can 
to accepti the ea, what sentence he would se i a 
g en set of ts are confirmed the sente por . 
A court canno e a ea use of 
dif ent sentenc tr cour ted 
meting out a i t a use t se go 
to tr ia 1 , rat than to acce a ea a (In re Lewal 
( 1 9 7 9 ) , 2 8 Ca 1 • 3d 2 7 4. ) 
Lastly, the recent case of e vs Ga (19 ), 90 
Cal. .3d .26, further ensures the a will honored 
(enforced) by the courts. court of al in Gal held a 
defendant can withdraw his guil ea where an seen 
6ne ndant had entered 
specified sentence 
stayed until after 
sentencing the judge 
a plea o g 
the promise 
ant's 
revoked 
il 
that 
al was 
ant's 
a 
circumstance works to deprive the de 
plea bargain. In Gallego, a c 
ineligible for a rehabilita 
the bargain. 
ant of the benefit of his 
law made 
c 
defendant 
essence of 
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THE THREE COUNTY STUDY 
The staff of the Joint Committee r Revision of the 
Penal Code staff collected extens data on bargaining in 
three California counties during September er of 1978. 
County A is a large, urban county; Coun a e 
metropolitan county with a signif urban population. The 
third jurisdiction, County C, is a ium-si Southern 
California county with one or urban center. The selection of 
three jurisdictions in wh to conduct the st y is important 
because it allows a test of the d ee of consistency in plea 
A detailed discuss of s n of the study, the 
techniques of data collection, and me s of analysis can be 
found in the Appendices to this report 7 Here the major features 
of data collection and analysis me s will summarized in 
brief. Data collection was signed to: 
1. Gain perceptions and nions about plea 
bargaining from persons d ectly and 
indirectly involved in the ess thin 
each jurisdiction; and 
?The Appendices to this study has been pr ted in a separate 
volume. It can be purchased from the Assembly Publications 
Office, Box 90, State Capitol, Sacramento, CA 95814. 
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2. To go beyond the self-r rt of 
participants in order to actuall ument 
the processes and conse s of ea 
bargaining from a sample of cr cases 
each jurisdiction. 
To accomplish the first objective, per 
interviews were conducted with over 125 sons i i 
district attorneys, deputy public defenders j es, peace 
officers, probation officers, and defendants three 
counties. Interviews with prosecutors, defense attorneys and 
judges were particularly hensive, coveri a range of 
questions regarding the practice of ea bargaining 
To accomplish the second objective, the Committee 
conducted an extens anal is each jurisdict n of district 
attorney case files for criminal defendants sentenced under 
Determinate Sentencing Law. It is important to emphasize that 
the Committee recorded this data direc y the case files and 
did not depend on secondary statistics collected for other 
purposes.8 
8Both interview questionnaries and the case file data 
collection instrument were based in large part on materials 
prepared for a national study of plea bargaining commissioned by 
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. For a complete 
presentation of these materials, see "The Study of Plea 
Bargaining in Local Jurisdictions: A Self-Study Manual", 
Washington, D.C.: Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, 
Georgetown University Law Center. May 1978 {Draft). 
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The present study is 1 ited to fe 
Interviews covered topics related to felony 
case file analysis was limited to s 
a 
a bargaining. 
generally. 
burglar s 
There are strong reasons for cho 
categories. First, robbery and 1 
crimes. Thus, they constitute a signif 
of se crime 
ar common 
ant port of the 
felony ea aining activity in the State. y are ser us 
crimes against persons and property, and there , invo 
important questions public protect n and defendants' r hts. 
Furthermore, robbery and burglary do not involve 
emotionally charged criminal behav s, such as 
crimes, which arouse the public and may di tort the b 
or sex 
aining 
process. Finally, there are suff ient numbers of cases of 
burglary and robbery to allow the study of barga ing without the 
confusing influences of a variety of crime s. 
The Committee's study incl a cases of and 
80% or more of burglary cases which were bound over to superior 
court under the Determinate Sentencing Law the 
jurisdictions during the period between y 1, 1977, and 
October, 1978. These cases were all sentenced under California's 
Determinate Sentencing Law which prescribes min middle, and 
maximum sentence times for individual crime categories; and 
stipulates sentence enhancements for using firearms or other 
deadly weapons, intentionally causing great bodily i ury, 
causing extraordinary property loss or damage, and for de ndants 
who have served time for prior felony convictions. 
26 
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The Study Setting 
Before the process of plea bargaining in the ee 
jurisdictions can be meaningfully descr and ed, it is 
necessary to identify the nature of the criminal cases the 
characteristics of the defendant populat ns within each county 
Tables I, II, and III present data describing the fact patterns 
for the robbery and burglary crimes in the study, the personal 
backgrounds of defendants, and the criminal histories of 
defendants. All data was gathered direc y from the case files 
of the defendants. A brief description of the crime and 
defendant profiles for each county will serve to summarize this 
information. 
County A 
County A, a large urban county, had the heaviest felony 
caseload of the three jurisdictions in the study. The number of 
burglaries and robberies were about equal for the time period 
studied. The typical robbery involved the use of a weapon 
(64.4%) and victimized persons were most likely to be males, 
Caucasian, and strangers to the defendant. About half of the 
robberies occurred at night, and a significant minority of 
incidents resulted in some injury to the victim (25.3% minor 
injury; 9.1% hospitalization). It is somewhat ironic that these 
robberies with the aura of threat to the victim frequently 
involved a relatively minor loss of property or money (nearly 
two-thirds of the robberies involved less than $100). 
27 
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TABLE I 
CRIME FACT PATTERNS 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
USE OF WEAPON 
YES 64.4% 9.0% 66.7% 5.4% 78.6% 0.0% 
HARM TO VICTIM 
Minor Injury 25.3% 2.1% 28.1% 3.1% 14.3% 1.9% 
Hospitalization 9.1% 0.0% 3.3% 2.2% 7.1% 0.0% 
NIGHT OFFENSE 
YES 54.6% 63.8% 70.7% 74.0% 84.6% .6% 
TYPE OF BURGLARY 
Residential N/A 35.4% N/A .9% N/A 47. 
Nonresidential N/A 36.5% N/A 3 $ N/A 43. 
Auto N/A 27.1% N/A 15. N/A 9.4% 
AMOUNT OF LOSS 
$100 or Less 63.2% 47.6% 62.7% 20.6% 63.6% 35.7% 
$101 to $250 10.5% 14.3% 18.6% 23.5% 36.4% 11.9% 
$251 to $1000 21.1% 14.3% 15.3% 19.1% 0.0% 28.6% 
Over $1000 5.3% 23.8% 3.4% 36.8% 0.0% 23.8% 
., ., 
• 
TABLE I LCo_rl_tinuedJ 
CRIME FACT PATTERNS 
-
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
SEX OF VICTIM 
Female 27.0% 29.1% 33.8% 20.4% 0.0% 20.0% 
Multiple 20.0% 7.6% 6.2% 5.6% 14.3% 18.0% 
Male 53.0% 63.3% 60.0% 74.1% 85.7% 62.0% 
RACE OF VICTIM 
Black 17.3% 14.7% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hispanic 6.1% 7.4% 12.5% 15.6% 0.0% 7.3% 
Oriental 3.1% 17.6% 12. 9.4% 0.0% 2. 
American Indian 0.0% 0.0% 0. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Caucasian 56.1% 54.4% 45. 71 9% 100.0% 85.4% 
Multiple 17.3% 5.9% 16.6% 3. 0.0% 4.9% 
DEFENDANT'S RELATION TO VICTIM 
Family 2.0% 5.0% 0.0% 3. 0.0% 4. 
Friend/Acquaintance 8.2% 10.0% 9. .0% 21.4% 16. 
Stranger 79.6% 83.8% 83.9% 67.9% 78.6% 80.0% 
(Number of Cases) (103) (102) (66) ( 113) (14) ( ) 
• 
TABLE II 
DEFENDANT BACKGROUND PROFILE 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
--
SEX 
Male 90.3% 98.0% 92.4% 92.8% 92.9% 94.3% 
Female 9.7% 2.0% 7.6% 6.2% 7.1% 5.7% 
RACE 
Black 68.9% 52.0% 19.6% 14.2% 0.0% 6.4% 
Hispanic 9.7% 8.8% 26.8% 31.1% 28.6% 19.1% 
Oriental 4.9% 3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
American Indian 0.0% 1.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Caucasian 16.5% 34.3% 51.8% 54.7% 71.4% 74.5% 
AGE 
U~der 21 20.0~ 18.6% 27.7% 35 0% 25.0% 13.5% 2 to 25 35.0 26.5% 33.8% 35.1% 33.3% 38.4% 
26 to 30 21.0% 29.4 21.5% 16.2% 16.7% 25.0% Over 30 24.0% 25.5% 16.9% 13.5% 25.0% 23.1% 
MARITAL STATUS 
Single 65.9% .4% 50. 64. 70.0% 
Married 12.5~ 7% 16. 13. 0.0% Separated 4.5 .2% 12. 4. 0.0% 
Divorced 6.8% • 8% 14 • 9 20.0% Common Law 8.0% .9% 3. 8 0.0% 
EDUCATION 
1-4 years 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9-11 years 45.6% 44.6% 54.2% 50.7% 88.9% Completed Highschool 25.6% 28.3% 20.8% 21.3% 11.1% 
Some College 21.1% 20.7% 22.9% 25.3% 0.0% 
Trade School 7.8% 5.4% 2.1% 2.7% 0.0% 
• • "' 
TABLE II (c;_gnttnued} 
DEFENDANT BACKGROUND PROFILE 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
--
YEARS LOCAL RESIDENCE 
Less than One Year 10.5% 2.4% 17.3% 15.6% 10.0% 17.5% 
One year 5.8% 4.9% 7.7% 2.6% 0.0% 5.0% 
Two to Five Years 4.7% 3.7% 11.5% 15.6% 0.0% 5.0% 
Over Five Years 79.1% 89.0% 63.5% 66.2% 90.0% 72.5% 
EMPLOYMENT 
Full-Time 14.6% 16.3% 25.0% 33.7% 16.7% 30.4% 
Part-Time 4.2% 2.2% 25.0% 8.4% 8.3% 10.9% 
Unemployed 77.1% 69.6% 36.4% 50.6% 75.0% 43.5% 
Irregular 4.2% 12.0% 13.6% 7. 0.0% 15.2% 
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT 
Up to 1 year 61.1% 73.7% 79.1% 87.3% 100.0% 86.2% 
Two Years 13.9% 5.3% 14.5% 6.3% 0.0% 10.3% 
Three Years 5.6% 2.6% 4.7% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Four Years 5.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Five Years 2.8% 7.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Six Years 2.8% 5.3% 0.0% 0. 0.0% 0.0% 
Over 8 Years 8.3% 5.3% 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 
HISTORY OF MENTAL ILLNESS 
YES 13.5% 16.1% 14.6% 11.8% 9.1% 13.6% 
NO 86.5% 83.9% 85.4% 88.2% .9% 86.4% 
• 
TABLE II {Continued} 
DEFENDANT BACKGROUND PROFILE 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
--
HISTORY OF DRUG ABUSE 
YES 45.2% 57.7% 75.9% 43.0% 54.5% 62.8% 
NO 54.8% 42.3% 24.1% 57.0% 45.5% 37.2% 
HISTORY OF ALCOHOL ABUSE 
YES 20.0% 30. 37. 30. 30.0% 38.1% 
NO 80.0% 69. . 69 .0% 61.9% 
• 
TABLE I II 
DEFENDANT CRIMINAL HISTORY PROFILE 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
-
.ON PROBATION AT ARREST 
YES 48.5% 56.0% 43.5% 46.7% 33.3% 47.1% 
NO 51.5% 44.0% 56.5% 53.2% 66.7% 52.9% 
CHARGES PENDING 
YES 20.7% 17.4% 52.8% 20.8% 37.5% 18.2% 
NO 79.3% 82.6% 47.2% 79.2% 62.5% 81.8% 
JUVENILE RECORD 
YES 35.9% 31.6% 45.2% 54.8% 90.0% 77.1% 
NO 64.1% 68.4% 51.9% 48.1% 10.0% 22.9% 
PRIOR FELONY ARRESTS 
None 27.0% 19.6% 36.7% 51. 23.1% 31. 
One 17.0% 7.8% 21. .9% 15.4% 17.6% 
Two or Three 14.0% 20.6% 11.7% 10. 38.5% 15. 
Four or More 42.0% 52.0% 30.0% .4% 23.1% .3% 
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS 
None 53.5% 44.6% 56.9% 68.4% 46.2% 
One 15.8% 12.9% 17.2% 12. 30.8% 19. 
Two or More 19.8% 24.8% 12.1% 12. 15 4% .7% 
Four or More 10.9% 17.8% 13.8% 6.3% 7. 13.7% 
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TABLE III Continued 
DEFENDANT CRIMINAL HISTORY PROFILE 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
-
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
-
PRIOR ROBBERY CONVICTIONS 
None 78.4% 90.2% 87.9% 90.4% 76.9% 86.3% 
One 13.4% 4.9% 8. 7.4% 15.4% 9.8% 
Two or More 8.2% 4.9% 3. 2.1% 7.7% 3.9% 
PRIOR BURGLARY CONVI ONS 
80. .0% 76.9% . 
11. 15. 7. 7. 13. 
Two or More 8. 17 6. 15. 1 • 
CONVI IONS LAST 5 
. 
. 
Two or More 21. 
PRIOR MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS 
None 32.7% .8% . 
One 18.4% 20.8% 11. 0.0% . 
Two or Three 20.4% 21.8% 17.0% 25.0% 6. 
Four or More 28. 36.6% 28. 50.0% 
TABLE III Continued 
DEFENDANT CRIMINAL HISTORY PROFILE 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS 
None 34.3% 25.3% 21.4% 44.2% 37.5% 27.5% 
One 22.2% 16.2% 17.9% 17.9% 0.0% 12.5% 
Two or Three 21.2% 23.2% 25.0% 15.8% 37.5% 40.0% 
Four or More 22.2% 35.4% 35.7% 22.1% 25.0% 20.0% 
MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS LAST 
5 YEARS 
None .0% 44.4% 39.3% . 37 • 
One 20.0% .2% 16. 15. 12. 
Two or More • 0% .3% . 33 • 50 • 
• 
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TABLE IV 
DISTRIBUTION OF TYPE AND PERIOD OF INCARCERATION 
(JAIL OR PRISON) TO WHICH ROBBERY AND BURGLARY DEFENDANTS 
WERE SENTENCED IN THREE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
.8% 
**This category contains a small number of cases which received a sentence for "time 
weeks. or which received county jail terms of less than three 
COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY 
I 
lary defendants County A were less likely 
to receive a prison sentence than s (27.8%). 
it sentence More than half 51.5% rec 
Straight probation (14.4%) was also more common 
burglars robbers. 
state prison sentences wh h faced a substant 
percentage of the robbers. Just one %) 
sentenced to more two ars two- ds were 
s 
sentenced to less than one year, more than f (54.3%) 
to less than six months. 
--County B most comrno sentenced its y 
defendants to state ison (44.6 ), but substantial 
portions received s it sentences (26.2%), or were 
sentenced to CYA (20.0%). The latter fact reflects the 
youth of de ants in Co B. Per s of 
incarceration for s vary. Over half (53.1%) 
received sentences of less than one year, most of these 
were for less than 6 months (42.9%). By contrast, 
another one-fourth (24.5%) were sentenced to more than 
four years in state prison. 
Very few b lars in County B rece state 
prison sentences (10.7%). The "typical" burglary 
sentence was county jail plus probation (50.9%}, though 
straight probation (8.9%), and CRC (4.5%) sentences all 
36 
were meted out to some of the Coun 1 s convicted 
burglars. 
The relative lack of state ison sentences means 
that nearly nine in ten (87.3%) burgl de ants 
County B received a sentence of one year or less; 
two-thirds were incarcerated for less than s months. 
Not a single burglar in the County B sample wen to 
prison for more than four years. 
--In County C, one-half of y defendants 
were sentenced to state prison (50.0%) and virtually 
all the rest (42.9%) received it sentences. 
Accordingly, one-half received sentences of one year or 
less. Over one in three (35.7%) was sent to state 
prison for more than four years. 
Over one-third (36 0%) of County C's burglars 
received state prison terms. An equal n er split 
sentences, and most of the rest received stra ht jail 
time (12.0%), or were placed on straight probation 
(14.0%}. One in five of the burglars in Coun C was 
not incarcerated (other than, possibly, a few days of 
"time served" in custody). Another 16.7%, however, 
were sentenced to more than two years state prison. 
In summation, the sentencing pattern for robberies is 
quite similar across the three counties. Approximately half are 
sentenced to state prison, most of the remainder receive split 
37 
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sentences. The only exception is found in County B which has a 
relatively high proportion of CYA sentences. Robbery sentencing 
in each county is also characterized a bifurcat n of 
sentences between those which are r atively light (under one 
year) and a significant portion of 11 he 
years or more. 
prison terms of four 
Sentences for burglary tended to be less severe across 
the counties. There was, however, a di ity in 
burglary sentencing between jurisd 
(County C) and as few as 10.7% (Co 
t ns As many as 36.0% 
B) of the burglars 
received state prison terms. In general County C sentenced more 
stiffly for burglaries, and County B less stiffly. The latter 
fact could, again, reflect the 
their lack of criminal history. 
not explain County C's relat 
Frequency of Plea Bargaining 
uth of County B's defendants and 
These factors, however, would 
y stiff sentences. 
Just how many of the robberies burglaries in these 
representative counties were settl through plea bargains? 
Table V provides a breakdown of the cases disposed of through 
jury trial, those that were plea bargained, those that plead 
guilty without plea bargaining, and a residual category for which 
there was no data on whether the plea of guilty resulted from a 
bargain. The figures make it clear just how completely the plea 
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TABLE V 
--
RATES OF PLEA BARGAINING FOR ROBBERIES AND 
BURGLARIES IN THREE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
Superior Court cases disposed 
through Jury Trial 18.4% 8.8% 19.1% 0.9% 28.6% 1.9% 
Superior Court cases disposed 
through Plea Bargains 78.6% 76.5% 60.3% 91.6% 71.4% 90. 
Superior Court cases disposed 
through Guilty Pleas wi 
no Plea Bargain 1 6.9% 11. 2. 0.0% 5. 
Superior Court cases disposed 
through Guilty Pleas wi 
reason for Plea unknown 0. 6. 9. 4. o. 
(Number of ses) (103) ( 102) ( ) (113 (14) 
II 
bargaining process dominates the settlemen of 
burglary cases. 
than 
y and 
s --In County A, 
went to trial (18.4%); ss ten ( 8. 8%) 
burglaries went to jury tr 1 
the robbery and burgl cases 
plea bargains (78.6% and 76 5% 
--In County B, the tr 
19.1%. However, the rate 
lower. Indeed, of the 113 b 
available, only one went to tr 1 
of the robbery cases 
ninety percent of the burg 
(91.6%). 
--In County C, jus th 
cases went to jury tr (28.6% , 
the robbery cases were di sed 
bargains (71.4%). Only two ent of 
urths of 
through 
er s is 
s much 
data was 
y two-thirds 
and over 
a ins 
robbery 
emainder of 
burglary 
cases were tried by j 90.4% were disposed of 
through bargained pleas of gu 
It is important to 
cases which have actually 
the percentage of jury trials for 
these crimes would be much 
The figures substant 
conclusions: 
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that se figures apply to 
over to s court, so 
fendants who are arrested for 
a tant 
First, the figures make it clear that the jury 
trial has become the e rather than the rule for 
--~--
disposing of robbery and lary cases. this 
it is difficult to believe that 
standard of justice which is set 
There simply are not enough tr 
adequate indication of the " 
A corollary to the above f 
ea b 
" tr 
i 
Guilt or innocence are y rar y 
jurisdictions. Of the 46 j 
three counties, only 4 res 
the determination of guilt or 
the "screening" of cases at e 
process, or through 
Among pleas of gu ty, 
attached to a plea bargain. 
a 
reflect a 
1 by j 
ide an 
1 res t. 
us. 
through 
se 
in the 
i tal. Thus, 
made through 
ints 
ea 
the 
guilty. 
ority were 
court judges in 
t their the three counties corroborated 
interviews. Judges in all juri tions estimated that 
a very high percentage (50-90%) of all the guilty pleas 
that come before them have ea ained. It was 
common for judges to observe that "nearly all" guilty 
pleas are the product of some sort of barga 
clear that, at least 
jurisdictions, plea 
these cr 
a is 
disposing of felony cases. 
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All of the above suggests a conclus n whi h is 
tested further throughout the st In the 
contemporary criminal justice tern tr 
constitute the normal course of events 
ls do not 
settling 
felony cases. It is more plausible to argue that 
trials are sought when special circumstances lead 
prosecution or defense to avoid the "normal" process of 
plea bargaining. 
Charge and Sentence Bargaining 
In the sample counties, and throughout the State, a 
basic distinction can be made between plea barga s involving the 
reduction or dropping of charges in exchange for a guilty plea 
(charge bargaining) and a bargained agreement on type and 
length of sentence (sentence bargaining). These opt require 
some clarification • 
In response to questions of the Committee staff one 
public defender stated, the "primary purpose [of a plea bargain] 
is a guarantee of a sentence offered in advance." The most direct 
method of accomplishing this end a "sentence bargain" between 
prosecution and defense which specifies the sentence that the 
prosecutor will recommend to the court. As explained in Chapter 
I, California law requires that such guarantees be recorded in 
open court and accepted by the judge. California law also 
41 
provides protection of the de 
guarantee. 
ant i terms of the 
Sentence barga itse s 
some jurisidctions, judges wi 1 acce 
ify bo the type of sentenc (e g. sta 
jail, probation) and the 1 th of ncarcerat 
counties judges may accept more 1 i rec 
commonly, these more limited forms of sente 
f 
the form of a g lty ea retur an tee the 
defendant will not be sentenced to state prison. 
Charge bargaining a ss d t h to 
ex chang a sentence guarantee a ea of gu 
Essent lly, charge aining es t over the 
number and type of charges to the defendant wi e 
guil The de nse object to 
will res t in the lig st sentence 
to those s 
However, because of 
judicial discretion and the 
any one set of charges, th 
of sentenc 
route is less d ec 
ssibilit 
rela 
the ultimate sentencing outcome 
Charge bargain also 
is sentence 
sever 
a 
F st 
for 
to 
charges which are filed at compla t, or in 
dropped together when a plea of gu ty is te 
be 
charge 
"dismissal" may involve dropping 
charge, or it may involve the el 
e counts of 
tion of a c 
The potential sentence re ult a set of 
may be minimized another Rel t y "ser us" c 
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same 
ether. 
es 
s 
may be replaced with less serious 
potential sentence. This of 
referred to as "sentence t 
Finally, bargaini over 
the "enhancement" charges wh h are 
Enhancements, such as use a f 
convictions in the last five 
base sentence. Clearly, el t 
direct effect on the de ndant's t 
Plea bargaining, 
different "styles" accord to 
bargaining practices wh are 
j ur isd ic tion. Through in terv 
analysis of court and distr t 
bargaining style of each of st 
outlined in brief. 
County A 
Deputy district at 
able in County A expressed cons 
predominent form of bargain 
disagreement which in itself demons 
y 
a 
j 
es y reducing 
y 
es can so be 
i Cal iforn 
felony 
a speci ied term to 
se c es wi 
ume var ty of 
sentence and charge 
a 
ts, and an 
s, the 
i t can be 
public defenders 
eement about the 
ir jurisd tion, a 
tes the var ty of 
practices which may be used. Though a district 
aining attorneys indicated a predom 
(particularly in the Hemic lary sect ns) a majority 
n 
a 
of the interviewees agreed that sentence b a ing predominated 
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TABLE VI 
CLASSIFICATION OF TYPES OF PLEA BARGAINS 
BASED ON ANALYSIS OF CASE FILES 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
Charge Bargaining Only 15.8% 25.9% 38.5% 63.1% 10.0% 41.7% 
Sentence Bargaining Only 22.0% 35.8% 33.3% 10.7% 10.0% 20.8% 
Charge & Sentence Bargaining 62.2% 38.3% .2% 26.2% 80.0% 37.5% 
(Number of Cases) (81) (79) (38) (103) (10) ( ) 
under the then incumbent distr t t Ac 
public defender, "you barga 
dismissing counts." 
s all 
to one 
sed to 
Most interv ag 
not restricted to discuss 
of charge and sentence 
distinction itself is somet 
attorneys in County A, for 
dropping of enhancements to be 
because of their direct tran 
The observat 
deputy public defenders 
staff analysis of robbery 
Nearly two-thirds (62.2% of 
combined charge and sentenc 
straight "sentence" barga 
was also predominant, with 5.8 
sentence only, and 38.3% 
considerations. There is, 
the types of bargains struck 
for burglaries are most 
bargains, but not both. 
n 
The relative pr 
County A is encouraged 
policy and judicial pract 
written policy on plea 
ence 
Wh 
a 
b 
t 
t 
a was 
eed, the 
t 
the 
e" negotiat 
arceration. 
and 
Committee's 
VI). 
cases 
% were 
sen nee 
reements 
aining 
ing 
sentence 
t 
c e 
le dif ence in 
ea bargains 
or sentence 
reements in 
district attorney 
official 
, the district 
attorney indica ted that the office should 1 i a 
sentence recommendations. Judges Co th y 
by considering and frequently ace sec 
recommendations for "state pri state prison 11 
time to be served in the latter stance 
County B 
The district attorney in Coun B 
written policy on plea bargaining referr as sentenc 
policy under SB 42" (California's Determ te Sentenci 
Statute). The policy sets forth nion t "the 
justice system usually works better when each 
concentrates its efforts on its own job" 11 that 
the district attorney's business, [and] sentenci is the court s 
business." It follows that the distr t attorney authorizes y 
a limited involvement in sentence barga ing secutors. 
"[I]n an appropriate case, under 
existing guidelines, the deputy 
conditional plea on the sole 
no state prison sentence 
the case." 
Deputy district attorneys, deputy publ nders 
judges for County B agree that sentence t t in the 
county is largely limited to guarantees of no state son. 
The formal policy also proscribes c e negot t 
"[T]he only acceptable excuse 
reducing a charge is changed c umstances 
which materially affect the evidence between 
the time the complaint is authorized and the 
time of the trial." 
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Despite the official pol y, both the anal is of the 
case files, and the interviews with dep 
deputy public defenders ind ated that 
di tr attorneys and 
e was 
common practice in County B. The comment of one uty 
defender is exemplary, "two-thirds of the cases see some counts 
dropped in exchange for a plea ... the ass ea bargain" 
Table VI reflects a frequent resort to 
County B, particularly for burglaries, wh 
e a 
of the ea 
bargained cases relied solely on e agreements. Seven of ten 
deputy district attorneys agreed that charge bargaining is the 
predominant form of bargaining in the exper nee. 
The reliance on charge barga i can, again, be 
related to office policy and the practice of judges County B. 
It is clear in the responses of both deputy district attorneys 
and judges in County B that (in the words of a de 
attorney) there is virtually "no sentence bargaini 
district 
except to 
the extent of indicating state prison, or no state prison." A 
judge put the situation succinctly, "in his court a [district 
attorney's] promise of no state prison will be honored, not a 
promise regarding the term." Thus, the conditional plea for no 
prison is the only sentence bargaining option, and a great deal 
of discretion in determining the term and it of 
incarceration is left in the hands of the judge. One County B 
deputy public defender observed that "a conditional plea [of no 
state prison] is not much of a barga II 
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In this circumstance the observat n of another deputy 
publ defender that "the dominant s on 
c es down to the proper l 11 makes sense. 
specific control over the term of incarcerat 
et ting 
ut 
reement 
he 
charges becomes a critical t control over sentence. 
Again, one of the County B terv 
public defender and [the] district at 
the charge." 
sums up the result the 
ly ee on 
Coun C 
In County C the offic 1 sit n of the district 
attorney opposed any of tence arga ing because t is an 
e. As Coun B, deputy infringement on the role of the j 
district attorneys agreed that the of sentence bargaining 
was largely restricted to the conditio ea no state 
prison. "The only thing we bargain sentence b aining s 
whether or not the defendant sho go to state ison or not at 
the time the defendant is sentenced." Two of three judges 
interviewed in County C indicated a re atti e towards 
accepting prosecutors' sentence recommendations. 
that "I do not el that I should g the 
more weight than any of the other 
impose a sentence." The other 
tors I cons er before I 
ated a greater reliance on 
probation reports, arguing that "the probat report has more 
information than the district at s and may be a li tle 
less biased toward the defendant than the dis tr ic attorney is." 
47 
In any case, the apport ities for direct sentence 
bargaining between district attorney and se are 1 i ted 
Table County C, and the analysis of y and b 1 cases 
VI documents a preponderance of c 
in that jurisdiction (41.7%). The 
bargains in cases of robb 
agreements (80.0%). 
Comparison of the Counties 
This preliminary compar 
three counties leads to sever 
--Though a gener II 
county, there is a t d 
practices in different uri 
eements burglar s 
t i of the 
bo 
f arga i 
s. 
and sentence 
"s 
each 
aining 
tween 
es" in 
different crimes, d 
within the same juri 
distr t judges 
B the t 
style of bargaining var s 
and burglaries. In Co B one 
attorney reported that the offi 
only ••• we don't really 
argued that "generally, 
Another example refers 
unt A 
t between robberies 
i tr t 
a "charge 
sentences." Another 
no e aining." 
s 
above, two of three interviewed in 
unty C. As noted 
st y approached 
district attorney sentence recommenda th 
caution. The third ted 11 95% of the 
time" because the prosecutor " more of the facts 
4 
about the case and knows more about the defendant than 
I do ... I like to allow the prosecutor the discretion to 
make the recommendation." 
--Though all counties report some degree of both 
major types of bargaining, district attorney policy and 
judicial practice combine to uce an emphasis on 
sentence bargaining in County A, and on charge 
bargaining in Counties B and c. 
--The different emphasis 
reflects a concommitant dif 
discretion and, therefore, of 
Specifically, direct sentence 
a ing style 
in the focus of 
aining efforts. 
ining between 
prosecution and defense in Counties B and C is limited 
to the conditional plea, so that specif sentence 
negotiations tend to take place between the judge and 
and defendant as to sentence. As stated by one deputy 
district attorney in County B, the "defense attorney 
bargains with the district attorney on charges and the 
judge on sentence." This focus on judicial bargaining 
is seen by some deputy distr t attorneys as an 
usurpation of their prosecutional function. Again, a 
deputy district attorney in County B states the 
prosecutorial case: "[the] most significant type of 
plea bargaining is done by the judge s stituting his 
or her judgement for that of the district attorney ..• 
judges are always substituting ir judgement. 
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District attorney bargaining is where the case should 
be settled." 
Discussion 
This preliminary look at the prevalence and s e of 
plea negotiation in the three counties has produced a p ture of 
the process of resolving burglary and robbery cases ch is at 
odds with the publics' expectation that guilt is determ ed on 
the facts of the case through the deliberat n of a jury of 
peers. Clearly, the jury trial has become a rare e ion for 
the disposition of robbery and burglary crimes. In some 
jurisdictions trials for burgalry were virtual! nonexistent 
during the period of the study. 
Furthermore, a close examination of the ways in which 
plea bargains are fashioned in the three counties does not 
confirm the public's expectations of openness and uniformity in 
the procedures of justice. Between jurisdictions bargains are 
carried out in different ways. Sometimes bargains for sentences 
are more prevalent, and other times bargains focus on charges. 
Similarly, the mix of prosecutorial and judicial discretion in 
striking bargains varies with the bargaining style, and can be an 
object of some jealousy by prosecutors. 
Some obvious questions arise from this preliminary 
description of plea bargaining practices in California. What is 
the impact on the defendant? What are the results for the public 
and their right to protection? If crimes are not being resolved 
50 
through the judgement of juries, what are the factors which shape 
the outcomes of bargained justice? Or, most bas al , how 
dif ent are the results of "negotiated" justice 
results of "adversary" justice through trial by jury? Cha 
III of this report will consider these quest ns. 
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THE RESULTS 
The very term 
Something is being g 
something is being gained. In th 
"terms" of this bargain will 
A first requirement for anal i 
bargains is to describe what is g 
What charge and sentence conce s 
receive? 
s* 
terms of plea 
a v1hat is ga 
fendants actually 
Secondly, an adequate ipt of the terms of the 
bargain must attempt to identi the criter determining 
much will be "given away" for a 
what factors do prosecutors, de 
ea guil In other words, 
and judges se ttor 
consider when deciding what sentence a g 
Finally, an adequate cons erat 
case "deserves"? 
of terms of 
bargaining requires some analysis of 
the participants. The requirement 
relative "advantage 
t criminal charges be 
proven "beyond a reasonable t be a j of peers clearl 
places the burden of upon 
presumption of innocence to the de 
reverse the prosecutor's burden and 
innocence on the defendant? 
2 
prosecut and reserves 
an Does plea bargain 
ace the urd i 
Plea Bargaining and Jury Trials: 
~entencing D1fferentials 
An initial step in scr the res f 
bargaining is to compare the sentences me out thro 
bargains with those resulting from jury tr ls. To 
the comparison, Tables VII, VIII, and IX prov data on 
of sentence, the average period of incarceration for 
and the average percentage of the max at 
received by defendants. 
ea 
nv t 
The average percentage of the maximum sentence is an 
important measure of bargaining "success" and requires further 
explanation. Each of the cases the study was sentenced under 
California's Determinate Sentencing Law which prescribes specific 
mitigated, middle and aggravated sentence terms for each crim 
charge and prescribes additions to this term i tional 
separate charges and enhancements. Thus, it was possible to 
calculate a "maximum" prison term appropriate to the set of 
charges for which each defendant in the study was convicted. The 
disparity between this "authorized" term of arc era tion under 
determinate sentencing and the actual time of incarceration to 
which a defendant was sentenced provides a measure of the 
"leniency" or "severity" of the sentence. The higher the 
percentage of the maximum a defendant receives, the more "severe" 
the sentencing decision. The objective of sentence bargaining by 
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TABLE VII 
--
TYPE OF SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR ROBBERIES 
BY TYPE OF DISPOSITION 
State County Split 
Prison CYA Jail Sentence 
COUNTY A 
Jury Trial 78.6% 0.0% 7.1% 14.3% 
Plea Bargain 35.8% 8.6% 0.0% 45.7% 
Guilty Plea, No Bargain 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
Guilty Plea, Reason Unknown 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
COUNTY B 
Jury Trial 63.6% 18.2% 9.1% 9.1% 
Plea Bargain 39.5% 15.8% 2.6% 34.2% 
Guilty Plea, No Bargain 57.1% 42.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Guilty Plea, Reason Unknown 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 
COUNTY C 
Jury Trial 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Plea Bargain 30.0% 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 
Guilty Plea, No Bargain 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0. 
Guilty Plea, Reason Unknown 0. 0.0% 0% 0.0% 
*Five additional jury trials resulted in acquittal. 
**one additional jury trial resulted in acquitta • 
., 
No.of 
CRC Probation Fine Cases 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14* 
0.0% 8.6% 1.2% 81 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11** 
2.6% 5.3% 0.0% 
0.0% 0 0% 0.0% 7 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4 
0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0. 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 
.. ., 
TABLE VII (Continued} 
TYPE OF SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR BURGLARIES 
BY TYPE OF DISPOSITION 
State County Split No.of 
Prison CYA Jai 1 Sentence CRC Probation Fine Cases 
COUNTY A 
Jury Trial 71.4% 0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7 
Plea Bargain 19.2% 6.4% 1.3% 56.4% 1.3% 15.4% 0.0% 78 
Guilty Plea, No Bargain 57.1% 0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 7 
Guilty Plea, Reason Unknown 42.9% 14.3% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 7 
COUNTY B 
J Trial 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0% 0.0% 1 
ea Bargain 7.2% 3.1% 10. 3.0% 
i 1 Plea, . o. 0 
i1 ea, nown 20. 0.0% 0. 0. 5 
COUNTY C 
Jury Tri 100.0% 0.0% 0% 0.0% 0.0% o. 
ea Bargain 37.8% 0.0% 8. . 0.0% 15.6% 0. 
Guilty Plea, No Bargain 0.0% 0.0% 66. 33.3% 0.0% o. 0.0% 3 
Guilty Plea. Reason Unknown 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0. 100.0% 1 
Average for all cases 
Average for jury trial 
Average for plea bargain 
Average for guilty plea, 
no bargain 
TABLE VIII 
AVERAGE SENTENCES RECEIVED BY TYPE OF DISPOSITION 
IN YEARS OF INCARCERATION 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
2.28yrs • 98yrs 2. 54yrs • 64yrs 
4.70yrs 2. 32yrs 3.69yrs 3. OOyrs 
1.73yrs • 77yrs 2.08yrs • 59yrs 
4.00yrs I. 59yrs 4. 42yrs .39yrs 
COUNTY C 
-
ROBBERY BURGLARY 
--
2. 96yrs 1. 2lyrs 
5. 58yrs 
1.92yrs 1.32yrs 
---- • 50yrs 
Average for 1 cases 
j s 
for olea ns 
eas 
., ., 
TABLE IX 
PERCENTAGE OF MAXIMUM SENTENCE 
{under determinate sentencing) 
RECEIVED AT CONVICTION BY TYPE OF DISPOSITION 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
• 
ROBBERY 
49.3% 
81. 
BURGLARY 
.8% 
ROBBERY 
. 
BURGLARY 
.4% 
43 
COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY 
• 
a defense attorney would be to lower the percentage of the 
maximum that his or her client receives. 
Based on the information these three 
sentencing results of trials and plea bargaining in e 
counties can be profiled. 
County A 
le the 
of the 
Over three-fourths (78.6%) of robbers and nearly as 
many (71.4%) of the burglars who were convicted at jury trial in 
County A received state prison sentences. By contrast those 
robbery defendants who plea bargained received state prison 
sentences less than half as frequently (35.8%), and plea 
bargained burglaries resulted in prison sentences only 19.2% 
of the cases. In no case for either crime d jury convictions 
result in probation only, or in a simple fine. Nearly ten 
percent (9.8%) of the plea bargained robberies and 15.4% of the 
burglaries produced these "no incarceration" sentences. The most 
prevalent plea bargained result, however, was the split sentence. 
Nearly half (45.7%) of the robbers and over half (56.4%) of the 
burglars received county jail time plus probation. By contrast, 
jury trials infrequently resulted in split sentences (14.3% for 
robberies; 28.6% for burglaries). Plea bargains in County A also 
resulted in state prison less often than the small number of 
cases which tendered a guilty plea with no concessions from the 
prosecution (57.1% of the burglaries; 1 of 2 robberies). 
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Differences between jury tr ls and a s 
terms of per of incarceration are 
and burglary cases th conv t 
sentences of 4.7 and 2.3 years, re t 
cases, on the aver e, resulted 
of incarcerat , 1. 7 ars 
burglaries Furthermore, is dif 
simply to more serious conv t c 
because the aver e a case 
approximately half the percen of 
1 
1 lesse 
9 2 
1 cannot 
rece 
sentence that 
y 
s 
resulted from trial. The aver e perc f max 
to 4 
sentence 
rece ed at robbery tr s wa 
barga s. Burglar s rece 
maximum than robber s 
a ly 
di 
0% for ea 
e of 
1, ut i between tr 
and plea barga s ilar 68 4 versus 1.4% . 
tr 
f 
B 
The typical robbery sen re ti 
1 in County B is state prison (63.6 ). 
(18.2%) were sentenced to CYA re ecti 
a jury 
Another one 
the at 
of County B ' s fendants). Ot sentence outcome e 
relatively rare, two of even tr al (9.1 res 
jail term, and another prod a i se tenc 
bargains, by contrast, res tate i 
39 5% of the robbery fendants. Ne as ea 
a coun 
Plea 
cases resulted in split sentences 4. and another 1 8 
res ted CYA terms. 
s 
uth 
A comparison of tr 1 and 
burglaries is diffic t 
included only one jury tr l 
result in a state prison sente 
(7.2%) of the plea barga 
prevalent bargained sentence wa 
split sentence). 
The typical term f i 
a outcomes for 
un B 
sti y, 
one in ten 
n The 
t 
at trial was nearly four f gure 
for robbers who plea barga 
partly a product of a more "sever 
sentence for jury tri ca 
bargained cases). The aver 
bargained cases of b 1 
incarceration 7.1 months 
a state prison sentence of 
maximum for that case. 
County C 
The small number o j 
comparison with barga 
results do provide a per 
outcomes of the predominant ea 
i 
robbery or burglary that wen j 
in a state prison sentence. Le 
bargained robberies (30.0% us 
ial 
a 
enti is 
e o maximum 
ea 
plea 
age term of 
un 
te 
cases 
res ted 
ent 
C makes a 
, but the 
assess the 
Every case of 
unty C resulted 
of the plea 
of the plea 
bargained burglaries (37.8%) to n. The al 
bargained sentence for robber us 
probation (60.0%}. a 
variety of outcomes other s sentences 
(37.8%), probation (15.6%) 
There were four j the 
maximum sentence was handed 
resulting in an average of 
typical plea bargain s; 38. 6% of 
the maximum. This sentenci the 
single burglary trial in the 
Discussion and 
The pattern of iff 
trials and plea bargained ca 
three jurisdictions. The 
less likely to result in a state 
to receive a much "1 h ter 11 
typical case that goes to j 
sentencing "severity" (i.e. 
conviction) is standardi 
potential sentences under de 
be argued that the cases which 
that they represent a 
cases. 
• 
A detailed comparison of the case file information for 
jury trial and plea bargained cases in this study contradicts 
such an argument on two grounds: 
1. Cases went to jury trial which represented the full 
range of fact patterns and fendant characteristics 
which were profiled in Tables I through III. Cases 
tried at jury were not a unique and homogeneous set of 
cases involving particularly severe cr s or 
particularly "hardened" defendants. 
2. Defendants in jury trial cases tended to have high 
probabilities of going to state prison and tended to 
get "stiffer" sentences "across the board" when 
compared to their counterparts who plea bargained. For 
example, in County A the average defendant with four or 
more prior felony convictions in a plea bargained case 
of robbery received 66.2% of the maximum sentence at 
conviction while the typical defendant with no prior 
felonies who plea bargained received a much lighter 
sentence (33.5% of maximum). Defendants with four 
prior felonies who went to jury trial for robbery in 
County A always received the maximum sentence at 
conviction (100.0%), and defendants with no prior 
felony convictions did not receive appreciably lighter 
sentences at jury trial (86.5% of maximum). Sentences 
in jury trials tended to be stiff regardless of the 
particular characteristics of the case. 
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These results were obta ug 
selected crime characterist s ( 
the viet , whe the of nse c r 
personal characteristics of defe ants 
education, his of drug abuse) 
criminal record (i e., number of ony 
whether they faced charges o 
probation at arrest). Res ts 
characteristics were consiste 
between jury tr s and ea arga 
away" by looking at the nature of the cr s 
ist of de ts in 
t e X c ar fies Thus, the 
"terms" of plea b j urisd ct 
ticularly if the res ts f j 
standard. 
As to sentence 
trials, for bo robb 
was state prison. The 
cases was almost always a 
were for robber s Coun 
In both these cases, the 
mo 
urg 
sentence 
it sen 
B and 
i sen 
frequent as a state 
note that in Count 
sentenced to state 
ison term. Fur 
A B the 
ison case of il 
bargain always fe between the h perc 
9 
f 
ta a 
0 
j 
ea 
e 
a 
except 
Coun 
y as 
ants 
jury 
t 
s 
c. 
tant to 
no 
resul ng from 
• 
jury trials and the low percen e assoc ted th a plea 
bargain. This is further ev 
sentences, and that plea 
On the aver age, 
nee that 
a ins 
ea b 
ss t 
trials bring "stiff" 
cases 
f 
e 
each 
arcerat n jurisdiction are sentenced to much 
than cases tried before a jury .59 2. 0 8 ars versus 2.3 to 
5.58 years). In County A the t 
guilty without a bargain was 
cases and those for jury tr 1 case 
outcomes for robbery cases with no 
for one case, were lower than the 
than the plea bargain aver e For no 
a 
tr 
arcera n eas of 
i 
t es B and c the 
guil pleas, except 
1 e, and higher 
ined burglary cases 
the outcomes in County B and C were somet s than the jury 
trial average, and sometimes ea average. 
Plea bargain cases, on the aver e, res t in about 
half the portion of maximum sen nee as tri s the same 
criminal charge (between 31.3% 
100.0%). This is a strong ind 
differential between jury trials 
average percentages of max 
.0% sus 60.0% and 
of the d ee of sentence 
gu 
in County A were midway betwee that 
for trials. Results of nonbarga 
and C were mixed. 
gu 
a cases. Again, 
eas without a bargain 
ea bargains and those 
eas in Counties B 
The above points raise an stion. Given the 
paucity of jury trials in the count s, does sentencing after a 
60 
trial by jury represent an extraord 
Does the obvious greater severi 
represent a penalty for exer i 
of one's peers? 
The observations of 
public defenders and of j s con 
sentenced more severely if t 
plea bargained. The words of one 
judge probably gives a de an 
convicted by a jury." 
differential, however, var s 
of two general orientat 
One view is that str 
conscious act, a recognit 
should be rewarded. Ad 
a view expressed by many t 
counties, "The system coer 
severe sentencing." Another s 
i.e., if you lose you will ge a 
•.• always." Many of the de 
sentencing as "coercion to rc 
several interviewees ob 
the defense that the client l 
a jury trial.9 
9This study was done be 
case of In re Lewallen (1 9) 28 
this kind of court conduct. 
s 
y ree of punishment? 
i at trial 
h a jury 
str t attorneys, d 
ne 
nte 
the same case wi 
a 
it wo be if 
l any 
shment if 
tencing 
wees and takes one 
trial is a 
ea bargaining 
un ty A stated 
ys three 
sults in more 
greatest risk, 
n. The maximum 
f entia! 
II In County C, 
ex i informs 
more severely after 
erne Court 
now prohibits 
Deputy district attorneys also expressed the n 
that some differential sentencing was con us, but tended not 
to see it as "coercive." Rather, they offered 
reasons why leniency in plea barga cases is just 
Prominent among these were a var of comments wh h the 
view that "a plea before trial is a mit ting factor." Mo t 
often, the mitigation was linked to the expressed bel f that "a 
plea shows an acceptance of respons ilit II fess is 
good for the soul." 
A second view of the reasons sentencing 
differentials between plea bargains and jury tr ls emphasizes 
that the differential is a log al product of edur 
differences rather than a conscious dist tion between tr ls 
and barga A deputy district attorney in Coun B ex ssed 
the position most succinctly: 
"Any judge probably gives a de ant more severe 
punishment if conv ted by the j The reason for 
this is that bad ts come out, more ta s come out, 
there's possible perjury by the defendant. Go 
through trial is like living through the crime, as 
opposed to making a decis n on the basis of a 
probation report that is more detac " 
Similar comments were frequent amo de se and 
prosecution attorneys in each county. One ser that the 
judge is influenced by more factors after the trial, i uding 
"defendant attitude and conduct" and "amount of ev ence." 
Another observed that more severe sentences resulted from 
"see[ing] the victim and see[ing] how badly hurt .•. especially in 
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•.. cases with violence. Hard evidence is very emot nal and 
[the] judge reacts to it." 
Judges confirmed the tance of it 
information and greater trial exposure 
differentials between trial and a 
ex a ing sen te 
cases. While most 
argued that they did not explicitly sentence harder s y 
because a defendant goes to tr 1, they d ac 
words of a judge in County C, "I know more abo 
after he goes to trial." Another j e un 
"in trial you learn more about a de ndant .. wh 
a different light and make different cons era 
sentencing." 
defendant 
B arg t 
may put him in 
for 
The frequent mention that addit knowledge and 
exposure to a case through trial results in a stiffer sentence 
raises a serious question. If such add t t n 
results in a more appropriate sentence, than the mass of plea 
bargaining dispositions may be inappropr tely sentenced because 
of the absence of such trial tion the bargaining 
setting. 
In summation the actual sentences hand 
of robbery and burglary, and the observations of 
down in cases 
district 
attorneys, deputy public defenders, and judges, make it ear 
that (for whatever reasons) the de t es a stif 
potential sentence if he goes to trial ra than 
Furthermore, defense attorneys equen tl por tr 
ea bargains. 
is 
"sentence differential" into a fact of life which is relayed to 
6 
the defendant as part of their plea a ing adv e. 
presented here describes just how great a sentence dif 
e data 
nee 
The data there is between cases tried and those ea 
also shows the premise placed on a defendant to give up the 
constitutional to trial. 
Charge Bargaining 
The sentencing differentials documen 
section are most directly produced by otiat 
the prev us 
s between the 
defense and prosecution, or between the defense and the judge 
over the sentence itself. Indeed, the reduced perc~ntage of 
maximum reveals the sentencing advantage of plea bargaining for 
crimes of comparable sentencing severity under the law. However, 
the data in the preceding sections do not adequately reflect the 
process of bargaining charges, wh h may go on throughout the 
progress of a case in the justice system. Charges are initially 
recommended with respect to a given case the police arrest 
report. The process of determining iate charges, however, 
can be complex, and charges are revised at subsequent points. 
The district attorney has the reponsibility and authority to 
determine the official charges in a case, there is no obligation 
to accept the recommendations in the peace officer's report. 
The initial prosecutor's charges are filed in a 
complaint in the municipal court. If the case is bound over to 
superior court, another and possibly revised set of charges is 
filed at information. The revision of charges between complaint 
64 
and information is at the discretion of the prosecutor, subject 
to the evidence presented at the prelim hearing. Finally, 
the charges against a defendant be a revised tween 
filing of the information and convict Revision at this s e 
must be agreed to by the court, though they are routinely 
accepted. Thus, there are ample oppourtunities for agreement to 
be reached on a revised set of 
conviction. 
es between arrest 
.In many cases it is difficult to ifically predict 
the effect of charge revisions on the sentence the defendant will 
ultimately receive. Additional counts, for example, may or may 
not result in consecutive sentences, and as has been shown in the 
preceding section, charges with the same maximum sentence under 
the determinate sentencing law may result in actual sentences 
which vary substantially. 
The revision of charges, however, clearly will shape 
the overall limits of the potential sentence a defendant 
receives, and it is essential to describe the ways in which 
charges are revised through plea bargains, if the process is to 
be fully understood. Acordingly, the Joint Committee staff has 
gathered and analyzed information on the revision of charges in 
three ways: (1) through the addition or dismissal of counts of 
the primary charge (robbery or burglary); (2) through the 
dropping of the primary charge and the substitution of another 
charge; and (3) through the adding and dropping of charges other 
than the primary charge of robbery or burglary. 
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~argaining Counts 
Table X provides a summary display of the revision of 
the total number of counts of robbery or burglary that were 
charged to the defendants in this study at successive stages in 
their progress through the justice system To clarify the mean 
of the data display, robberies in County A can be followed as an 
example. One hundred and eight counts of robbery were ind ated 
as charges at arrest for the 8 robbery defendants where a case 
was disposed of through a plea barga Coun A. Sixteen of 
these were not carried forward to the charges filed in the 
complaint by the district attorney, and 18 new counts which did 
not appear on the police reports the defendants were added at 
the complaint stage. A few of these additions resulted in 
defendants being charged with robbery at complaint who had not 
been charged with robbery at arrest. Most of the additions and 
deletions, however, represented adjustments in cases with 
multiple counts of robbery at arrest. Overall, about as many 
counts were added as dropped, resulting in little overall change 
(+1.9%) in the number of counts of robbery which were recommended 
in the reports and the number filed at complaint. 
When charges were again filed at information in 
superior court, the district attorney included nine additional 
counts of robbery within the charges on these cases, and 8 of the 
counts present at the complaint were not filed at information. 
Again, though there were changes in the number of counts for a 
minority of cases, there was virtually no change in the total 
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A 
( 
{ 
Robbery (No.= ) 
Burglary (No. ) 
WI 
TABLE X 
TOTAL COUNTS OF ROBBERY OR BURGLARY THAT WERE ADDED 
OR DROPPED IN PLEA BARGAINED CASES IN THREE COUNTIES 
# of 
Counts 
at 
12 
48 
#of 
Counts 
Added at 
Complaint 
11 
3 
# of 
Counts 
Dropped 
at 
Co~ 
2 
% Change 
from 
Arre 
to 
. 
0 
14. 
i nt 
#of 
Counts 
Added at 
Information 
3 
5 
9 
# of % Change 
Counts from 
Dropped Complaint 
at to 
I ion Information 
8 
+ 
+ 
"' • 
IJ\BLE X ... _(C_o_nt i_nued) 
TOTAL COUNTS OF ROBBERY OR BURGLARY THAT WERE ADDED 
OR DROPPED IN PLEA BARGAINED CASES IN THREE COUNTIES 
# of 
# of Counts % Change # of 
Counts Dropped Information Counts 
Added at at to at 
Conviction Conviction Conviction Conviction 
COUNTY A 
Robbery (No.==81) 0 37 -33.3% 74 
Burglary (No.==79) 0 9 - 9.9% 82 
COUNTY B 
Robbery (No.=38) 0 19 -30.6% 43 
Burglary (No.=103) 0 56 -43.8% 90 
COUNTY C 
Robbery (No.=10) 0 13 -76.5% 5 
Burglary (No.=45) 7 -27.0% 27 
• 
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As discussed above, there was some and downward 
adjustment of counts of the d str t attorney for 
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evidence of wholesale "piling on" 
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in plea bargained cases takes 
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Nearly all of the plea bargained cases in County C had 
only one count of the primary charge of robbery or burglary 
indicated the peace officers 
robbery cases between arrest and in 
of robbery were added. 
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t The y adjustment 
tion was upward, 5 counts 
Over three-fourths (76.5%) of the robbery counts were 
dropped before the defendant plead guil to the conv tion 
charges. Indeed, in 7 of the 10 plea ined cases of 
in County C, the single count of robbery was dropped and the 
defendant was sentenced on an alternate e. 
y 
There is a steady, but sl ht decrease in the n er of 
burglary counts at complaint and information in Coun c. Just 
over one-fourth (27.0%) of the burgl counts c ed at 
information were dropped before a guilty plea was tendered, and 
the great majority of these were single burglary counts which 
were eliminated from the conviction charge. 
the dropping of counts in single count cases 
Thus, in County C, 
is common, with the 
result usually being the substitution of another charge for the 
primary charge of robbery or burglary. 
Comparison of the Counties 
This analysis of bargaining for count supports several 
conclusions: 
--Prosecutors do not significantly reduce or change the 
recommended counts in the police charge in any of the 
counties. There is some minor adjustment of counts 
at complaint and at information, but it does not 
significantly change the charges which de ndants 
face. Only for robberies in County C is there a 
notable increase in counts between arrest 
information. 
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--In each of the Counties a substanti 1 number of the 
counts filed at information were d be 
conviction. The rcen e e for 
burglaries in County A, a findi wh 
with County A1 s policy of sentence 
is consistent 
than charge bargaining. However counts were 
dropped for robberies in County A about as 
as in the other counties. 
--When a distinction is drawn between d i 
, ra 
one or 
some counts in a multiple count case, dropping 
the only count of the pr charge, the practices 
y 
of the counties are more clearly dif ent ted. In 
County C, most instances of dropping a count resulted 
in the elimination of the robbery or burglary charge; 
in County A nearly half of the reductions in robbery 
counts eliminated the charge, but v tually all of 
the burglary reductions applied simply to multiple 
counts of burglary. Given that eliminating the 
primary charge has a more direct relation to reducing 
the potential sentence than does the el ination of 
multiple counts, bargaining counts is most productive 
as a plea bargaining strategy in County C, and least 
productive for burglaries in County A. 
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~gaining The Primary Charge 
Each of the cases in the s 
most serious charge for the inc ent 
a burglary. One objective of charge 
was selected because the 
st n was a y or 
, then, could be 
to substitute some lesser e the ery or burg y 
charge. In the preceding discuss the ing of pr 
t es 
In this 
counts was described for cases 
cases in which the primary c 
section, cases in which the primary e was el ina ted through 
a plea bargain will be analy in ter 
COUNTY A 
In County A, over one-fi th of 
with robbery at information eventually 
tail. 
se defendants charged 
gu ty to some 
charge other than robbery. 
resulted from these plea bargains 
es at conv tion which 
summari below: 
Felony Assault (245 PC), 7 cases 
Burglary (459 PC), 4 cases 
Grand Theft (487 PC), 2 cases 
Extortion ( 518 PC), 1 case 
Trespass (602 PC), 1 case 
Vehicle Theft (10851 PC}, 
Possession of a Control 
(11350 PC), l case 
7 
case 
tance 
• 
Of the ea a 
0 y two ead to a primary c 
conv t n charges were: 
Accessory to a 
sorderly Conduct 
County B 
those fendants 
information, over one four 
charge: 
cases 
ot 
y 3 
(64 PC 
plead guil 
Grand Theft (484 PC), 7 case 
Acces to Felony 3 
ed 
b 
to 
2 ca s 
Felony Es ( 532 PC), 1 case 
urgl 
Nearly one-th 
th burglary at informat 
the ea a case 
were sentenced on a dif 
pr y charge: 
Receiving Stolen ty ( 4 96 , 9 
Theft (484 PC), 8 cases 
Attempted lary (664/45 PC), 2 cases 
Arson (447 PC), 1 case 
Trespass (602 PC), 1 case 
Vandalism (594 PC), 1 case 
Battery (242 PC), 1 case 
se 
These 
y 
t 
Drunk Driving Resulting in Injury (23102 PC), 1 case. 
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Nearly three-fourths of the ea 
charged with robbery at formation resul 
another charge: 
Burglary (459 PC), 3 cases 
Grand Theft (487 PC), 3 cases 
conv t ns to 
Petty Theft, with a prior (666 PC), 1 case 
One-third the plea bargained cases charged with 
burglary at information resulted in a guilty plea to another 
charge: 
Receiving Stolen ty (496 PC), 9 cases 
Vehicle Theft (10851 PC), 3 cases 
Petty Theft, priors (666 PC), 1 case 
Battery (242 PC), 1 case 
Trespass (602.5 PC), 1 case 
Comparison of the Counties 
The above data document a greater reliance on charge 
bargaining in Counties B and C. In both counties at least 
one-fourth of the cases which were resolved by a plea bargain and 
had a primary charge of either robbery or b lary at formation 
resulted in a guilty plea to another charge. Each county used 
certain substitute charges most frequently. For robbery, County 
B substituted grand theft; County C substit burg y or 
theft. For burglary, both counties frequently allowed a charge 
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of receiving stolen property, and Coun 
number of pleas to theft. 
B ace a substantial 
County A virtually never eas uced 
charges for burglary, but d acce eas to some ing 
other than robbery in approximately one 
of that crime. The most common acce 
ained cases 
was felony assa t, 
a more serious charge than grand theft, which was 
often substituted for robbery in Co t 
crime most 
Bargaining Additional Charges and Enhancements 
Many cases involve 
primary charge of robbery or b 
by additional charges for dif 
tiple 
1 
ent cr 
es. 
could 
In our study a 
been accompanied 
ich occurred 
simultaneously. Indeed, the sec tor has considerable 
discretion in construing the ts f a case so that a var ty of 
criminal charges may be justif a sing inc ent. More 
than half of the cases in the study 
information. 
more than one charge at 
Table XI provides a file of the numbers of 
additional charges to the primary charge of robbery or burglary 
which were filed at success e progress of plea 
bargained cases from arrest to conv t in County A. 
Additional charges are categori according to whether they 
consist of a prior felony , an ncement of another 
type, a felony, or a misdemeanor. Enhancements have a 
particularly direct relation to sentencing outcomes because they 
carry a specific "enhanced" pri n term under California's 
Determinate Sentencing Law. Thus, conv t 
75 
on an enhancement 
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TABLE XI 
CHARGES ADDITIONAL TO A PRIMARY CHARGE OF ROBBERY OR 
BURGLARY THAT WERE ADDED OR DROPPED IN PLEA BARGAINED 
CASES BETWEEN ARREST AND CONVICTION IN COUNTY A 
ARREST TO COMPLAINT COMPLAINT TO INFORMATION 
% Change % Change 
# of from #of from 
Charges # Added # Dropped Arrest Charges # Charges Complaint 
TYPE OF at at at to Added at Dropped at to 
ADDITIONAL CHARGE Arrest Complaint Complaint Complaint Information Information Information 
For a Primary 
Charge of Robbery 
(No.=81) 
Prior Felonies 0 3 0 * 7 0 +233.3% 
Enhancements 0 27 0 * 17 5 + 44.4% Felonies 36 17 14 + 8.3% 27 6 + 58.3% 
Misdemeanors 25 3 15 -48.0% 2 1 + 7.7% 
For a Primary 
Charge of Burglary 
(No.=79) 
Prior Felonies 0 7 0 * 2 3 - . Enhancements 0 2 0 * 1 0 + 50. Felonies 20 7 15 -40.0% 0 5 - 41.7% 
Misdemeanors 55 11 11 0.0% 3 - 40.0% 
*No percentage improvement because charges were fi filed at this point. 
• 
TABLE XI (Continued) 
CHARGES ADDITIONAL TO A PRIMARY CHARGE OF ROBBERY OR 
BURGLARY THAT WERE ADDED OR DROPPED IN PLEA BARGAINED 
CASES BETWEEN ARREST AND CONVICTION IN COUNTY A 
TYPE OF ENHANCEMENT 
For Primary Charge 
of Robbery: 
PC§ 12022(a) 
Armed with a Weapon 
PC§ 12022(b) 
Use of a Deadly Weapon 
PC§ 12022.5 
Use of a Firearm 
PC§ 12022.7 
Great Bodily Injury 
For a Primary Charge 
of Burglary: 
PC§ 12022(a) 
Armed with a Weapon 
PC§ 12022{b) 
Use of a Deadly Weapon 
I PC§ 12022.5 
Use of a Firearm 
TABLE XII 
DETAILED ENHANCEMENT CHARGES 
AT INFORMATION AND CONVICTION 
IN COUNTY A 
# OF CHARGES # OF CHARGES 
AT DROPPED AT 
INFORMATION CONVICTION 
( 8) { 5) 
(16) ( ) 
(15) ( 9) 
( 3) ( 3) 
( 1) ( 0) 
( 1) ( 1) 
( 1) ( 1) 
% OF CHARGES 
DROPPED AT 
CONVICTION 
62.5% 
81.3% 
60.0% 
100.0% 
0.0% 
100.0% 
100.0% 
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translates directly into time in state prison. Table XII details 
the types of enhancements which are d pr to a bargained 
plea of guilty in County A. es II and XIV e charge 
and enhancement information for Coun 
provide charge and enchancement 
County A 
The pattern of bargaini 
B. 
t 
addit 
enhancements in County A dif s sub ta 
for bargaining counts. Charges 
and dropped) by the prosecution at 
s XV and XVI 
for County c. 
and 
the pattern 
y adjusted (added 
e of the process. 
In the case of er most common additional 
so s. Though the charges recommended by the pol e were 
total number of felony charges filed the district attorney at 
complaint did not substant 1 differ 
recommended by the police (+8.3%), 1 ov 
the police charges were dropped or 
With respect to misdemeanors, a 1 er en 
dropped by the prosecution so that there were 
number 
one-th (38.8%) of 
prosecution. 
e (60.0%) were 
y half as many 
misdemeanors charged at compla t as were charged at arrest in 
robbery cases. Enhancements are not in the police 
report in County A, but a significant number of enhancements (27) 
were filed by the prosecution at a t. 
The numbers of ts (+44 4%) and additional 
felonies (+58.3%) charged at formation nearly doubles from 
those charged in the complaint. Typically, pr felony charges 
were also added at information. 
misdemeanor charges. 
76 
e was v tually no change in 
itional es and 
the b ined 
sdemeanors and 
The pattern of adding 
enhancements is reversed between 
plea of guilty. Over two-th s 
nearly two-thirds (59.3%)of the 
charges to which the de ndant 
were not t of the 
ad 
of the prior felony enhancements were 
over two-thirds (64.3%) all 
The tendency to 
County A's preference for sentence 
County's district attorney cons 
be a form of direct sentence 
about the impact of determ 
law intends to guarantee tha 
receive longer prison terms if 
convictions, or if they use 
Ironically, in County A these 
are very likely to be 
of bargaining. The direct at 
to state prison time makes them 
prosecution. 
a 
sen 
rsons 
Table XII provides greater 
enhancement bargaining. For a 
most common of the enhancement 
weapon" (12022[b] PC). Over three-
f 
ur 
Fur 
a 
, all but one 
convict 
were 
is tent 
because this 
and 
th 
ements to 
However, questions 
are raised. The 
comrn t felony crimes 
t , etc. 
tend prison terms 
n the process 
se enhancement charges 
tools for the 
tail descr ing 
c 
wa 
robbery, the 
use of a deadly 
81 3%) of se 
charges were dropped tween t n t n. All 
the "great bodily injur ts were d nearly 
I 
two-thirds (62.5%) of the" th a ements were 
dropped; and 60% of the "use of a f ha not 
part of the g 1 ea. 
The pattern of barga ing addi n 
enhancements for burg s Coun A s 
the pattern for robberies. S y , the grea 
t than 
f 
additional charges filed 
are misdemeanors. Forty 
recommended by the pol 
the di tr t attor 
ent of the 
e were not f 1 
felony and misdemeanor charges were red ed 
it 
between complaint and information. nally, 
rema ing felony (83.3%) and m anor 
s 
a Bo 
ano r 4 % 
ar y all of the 
c 
plead to by defendants. 
felon s (66.6%) that were c 
before conviction. 
enhancemen (l 0. 
were not 
pr r 
eliminated ed at t 
In summation, a c of Coun 
A, substantial numbers of fel em en s are 
added at complaint and information. great majori of se, 
particularly enhancements, are el a plea of 
guilty is taken. For b lar s there is a ste decrease 
the number of add i tiona! felonies 
conviction. The few enhancements 
eliminated before the plea of guilty. 
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mi emeanors from arrest to 
t are ed are largely 
County B 
Peace officers in County B r ed enhancement 
charges as well as felony and misdemeanor e e XIII). 
These charges were filed largely unc ed by the prosecut at 
complaint. A number of prior fe es were also ed by 
the prosecution at complaint. A number of pr lony c 
were added by the prosecution at the tion there were 
minor additions of enhancements, o s and 
misdemeanors. 
Most of the additional charges which are included at 
information are plead to by the defendants in plea bargained 
cases of robbery. Indeed, there is an act increase 6.4%) 
in the number of misdemeanors plead to over the number charged at 
information (largely representing the substitution of misdemeanor 
charges for more serious fel charges). The numbers of 
additional felony charges and enhancements were reduced prior to 
pleas of guilty in bargained cases; 27.3% of the felony charges 
were dropped, one-fourth of the enhancements and one-third of the 
prior felonies were dropped. 
Table XIV details the pattern of dropped enhancements. 
Eleven percent of the "deadly weapon" enhancements were dropped; 
and thirty percent of the "firearm" enhancements were dropped. 
The majority of addit nal charges filed at complaint 
in burglary cases are for mi emeanors. Both misdemeanor and 
felony charges for burglaries at complaint are largely unchanged 
from the recommendations in the police report. There is some 
increase in the number of felonies filed at format (+17.6%) 
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TYPE OF 
ADDITIONAL 
a Primary 
of 
or relon es 
Enhancements 
onies 
Misdemeanors 
For a Primary 
Charge Burglary 
(No.=98) 
Prior Felonies 
Enhancements 
Felonies 
Misdemeanors 
.. 'IIIII • • 
TABLE XI II 
CHARGES ADDITIONAL TO A PRIMARY CHARGE OF ROBBERY OR 
BURGLARY THAT WERE ADDED OR DROPPED IN PLEA BARGAINED 
CASES BETWEEN ARREST AND CONVICTION IN COUNTY B 
ARREST TO COMPLAINT COMPLAINT TO INFORMATION 
# of 
Charges 
at 
Arrest 
1 
0 
1 
18 
59 
No. 
Added at 
~omplain_!_ 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2 
No. 
Dropped 
at 
Complaint 
1 
2 
1 
2 
0 
0 
2 
6 
% Ch-ange 
from 
Arrest 
to 
Compla nt 
0. 
- 5. 
+ .0% 
- 14 
0.0% 
0.0% 
- 11.1% 
- 6.8% 
# Charges 
Added at 
Information 
5 
3 
1 
2 
7 
0 
8 
9 
# Charges 
Dropped 
Information 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
5 
% Change 
from 
Complaint 
to 
Information 
.0% 
+ 1 • 
9.1% 
+ 16 
0.0% 
+ 17.6% 
- 5.5% 
*No percentage improvement because charges were first fil at this point. 
TYPE OF ADDITIONAL CHARGE 
For a Primary Charge of 
Robbery (No.=38) 
Prior Felonies 
Enhancements 
Felonies 
Misdemeanors 
For a Primary Charge of 
Burglary (No.=98) 
Prior Felonies 
Enhancements 
Felonies 
Misdemeanors 
• 
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TABLE XIII (continued) 
CHARGES ADDITIONAL TO A PRIMARY CHARGE OF ROBBERY OR 
BURGLARY THAT WERE ADDED OR DROPPED IN PLEA BARGAINED 
CASES BETWEEN ARREST AND CONVICTION IN COUNTY B 
# of Charges 
Added at 
Conviction 
0 
0 
2 
7 
0 
0 
6 
13 
INFORMATION TO CONVICTION 
# of Charges 
Dropped at 
Conviction 
2 
5 
5 
3 
2 
1 
11 
26 
% Change 
Information 
to 
Conviction 
- 33.3% 
- 25.0% 
- 27.3% 
+ 36.4% 
- 28.6% 
-100.0% 
- 26.3% 
- 25.0% 
# of Charges 
at 
Conviction 
4 
15 
9 
11 
5 
0 
39 
TYPE OF ENHANCEMENT 
For a Primary Charge 
of Robbery: 
PC§ 12022(a) 
Armed with a Weapon 
PC§ 12022(b) 
Use of a Deadly 
Weapon 
PC§ 12022.5 
Use of a Firearm 
For a Primary Charge 
of Burglary: 
PC§ 12022.5 
Use of a Firearm 
TABLE XIV 
DETAILED ENHANCEMENT CHARGES 
AT INFORMATION AND CONVICTION 
IN COUNTY B 
# OF CHARGES # OF CHARGES 
AT AT 
INFORMATION CONVICTION 
( 1) ( 1) 
( 9) ( 1) 
(10) ( 3) 
( 1} ( 1) 
% OF 
DROPPED 
CONVICTION 
100. 
11.1% 
30. 
100 0% 
• 
and a slight decrease in the number of misdemeanors 5 5%). 
Some prior felony charges were also f at t 
Approximately one-fourth of the pr 
additional felony, and misdemeanor c 
information were eliminated ior to the ea of g 
bargained cases. Thus, as with robberies, 
burglary cases in County B did not result 
elimination of additional charges or pr 
ea barga i 
the who esa e 
fe c 
(enhancements were virtually absent for burglary cases). 
County C 
at 
ea 
Only ten ea barga cases of robbery are nc uded 
in the data set for County C, but a pattern of adjustment in 
charges other than the primary charge is still evident. Most of 
the addit nal charges filed in robbery cases were felon s or 
enhancements. The number of additional onies c ed at 
information was double the number filed at complaint. Between 
information and conviction, however, half of the it 
felony charges were dropped. Similarly, ten enhancement es 
were added at information, and 80% of these were dropped before 
conviction. Three prior felony charges were added at 
information, and two of these were dropped at convict Only 
one of the robbery defendants was charged with an additional 
misdemeanor at information, and this charge was dropped before 
the plea of guilty. 
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TABLE XV 
CHARGES ADDITIONAL TO A PRIMARY OF ROBBERY OR 
BURGLARY THAT WERE ADDED OR DROPPED IN PLEA BARGAINED 
CASES BETWEEN ARREST AND CONVICTION IN COUNTY C 
ARREST TO COMPLAINT COMPLAINT TO INFORMATION 
% Change % Change 
# of No. from # Charges from 
Charges No. Dropped Arrest # Charges Dropped Complaint 
TYPE OF at Added at at to Added at at to 
ADDITIONAL CHARGE Arrest Complaint Complaint Complaint Information Information Information 
For a Primary 
Charge of Robbery 
(No.=10) 
Prior Felonies 0 0 0 0.0% 3 0 * 
Enhancements 0 0 0 0.0% 10 0 * 
Felonies 3 4 0 +133.3% 7 0 + .0% 
Misdemeanors 0 0 0 0.0% 0 1 * 
For a Primary 
Charge of Burglary 
(No.=47) 
Prior Felonies 0 1 0 * 4 1 +400. 
Enhancements 0 0 0 * 0 0 o. 
Felonies 6 0 3 - 50.0% 1 0 + . 
Misdemeanors 16 10 5 + 31.3% 8 2 + 
*No percentage improvement se charges were filed at this point. 
TABLE XV {Continued} 
CHARGES ADDITIONAL TO A PRIMARY CHARGE OF ROBBERY OR 
BURGLARY THAT WERE ADDED OR DROPPED IN PLEA BARGAINED 
CASES BETWEEN ARREST AND CONVICTION IN COUNTY C 
INFORMATION TO CONVICTION 
% Change 
# of Charges # of Charges Information # of Charges 
Added at Dropped at to at 
TYPE OF ADDITIONAL CHARGE Conviction Conviction Conviction Conviction 
For a Primary Charge of 
Robbery (No.=10) 
Prior Felonies 0 2 - 66.6% 1 
Enhancements 0 8 - 80.0 0 
Felonies 1 7 - 50.0 7 
Misdemeanors 0 1 -100.0 0 
For a Primary Charge of 
Burglary (No.=47) 
Prior Felonies 1 2 - 50.0% 3 
Enhancements 0 0 0.0 0 
Felonies 0 1 - 25.0 3 
Misdemeanors 1 10 - 33.3 
TYPE OF ENHANCEMENT 
For Primary Charge of 
Robbery: 
PC§l2022{a) 
Armed with a Weapon 
PC§ 12022.5 
Use of a Firearm 
# OF 
AT 
INFORMATI 
( 6 
( 4) 
XVI 
( 6) 
( 3} 
% OF CHARGES 
DROPPED AT 
CONVICTION 
100.0% 
75.0% 
For b lary cases 
the primary charge were 
cases, 
ea jor 
anor In 
es 
rea sed 
tween one 
itional m 
sdemeanors and 
e ht 
ur 
information were not part 
es were filed 
o the it 
t 
No enhancements were 
One-
c ed 
es. 
cases 
Coun 
of 
C, with the except ts. Half 
se were conv t 
ison of the Count 
A comparison of Count s B 
substant ly dif patterns of barga 
and enhancements. 
--County A changes ace off er c 
County B the least. The same 
changing of charges between 
information. This is t 
cases. With the exce 
ly true of 
and misdemeanors for burg cases, addi 
most 
s for 
charges 
charges are not substantially alter tween arrest 
and information in County B. 
--In County A the rev ion of felony charges and 
enhancements for robbery cases resulted in a 
significant increase in the total number of 
81 
additional charges facing defendants 
the information was filed. Thus, 
the time 
robbery 
defendants in County A could 
additional charges signif antl 
e gone to tr 1 th 
greater than those 
--In County C, similar patterns appeared for felon s 
and enhancements in robbery cases and 
misdemeanors in b lary cases. 
--In Counties A and c, the great majority of additional 
charges and enhancements are not plead to at 
conviction in plea barga cases. This is true 
even of the many charges which have been added by the 
prosecutor since arrest. Thus, what was added is 
dropped before the plea of guilty~ In County B, 
fewer charges are added and a small percentage are 
dropped before the plea of guilty. 
Discussion and Summary of Charge Bargaining 
The preceding discussion of count, primary charge, 
additional charge, and enhancements bargaining amply demonstrates 
the myriad of options which are open to the participants in plea 
bargaining. It is also clear that charge bargaining in some form 
occurs in every jurisd tion, even in County A, wh h has an 
announced policy of sentence bargaining, but no charge 
bargaining. However, some overall conclusions can be drawn. 
82 
• 
First, while there lo of "movement" with respect 
to adjusting c s robbery case and , the 
ef t of this barga on sen s 
complicated by a number of f tors. 
--First, count a A 
principally addit counts i e count 
cases. There is less substitut ss r us 
charge for single counts 
when there substitut n i 
relatively ser us c of 
than "grand theft" as the 
burglary, i v ly 
charges the pr 
--For charge and enhancement 
counties many of the c 
been added by 
Indeed, virtually 1 
enhancements are eliminated 
--In County A there an 
bargaining tends to 
sentencing outcome less direc 
set of c s a conv 
II 
e 
e, 
the 
a sa t f " rather 
ther unties. For 
stitu of 
a 
have 
nee arrest. 
s 
r u 1 
on sentence 
t 
related to exact 
Some characteristics of charge bargaining in County A 
are not repeated in the other counties which do not have the 
complete sentence bargaining of Coun A. (Coun permits a 
conditional plea based on the amount of time of incarceration, as 
well as place of incarceration.) Counties Band C permit a plea 
based on state prison, no state prison, but rarely accept a ea 
for a specific length of incarceration. In Count s B and C the 
substitution of lesser charges for a si le count of robbery or 
burglary is more common. Furthermore, in County B there is 
neither a wholesale addition of charges and enhancements, nor a 
precipitous dropping of charges before conviction. 
The lack of complete sentence bargaining in Counties B 
and C makes charge bargaining a more important focus for 
meaningful plea negotiation, and the data bears that out. 
Interestingly·, the number of counts of the pr y charge plus 
additional charges and enhancements which were dropped at 
conviction in County A was largely a function of number of 
counts and additional charges at rmat Thus only 20% of 
the cases in County A still retain more than one charge at 
conviction; only 5.7% more than two charges. The situation in 
County B is different. In cases of burglary, there is some 
tendency for defendants who face more charges and counts at 
information to "do better" in gett counts and charges dropped, 
though this tendency is not as strong as Coun A. For 
robberies in County B, however, there is v tually no relation 
between the number of counts and additional c s at 
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I 
information and the number . Thus, County B defendants 
ead to mul t e c s 36.5% were conv ted more frequently 
of more than one e; .2 more than two) Coun y 
one represents an intermediate case 26.9% 
charge; 6.0% to more than two). 
To briefly restate, e 
ad to more 
ing County A 
usually results in pleas to a sing charge, most often 
or burglary, (80% of the cases were co ted f or 
burglary; the comparable f ures in Counties B and C are 76% and 
61% respectively). In this sense, the a that sentence 
bargaining is the important of aining Coun A is 
true. Given this, 
' 
a uc al quest is raised. Why 
all of adjustment of charges, tic arly the case of 
robbery? Nine of ten publ de ers Coun A argue 
that the adjustment of es at a t format n 
represented substanti overc ing due to it al ace 
officer pressure, and to coerce eas. There was a 1 
defender consensus that th pract makes advis 
more difficult. ( " Th is is a te r r i b 1 e que s t ion 
one's client 
a de nse 
attorney.") Such pract s it er the defendant to 
understand what is going on, yet, since "the charges scare the 
hell out of them (when) t are locked a hel ess", more 
plead because of the greater risk 
a judge or jury. 
y face at the uncertainty of 
De~~!mining the Results 
Many of the robbery and burglary defendants the 
three counties plead guilty to a of counts and 
charges in return for a promise of no state prison, or a 
reduction in the length of arcerat n as compared to the 
sentence they could receive under Cali nia's Determ te 
Sentencing Law. The extent to which a given de ant reali 
these objectives depended on the " " t ed between 
defense counsel and the prosecutor and on what prosecution 
was willing to "give up" in exchange for a ea of guilty. In 
this section of the report the is uses on factors 
which are related to what the secution gave up, and what the 
defendants gained in bargained pleas of guilty The question 
approached two perspectives. First, de 
attorneys and deputy public defenders were 
they "evaluate" a case for plea bargain 
distr t 
to ate how 
That , what 
factors they take into consideration in termin what the plea 
agreement should be. Second, a statistical analys was 
undertaken to determine the best pred tors of the centage of 
maximum sentence at conv tion that the defendant received, and 
of the probability that a defendant went to state prison. 
Considerations of the Partie ts 
Prosecuting and defense attorneys are the central 
negotiators in determining a plea barga Since a ing 
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an informal system of ex 
exact nature of a a in, 
e th 
the outcome 
situation will be at least par 
"expectations" of t i 
"worth" and, therefore, 
When asked to s 
entered into this decis 
and deputy public defenders 
i 
considerations in ur major ar 
1. The nature and ser 
The partie ts 
incidence of v nee 
the involvement dr 
premeditation; o 
ser us the cr was. 
2. The defendant's cr 
3. 
A second maj 
convictions; whe 
arrest; whether the 
pending ; and the 
cooperation/rehab itat n. 
Participants also ment 
related to the de 
those 
d 
tors 
87 
set" rules governing the 
t 
ns 
h 
tors 
son a 
ular barga ing 
f ure the case is 
excha e 
that 
f a weapon; 
to 
st 
at 
es 
of 
y 
t s 
mental state, age, history of employment, negative 
impacts of incarceration (e.g., loss of job), and 
finally, the defendant's statement of guilt or 
innocence. 
4. Stre th of the case and other al issues. 
Finally, participants consider "chances of 
winning." They specified concerns about 
availability/credibility of witnesses, the strength of 
the other side's case, and the i of legal 
motions. 
These factors were volunteered by prosecut and defense 
attorneys in each juri 
emphases. 
County A 
tion 
In County A over one-
district attorneys specified 
to the nature of the crimes. 
ut 
most 
general "threat to society" represen 
specifically, the presence of phys 
considered important. The next most 
somewhat different 
of the tors that deputy 
ua ng a case were related 
concern was the 
by incident. More 
violence and injury were 
t concern (23.4% of 
the criteria mentioned) was the defendant's ior criminal 
record, and particularly, evidence of recid ism. 
Of less importance to the deputy district attorneys in 
County A were factors related to 
character (12.8%), and the s 
defendant's sonal 
th of the case (8.5%). 
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The defense prioritized its considerations in a very 
different way. The strength of the case and the evidence, 
particularly the strength of the other side's case, were most 
frequently mentioned (44.1% of the criteria mentioned). Of 
distinctly less importance were factors related to the 
defendant's criminal background (14.7%), the defendant's personal 
characteristics (11.8%) and the nature/seriousness of the crime 
(11.8%). Percentages do not add to 100 because some responses 
were idiosyncratic, or were not codable within these categories. 
County B 
Deputy distr t attorne County B tended to mention 
the seriousness of the crime and its threat to society as the 
most important considerations in determining what would be an 
acceptable plea bargain (30.6%). Very nearly as important, 
however, were factors related to the strength of the case and the 
evidence (27.8%}. In addition to these major areas of 
consideration, a small minority (16.7%) referred to the 
defendant's criminal history. 
Deputy public defenders in County B expressed a variety 
of considerations, but focused on the strength of the case, 
particularly the oppositions case. About one-third (32.3%) of 
the criteria volunteered by the defenders related to the legal 
and evidentiary considerations for winning. The second most 
important set of criter (22.5%) related to the defendant's 
criminal record. Factors relating to the seriousness of the 
89 
crime (12.9%) and the defendant's personal character (12.9%) were 
mentioned much less frequently. Even here the focus was often on 
the affect of personal character on the 1 1 f 
As one defender noted, the importance of the defendant s demeanor 
is largely in the "ability to invoke the j 
County C 
Both prosecuting and defense at ys Co C most 
frequently mentioned factors related to str of the case and 
the likelihood of winning in court (25.7% and 45 
respectively). The stronger their case, the more the defense 
would demand, and the less the prosecution would g up to stay 
out of court. For the prosecution, the next most frequently 
mentioned factors related to the nature of the crime and the 
degree of its threat to soc (22.9%); foll 
defendants criminal background (17.1%). Prosecutors d not 
frequently consider the defendant's per 
Deputy public defenders in Co 
counties, focused on the stength of the case, 
characteristics. 
C, as the other 
ticularly the 
opposition's case. Seriousness of the cr , def ant's 
criminal history, and defendant's personal character, were given 
about equal, but distinctly secondary importance {13.6%). 
Discussion and Summary 
These self-reported considerat ns for selecting an 
appropriate bargained settlement reveal some important 
90 
• 
• 
distinctions between the perspect es f 
attorneys, differences which refl t the 
secutors and defense 
spect es 
the criminal justice system. Prose utor tended more on 
the nature of the crime, or how ser us a threat to soc was 
the defendant's act. They also tended to ace greater relative 
focus on the defendant 1 s crim 
public defenders. 
his than did the 
The underlying tance of se cons erations was 
apparent in some of the idiosyncrat remar of deputy district 
attorneys which did not fit com for y in of the four 
major areas of criteria. A deputy distr t attorney stated the 
logical links between crime, de ant's background and what the 
bargain should be in concise terms. You uate the case 
according to, "what sentence you think the defendant should get". 
Another prosecutor in County C evaluated according to "how I feel 
the person should be punished". Thus, many prosecutors look to 
those characteristics of the cr and the fendant which 
indicate to them how severely the de£ ant be sentenced. 
The defense reflects a different orientation. They 
focus foremost on the stength of the case and the opportunities 
for procedural relief. Their major consideration is "can the 
case be won in court?" Indeed, virt ly every deputy public 
defender interviewed in this study agreed that they conveyed 
their estimate of the probabilit s of winning a jury trial to 
the client. "That's our job, to that ss nal 
decision." Deputy public defenders also noted that their 
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estimate was frequently "pessimistic". One arg that "by the 
time the public defender goes to trial, conviction is 98 percent 
certain". If your case were strong, or the prosecutor's weak, 
you would be able to "work something out". 
Statistical Prediction of the "Degree" of the Bargain 
The self report of deputy district attorneys deputy 
public defenders provide insight into the criteria that are 
brought to bargaining negotiations, but they do not provide 
information on which criteria prevail. Which criteria most 
directly translate into more or less incarceration, or a lessened 
likelihood of being sentenced to state prison? To answer these 
questions, a statistical analysis of the case file data from the 
three counties was undertaken. 
Two basic analytic decisions underlie the analysis. 
1. The indicators of bargaining results were limited 
to state prison/no state prison, and the percentage of 
maximum sentence on conviction charges that the defendant 
received. These measures reflect the results of charge 
bargaining only indirectly, but are the best available 
indicators of bargaining results for two reasons: 
First, they are direct indicators of success for the 
defense in the plea bargain. Success for the defense is 
not going to state prison and achieving a reduced period of 
incarceration for the conviction charges. As we have noted 
previously, a reduction of sentence is ultimately the 
defense objective in plea bargaining. 
92 
• 
• 
Second, the indicators are unambiguous. Indicators 
more directly linked to charge barga are itably 
ambiguous because the link from charge barga to 
sentence outcome is not straightforward. 
2. The factors used to predict ea bargain 
outcomes were selected to reflect the self-reported 
criteria identified by deputy district attorneys and 
public defenders as reported in the preceding sect 
Thus, predictor variables were selected for formation on 
the nature of the crime (crime fact pattern), the 
defendant's criminal history, and the defendant's personal 
characteristics. Information on the strength of the case 
was not included because of the strong evidentiary base of 
the cases in t study (see Table XVI I). Indeed, if the 
cases were weak they would in all probability have been 
bargained out or dismissed before being bound over to 
superior court. At this stage, "strength of case" 
considerations are likely to be idosyncratic to specific 
cases (e.g., a witness "turning to sand") . 
Factors Related to Barga ing Results 
Tables XVIII through XXIII display the probabilities of 
going to state prison and the percen of maximum sentence 
received for plea bargained cases in relation to a number of 
selected predictor variables (potential pred tors were selected 
for their importance in fully describing the criminal incidents 
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TABLE XVII 
PROFILE OF THE EVIDENTIARY BASE FOR CASES 
OF ROBBERY AND BURGLARY IN THREE CALIFORNIA COUNT! 
COUNTY A COUNTY B c 
• Robbery and Burglary cases 
with physical evidence. 82.1% 85.0% 95.7% 
Robbery and Burglary cases 
with eyewitness 
i dent ifi cation. 86.7% 82.2% 64 1% 
Number of witnesses: 
None 6.0% 9.6% 35.3% 
One 34.5% 37.1% 36.8% 
Two 37.0% 31.2% 14.7% 
More than two 22.5% 22.2% 13.2% 
• 
,. ,. 
• 
TABLE XVIII 
CRIME FACT PATTERNS AND PERCENTAGE OF CASES 
SENTENC~D T~STATE PRISON (PLEA BARGAINED CASES ONLY) 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
----
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
USE OF WEAPON 
YES 37.8% 50.0% 41.2% * 
NO 34.1% 27.8% 42.9% 
HARM TO VICTIM 
None 34.6% 26.7% 41.4% 16.3% 
Minor Injury 42.1% 50.0% 44.4% 66.7% 
Hospitalization 33.3% 50.0% --- 0.0% 
TYPE OF BURGLARY 
Resident i a 1 N/A 34.3% N/A 22.4% N/A 47.6% 
Other N/A 25.9% N/A 8. N/A 29.2% 
AMOUNT OF LOSS 
$100 or Less 40.0% 10.0% 35.4% 14. --- 46. 
$101-$250 66.7% 33.3% 42.9% 33.3% 
---
.0% 
$251-$1000 36.4% 0.0% 22.2% 7.7% --- 45.5% 
Over $1000 0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 16. --- 6% 
NIGHT TIME OFFE 
YES 37.2% 17.5% 36.8% 11. 
---
.1% 
32.4% 44.1% 53.8% 29. --- .7% 
*"---" means. e no ea bargai case in that category, or variance insuffici nt usi n 
analysis. 
SEX 
e 
HISPANIC 
2 
21 
26 to 30 
30 
*"---
11 means either no plea 
analysis. 
XIX 
DEFENDANT BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND 
PERCENTAGE OF CASES SENTENCED TO 
STATE PRISON (PLEA BARGAINED CASES ONLY) 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
• 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
37. 
25. 
15. 
33.3% 
• 5% 
61.1% 
ined case in 
• 8% .9% 
. . 
.3% • 
. 8% 3% 
0. 
9% 
28.6% 
.0% 
9. 
• 5% 
71.4% 
55.6% 
category or variance ins 
15 • 
14 
0. 
10 • 
27 • 
7% 
ci 
COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY 
* 
i 
EDUCATION 
1-8 years 
9-11 years 
Completed Highschool 
Some Post Highschool 
YEARS LOCAL RESIDENCE 
Less than one year 
One year 
Two to Five Years 
More than 5 years 
UNEMPLOYED 
HISTORY OF DRUG ABUSE 
YES 
NO 
• • • 
TABLE XIX (Continued) 
DEFENDANT BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND 
PERCENTAGE OF CASES SENTENCED TO 
STATE PRISON (PLEA BARGAINED CASES ONLY) 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
• 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
.5% 
35.3% 
31. 
57.1% 
0.0% 
.0% 
66. 
42. 
43. 
33.3% 
51.4% 
. 
0.0% 
.0% 
19.2% 
36. 
0.0% 
0.0% 
. 
. 
12.5% 
30.7% 
43.6% 
9.8% 
31.3% 
25.0% 
71. 
. 
.3% 
.0% 
33 3% 
.0% 
. 
.5% 
.6% 
18.4% 
25.0% 
31 
o. 
8. 
25 • 
32. 
5.4% 
COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY 
50.0% 
30.0% 
. 
50. 
. 
"' • 
XX 
DEFENDANT CRIMINAL HISTORIES AND PERCENTAGE OF CASES 
SENTENCED TO STATE PRISON {PLEA BARGAINED CASES ONLY} 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
--
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
--
PROBATION AT ARREST 
YES 48.6% 38.2% 50.0% 40.0% * 59.1% ---
NO 22.5% 15.9% 20.0% 0.0% --- 19.0% 
OTHER CHARGES PENDING 
YES 62.5% 62.5% 43.8% 20.0% --- 33.3% 
25.4% 21.9% 37.5% 14.0% --- 41.9% 
IOR FELONY CONVICTIONS 
None . 6.8% 14. --- 30.4% 
25. 66. --- 10.0% 
Two or Three 71.4% 40.0% 66.7% --- .3% 
or More 87.5% 100.0% --- 100.0% 
PRIOR M CONVI 
None 10. 0.0% 2.4% --- 10 0% 
One 47. .5% . --- 50.0% 
Two or Three 38.9% 66.7% 13.3% --- .4% 
Four or More 64.7% 57.1% 47.6% --- . 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
YES 35. 36. 41.4% 19. ---
NO 33.3% 9 44.4% 7 7% ---
*" 
---" means no ea cases in that , or variance i c ent us on i 
analvsis. 
., 
XXI 
CRIME FACT PATTERNS AND AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF 
MAXIMUM SENTENCE AT CONVICTION (PLEA BARGAINED CASES 
., 
SEX 
Male 
Female 
BLACK 
YES 
NO 
HISPAN 
21 to 25 
30 
EDUCATION 
1-8 years 
9-11 years 
• • 
TABLE XXII 
DEFENDANT BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF 
MAXI~UM SENTENCE AT CONVICTION (PLEA BARGAINED CASES ONLY) 
COUNTY A 
ROBBERY 
Average 
% 
44.1% 
33.3% 
41.6% 
45.6% 
27. 
. 
42.8% 
38.2% 
41.1% 
BURGLARY 
Average 
% 
--
36.9% 
50.0% 
33.3% 
.8% 
39.1% 
. 
33.8% 
38.5% 
• 8% 
42.7% 
31.9% 
COUNTY B 
ROBBERY 
Average 
% 
40.7% 
16.7% 
37.5% 
35.5% 
47 • 
38.4% 
12. 
BURGLARY 
Average 
% 
33.5% 
6.1% 
34 
30. 
. 
34.0% 
31.4% 
Completed Highschool 39.9% 41.3% 61.8% 43.8% 
Post Highschool 60.5% 13.6% 0.0% 16. 
*" ---" means, either no plea bargained cases in that category, or variance insuffici 
analysis. 
COUNTY C 
ROBBERY 
Average 
% 
---
-·--
---
---
---
-
---
i 
BURGLARY 
Average 
% 
* 
4% 
36 7% 
43.7% 
44. 
27. 
s ion in 
YEARS LOCAL RESIDENCE 
Less than one year 
One year 
Two to ve years 
., 
• 
DEFENDANT BACKGROUND CHARACTER! CS AND AVERAGE PERCENTAGE 
MAXIMUM SENTENCE AT CONVICTION (PLEA BARGAINED CASES ONLY) 
ROBBERY 
Average 
% 
25.8% 
0.0% 
55. 
A 
y 
% 
25.0% 
.9% 
. 
COUNTY B 
ROBBERY 
Average 
% 
94. 
.4% 
.4% 
BURGLARY 
Average 
% 
.7% 
6.1% 
37.4% 
More than Five years 49.6% 36.3% 26. 
EMPLOYED 
38.4% 25.9% 12. 26. 
44.5% 38.8% 46.1% 46. 
HISTORY OF ABUSE 
oV/0 -.:t .2% 39. 
.9% 11. 
COUNTY C 
ROBBERY 
Average 
% 
BURGLARY 
Average 
% 
34.9% 
.7% 
8.5% 
35.4% 
. 
. 
26. 
• • • 
TABLE XXIII 
DEFENDANT CRIMINAL HISTORIES AND AVERAGE PERCENTAGE 
OF MAXIMUM SENTENCE AT CONVICTION (PLEA BARGAINED CASES ONLY) 
PROBATION AT ARREST 
YES 
NO 
OTHER CHARGES PENDING 
or 1nree 
or 
IOR MI I I 
or 
or More 
C DEFENDER 
YES 
*"---" means, either no olea 
is. 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
Average Average Average Average 
% % % 
54.8% 46.0% 27.5% 45.5% 
29.9% 24.7% 34.2% 27.4% 
55.8% • 6% 38 • 26.7% 
. 35. 
. 
bU. 4Y.8% 
. .2% 
. 
. . 
45. 28.7% 
50.8% 
43. 43.7% 38.7% 37.4% 
• 4% 23.9% 39.7% 23 • 
ined cases in that category, or variance insuffici 
COUNTY C 
ROBBERY 
Average 
% 
* 
---
---
---
---
BURGLARY 
Average 
% 
58.4% 
18.8% 
.8% 
38.9% 
36. 
38.9% 
i usion in 
• 
• 
and defendant backgrounds in a nonredundant fashion). The 
findings represented through these tables will be discussed 
county by county. 
County A 
In County A there was no consistent relation between 
factors conceiving the fact pattern of the cr (use of weapon, 
harm to victim, amount of loss, n htt offense) and the 
probability that a robbery defendant rece a prison sentence 
(Table XVIII).10 Defendants who used a gun or caused an injury 
requiring hospitalization of the v tim did receive a greater 
percentage of maximum sentence at conviction, (46.7% of maximum 
if a weapon was used; 39.8% if not; 76.6% of maximum if the 
victim was hospitalized versus 41.5% if there was no injury). 
Sever factors concerning the personal acteristics 
of defendants made a difference in the sentences resulting from 
plea bargaining • 
--Defendants with a history of drug abuse were much 
more likely to go to prison (51.4% versus 23.1%) and 
received a greater percentage of the maximum sentence 
at conviction (average percentage of 51.8 versus 
average percentage of 36.9). 
lOFrom the data it is clear that most prosecutors defined 
prison as state prison or CRC. Coun jail and CYA are not 
included. 
94 
--Defendants with more educat n were more likely to 
receive a state prison sentence (57.1% with post-
high school education versus 26.5% with less than 8 
years), and showed a slight tendency to receive a 
stiffer sentence at conviction (60.5% of max 
post-high school; from 38.2% to 41.1% for lesser 
educational levels). 
--Younger defendants were much less likely to receive 
state prison sentences (15.8% for those under 21, 
versus 61.1% for those over 30). Age made little 
difference in the percentage of maximum incarcerat 
that defendants received. 
--Hispanic defendants tended to go to pr n ss 
frequently (12.5% versus 38.4%) and to receive 
"lighter" sentences in terms of percentage of maximum 
(27.2% versus 44.2%). 
--Employment had a mixed relation to sentencing 
results. Employed defendants were more 1 ly to 
receive prison sentences (43.8% versus 33.3%), but 
received a lower percentage of maximum time (38.4% 
versus 44.5%). 
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Tables XX and XXIII clear y d trate the 
effect of the defendant's cr sentence re ults in 
ea bargained cases. 
--Each prior felony conv def ants 
brings a steady i f 
sentenced to state prison ( 19 1% chance of state 
prison with no pr lon . 87. 5% e 
' 
or more prior J I a se the 
• percentage of average max urn at conv t 
(33.5% for no pr s; 66 2% for four or more). 
• --Robbery de ants c ther 
cases were much more 1 1 to se tenc to prison 
(62.5% versus 25.4%) and to et stiffer t s 
(average en max ver us 3 7 8%) 
--Robbery defendants on t at arrest 
similar sentencing 
(48.6%) went to prison to 2 . % and, on 
the average rece f max 
sentence on conv t n ( 9 9 se 
not on probat n). 
--Numbers of mi nv t were so 
related to sta 
and increasi ly st t t e fee 
is less direct than for pr felon s. 
A similar analysis reveals those cr de ant 
characteristics which are assoc ted th sentenc results 
burglaries in County A. With respect to cr 
--Burglary defendants for res ential 
fact patterns: 
laries were 
more likely to receive a state prison sentence (34 3% 
versus 25.9% for other types of burg y) 
--Burglaries with very e amounts ss (over 
$1000) resulted in state prison more tly than 
lesser burglaries, and prod 11 Stiffer average 
sentences (65.6% max at conv t 
--Finally, burglaries wh the use of weapons 
or involved harm to the v t were 1 to produce 
state prison (50.0% use wea to 
victim, versus 27.8% no we 26.7% for no 
injury) and a stiffer sentence (58.3% for use of a 
weapon versus 30.6% none; 45.8% 
hospitalization versus 35.7% 
However, as reveal our 
patterns, few burglaries 
real or potential violence 
no inj 
file of cr 
it 
ro 
) . 
fact 
of 
the de ants, With respect to per 
sentences in plea bargained cases o b 
affected by the following: 
ary are substantial 
• 
• 
--Defendants with a history of drug abuse were much 
more likely to be sentenced to state prison (43.6 
versus 9.8%) and received approx tely e the 
percentage of maximum sentence at convict than 
defendants with no drug his (47.2% v. 22.2%). 
--Employed defendants are less likely to get state 
prison (12.5% versus 30.7%) and rece 1 hter 
sentences on conviction (25 9% of max urn versus 
38.8%). 
--Black defendants were less likely to get state prison 
(23.5% versus 33.3%) and received lighter sentences 
on conviction (33.3% of maxim~1 versus 40.8%). 
--Younger defendants were less li y to be sentenced 
to state prison than older defendants 50.0% of those 
over 30 were sentenced to prison; not one defendant 
under 21 went to prison). Those under 21 also 
received notably light sentences (9.7% of maximum) . 
As with robberies, the clearest effect on burglary 
sentences comes from factors related to the defendant's prior 
criminal history. 
--Prior felonies are stongly related to sentenc 
outcomes in plea bargained cases. Defendants with no 
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prior felony convictions seldom receive prison 
sentences (6.8%) and averaged 15.4% of the 
maximum sentence at conviction. De ndants ur 
or more prior felonies had a high probability (70.6%) 
of going to state prison, and received on the average 
66.2% of the maximum sentence on conviction. 
--Prior misdemeanors have a similar, 
weaker effect on sentencing 
h much 
--Burglary defendants on probat at arrest are much 
more likely to go to prison (38.2% versus 15.9%} and 
receive stiffer sentences (46.0% of maximum versus 
24.7%) than defendants not on probation. 
--Burglary defendants who face pending charges on o 
crimes are also much more likely to to prison 
those not facing other charges ( 6 2. 5% versus 21. 9%) 
and receive stiffer sentences (46.0% of maximum 
versus 24.7%). 
--Finally, burglary defendants who are re sented by a 
public defender are much more likely to go to prison 
than defendants with private counsel (36.4% versus 
9.7%), and they receive stiffer sentences (43.7% of 
maximum versus 23.9%). 
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In Coun B tors r 1 ting to he cr fact tern 
very little consistent ef t on the 
plea bargained robbery cases. There 
percentage of maximum sentence to 
loss in a robbery (20.2 aver 
defendants in cases with under $1 1 
those involved 
Defendants in nighttime 
s 
often than defendants 
However, other than 
the nature of the cr 
robber s 
se a ted 
(ev use 
v tim) made lit e difference. 
This is not ca 
background characteris s o 
--The personal attr ute 
associated th sentence 
cases of robbery Coun 
being Hispanic Over 
Hispanic robbery de 
prison compared to 
non-Hispanics. s 
received signif antly ti 
conviction (72 7% o 
to an average f 8 1% f 
re 
tenc 
ency 
th the amount f 
max 
55 4 aver 
2 0 1 0) 
to prison less 
6 8% versus 53 
related 
or harm to the 
t to sonal 
tro 
a 
ly 
te ed to state 
ants 
at 
n-Hi 
so 
ed 
8%) • 
to 
e 
Black defendants in County B d not tend to receive 
sentences which differed other races. 
--In addition, robbery defendants ith a his of 
drug abuse are more likely to be sentenced to state 
prison than those without a drug history 38.5% 
versus 28.6%), and receive a much h her average 
percentage of maximum sentence on (39.1 
average percentage versus 11 aver pe cen tage) • 
--Employed defendants are somewhat ss li y to go to 
47 1%) and state prison than 40 0% versus 
received a much lighter sentence at conv tion (12.9 
average percentage of max 
average percentage) 
--Very young defendants ( er 
unlikely to go to prison 9. 
slightly lower rcen e of 
at conviction than er f 
sentence versus 46.1 
are part ularly 
, and ece a 
max sentence 
ants (30 9 average 
percentage versus 47. aver cen e those 
over 30). 
--Longtime local res ts te r 1 hter 
sentences than s resid ts f 
years or more rece on 
maximum sentence at conv t 
10 
e 26 2% of the 
se th ss than 
• 
• 
a year's residence received an average of 94.2% of 
maximum). 
--Female defendants are also less li to be 
sentenced to state prison (33.3% versus 42.9%) 
received relatively light sentences at conv tion 
compared to males (16.7 average percen e). The 
defendant's criminal history is also strongly 
related to the sentencing outcome of 
cases in County B. 
ea bargained 
--Prior felony convict are clearly related to the 
type of severity of sentences received by robbery 
defendants particularly when the past record shows 
no convictions or has four or more prior convict ns. 
Every robbery defendant with four or more prior 
convictions went to state prison, while only 14.3 of 
those with no prior felony convictions went to 
prison. Similarly, robbery defendants with no prior 
felony convictions averaged only 20% of the maximum 
sentence at convict n and defendants with four or 
more prior convictions averaged 93.3% of the maximum 
sentence at conviction. 
--Robbery defendants facing charges pending on other 
crimes were slightly more likely to go to prison 
102 
(43.8% versus 37.5%), and received a somewhat higher 
percentage of maximum sentence on conv t ( 3 8. 2 
average percentage versus 25.6). 
--Robbery defendants on probat at arrest were more 
likely to receive a prison sentence (50.0% versus 
20.0%) but they actually received slightly less of 
the maximum time they could have rece 
conviction than defendants who were not on probation 
(27.5 average percent versus 34.2). 
--Defendants who had fewer misdemeanor 
convict ns tended to to prison ss often an~ 
tended to receive "lighter" sentences at convict 
These differences, however, were neither as strong, 
nor as consistent as felonies. 
In County B, as with robber , factors relating to the 
crime fact pattern had very little consistent ef ct on the 
sentencing outcome of plea bargained burglary cases. This is 
partly because the burglary cases were very similar many 
aspects of the fact pattern. For instance, there were not enough 
instances in which weapons were used in burglaries to carry out a 
meaningful analysis. Injuries to the victim were nearly as 
unusual. There was some tendency defendants in cases of 
residential burglary, however, to go to prison more frequen y 
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than defendants in nonres ent 
and to get "stiffer" sentences 
percent of maximum versus 26.4 
offenders also were more likely to 
offenders (29.6% versus 11.8% wer 
terms of time incarcerated 43. er 
versus 29.1 average en 
As with robbery ndan 
burglary defendants were tant 
sentencing results. Several per 
clearly related to sentence resul 
--Burglary defendan 
much more 1 ly to se 
(32.6% versus 5.4% and 
( 44. 9 average 
24.2) • 
--Burglary de ndants 
likely to rece e a 
versus 25.0%) than 
received a aver 
maximum sentence co 
versus 46.8). 
--Age of de 
related to the il a 
s versus 8.5%) 
0 
e 
rounds o 
between 
were 
cases. 
use were 
son 
sentences 
less 
8.6 
us 
ized 
ent 
ison sentence 
(not one burglary defendant under 21 years of age was 
sentenced to prison,ll ne 7 7%) f those 
over 30 received prison sentences) Young 
defendants also tended to be sentenced to a lower 
percentage of the maximum se tence at conviction 
(21.5 average percent for se unde 21; 45.1 
average percent for ndants over 30) 
--Racial background was so re ated to tenc 
results for burglary de ndants, not as 
strongly as for robbery de ants. One- ird of the 
black burglary de ts were sentenced to state 
prison as compared to 11.1% de ndants from other 
racial backgrounds. Blac also tend to rece 
"stiffer" sentences • 6 aver t of maximum 
versus 30.5). His al were l ly to go 
to prison than non-Hi s (18.% versus 12.5%) 
received stiffer sentences (3 3 aver 
of maximum versus 27.4). 
Finally, the ndants cr 
includes a number of factors wh 
sentencing results in plea 
llcyA commitments are not i 
See Footnote 10 for explanat 
why. 
a 
ed 
f 
y 
f 
pri n 
percentage 
h story also 
t to 
ses. 
t of ison 
fined and 
' 
--If defendants were on probation at the time of 
arrest, they had a greater chance of going to prison 
(40.0% versus 0.0%) and tended to rece stif " 
sentences (45.5 average percent of maximum versus 
27.4). 
--Both prior felony and prior misdemeanor conv 
contributed to a greater i f state 
ns 
ison 
and the likelihood of "stif 11 sentenc Less 
than 5% of the defendants with no felony conv tions, 
or with no misdemeanor convictions, went to state 
prison. Two-thirds of those with more than four 
felony convictions and nearly half (47.6%) of those 
with four or more misdemeanor convict went to 
prison. Similarly, burglary defendants with no prior 
felony convictions received on the average 22.9% of 
their maximum sentence at conviction. with 
for or more prior felonies received 48.6 average 
percent of maximum. Numbers of prior misdemeanors 
showed a s ilar, but somewhat weaker relationship 
with the average percent of maximum. 
--Finally, burglary defendants represented deputy 
public defenders received prison sentences more 
frequently than those with other s of attorneys 
(19.7% versus 7.7%), and got higher percentage of 
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maximum sentence at conviction than those with other 
types of attorneys (37.4 average percent ver us 
23. 5). 
County C 
In County C the analysis of pred tion vari es was 
not conducted for robberies because the very small number of 
cases (10) prevented meaningful results. For lar there 
was little consistent relation between descr n of crime 
patterns and indicators of sentencing results. De ants 
t 
convicted of residential burglaries (47.6% versus 29.2%) and 
those convicted of daytime offenses (66.7% versus 37.1%) did have 
a greater probability of receiving a state prison sentence. 
Similarly, defendants received "stiffer" sentences if convicted 
of a residential burglary (46.9 average percentage maximum 
versus 29.2) or a daytime offense (64.4 average percentage versus 
35.4). 
A few factors concerning the personal characteristics 
of defendants made a difference in the sentencing of ea 
bargained burglaries. 
Defendants with a history of drug abuse were more 
likely to receive a state prison sentence (52.3% 
versus 33.3%), and received a greater entage of 
maximum sentence at conviction (average percentage of 
52.3 versus average percentage of 26.3). 
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Older defendants were much more like y to to state 
prison (54.5% of those over 3 % 
under 21), and rece sti 
average percen of max 
for defendants over 30 ver 
for those under 21). 
Employed defendants were 
state prison than 
The most consisten 
demonstrated by 
Many of the var les 
results in plea barga 
--Both prob 
receiving 
substantially 
felony convict 
de ndants wi 
versus 30.4% 
scri 
ed 
th 
percentage of max sente 
those with ur or more 
average percentage 
--Similarly, probab 
percentage of max 
t 
te 
at 
umber 
8 
nv t 
en 
50. %) • 
was 
hi tor 
sentenc 
son 
pr 
for 
e 
t 
27.7 
lower for defendants with no pr misdemeanor 
convictions (10.0% chance of prison with no pr 
misdemeanor convict ns versus 4 9% c e th 
chance with four or more; 12.5 average percentage of 
maximum with no priors versus 29.2 aver 
with four or more). Once a de ant 
prior misdemeanor conv t , however, 
e percen 
a single 
ther was 
e 
little significant sentencing 
convictions. 
sadvan further 
--Burglary defendants on 
more likely to be sentenc 
a n at arrest were much 
state ison (59.1% 
versus 19.0%) and received "stiffer" sentences 
(average percen of max of 58.4 versus 14.8). 
--On the average, defendants 
52.8 percentage of the max 
compared to 3 8. 9 
charges. 
entage 
ing other charges got 
sentence at conviction 
those facing no other 
--Defendants represented by public fenders tended to 
receive state prison sentences more often than those 
with private attor (40.6% versus 30.8%), but they 
also received sligh y "1 hter" sentences (36.1 
average percentage of max 
percentage). This dispari 
versus 38.9 average 
te that public 
defenders tend to hand more severe cases. 
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Discussion and Summary 
This detailed discussion of the major factors which 
distinguish sentencing results in plea a cases leads to 
several conclusions. 
--For cases in this study, characteristics of the crime 
(fact pattern) were not very strongly related to the 
sentence results. In many cases this reflects the 
similarity of the cases selected thi ysis. 
Most crimes with robbery burglary as their most 
serious charge are not going to differ widely in such 
characteristics as violence to the victim. However, 
it is notable that such factors as 11 use of a weapon" 
did not contribute more to differences in sentence 
outcomes. 
--The consistently strongest relation to sentencing 
outcomes were factors related to the defendant's 
criminal history, particularly prior felony 
convictions. The importance of these variables, 
statistically, seems greater than one would expect 
given the self-reported criterial2 applied by deputy 
district attorneys and deputy public defenders when 
they "evaluated" a case for bargaining. However, 
when dealing with a series of crimes (robberies and 
12Those interview responses, reported at the beginning of this 
section, focused more attention on the threat to society 
represented in the nature of the crime. 
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burglaries} of relatively equal character, the 
criminal history of the defendant could well be seen 
as the major factor reflecting the "threat 
society" represented by the incident. 
--In addition to criminal history other per back 
ground characteristics make a difference. Some 
as being employed, may be taken as v ence of 
rehabilitative potential. Others such as education, 
may act indirectly because, the words of one 
deputy public defender, "the more articulate the 
defendant is, the better." We also found that, 
particularly in County B, race makes a difference 
Hispanics got unusually severe sentences among plea 
bargained cases in that County, particularly in 
robbery cases. 
--Finally, it should be noted that many of the 
relations between individual criteria and sentence 
results are not dramatic. The data reveals different 
probabilities of going to ison, or of getting a 
"stiff" sentence for defendants with certain 
characteristics (e.g., prior record). However, in 
almost all cases there was still variation in 
sentencing among defendants th those same 
characteristics (e.g., some defendants with 2 ior 
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felonies were sentenced to prison, some wer not 
In other words the data presented demonstrates some 
clear trends in answer to the st "who ts 
the best deal?", but the individual defendant st 
faces a great deal of uncerta ty reg 
sentencing even when the factors in this anal is 
are considered. 
Predicting with Multiple Criteria 
One possible reason for the r at large ee of 
uncertainty about "who gets the best deal" in the preceding 
analysis is the fact that criteria are examined one at a time. 
While considering prior felony convictions alone leaves a e 
degree of discrepancy in sentence results unexplained, it may 
that prior felony convictions plus a number of o criter 
(e.g., use of a weapon, history of drug abuse) may give us a more 
accurate prediction of sentence results for ind idual 
defendants. The analyses in this section allow us to test the 
combined effect of the criteria presented the previous sect n 
on whether the defendant went to prison and the percentage of 
maximum received at conviction. 
A second disadvantage of the preceding analysis of 
criteria taken "one at a time" is the fact that some of the 
effects may be redundant. For example, Hispanics in County B rna 
receive sentences to state prison more often ause they to 
have more prior felony convictions, not simply because they are 
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Hispan The analysis in this section 
possiblity by providing a meas 
nt contribution of eac c 
---"'------
the contribution of other factors ha ta 
Table XXIV displ re a 
is which accomplishes the above two ect 
defendants in County A. The seven most tan 
cri ter are presented in order of the 
"indicator of relative importance 
allows comparison of the relative 
tic 
tance of two 
For example, being on probation at arrest and 
about the same relat amount of dif ence 
of a defendant going to state prison (betas= .18 and .17 
respectively). Both criteria, however, pale s nif ance 
compared to prior felony convictions ( ta = .44 The 
t 
esent mos 
discussion briefly synopsizes the predict 
the counties. Tables XXIV through XXVIII 
important predictive factors for robber s burglar s 
Counties A, B and C; Tables XXIX through XXXVI present 
method of prediction. 
Coun A 
The importance in County A of a de an s 
criminal history in determining the sentence result e 
bargained robbery case becomes more obv us through pr t 
with multiple criteria. Clearly the most impor factor 
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RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE MOST SIGNIFI 
FACTORS FOR PREDICTING ROBBERY SENTENCING OUTCOMES 
IN COUNTY A 
PREDICT! CRITERIA 
(In order of relative importance[ __ 
PREDICTING PERCENTAGE 
OF MAXIMUM SENTENCE 
AT CONVICTION 
#of or Felony Convict ons 
Age 
On Probation at n~ 
Level of Education Compl 
Degree of Harm to Victim 
Race Other than Black 
Use of Weapon 
Portion of total 
of maximum se 
ations from the average percentage 
PREDICTING SENTENCING 
TO STATE PRISON 
ich is explained by these 
# of Prior Felony Convictions 
On Probation at me of 
Is 
Has i in Cases 
s History of Drug Abuse 
Used a Weapon 
Percentage of cases sentenced to state prison 
predicted by these predictors: 
Percentage of cases not sentenced to state prison 
predicted by these predictors: 94.2% 
y 
ly 
4 
- 30 
.30 
.23 
.20 
34.4% 
18 
.09 
.44 
.17 
.12 
*The beta weight is a statistic which indicates much sta ized change n 
percentage of maximum sentence at conviction (or in the probability of ing 
sentenced to prison) is explained by a standarized ch in each i ive 
after 1 other predictive factors in the equation have explained a 1 the 
they can. 
PREDICTING PERCENTAGE 
OF MAXIMUM SENTENCE 
AT CONVICTION 
TABLE 
PREDICTIVE ITERIA 
(In order of relative importance) 
#of Prior Felony 
Had charges pending in cases 
Had a public defender 
Had a history of drug abuse 
Committed a nighttime burglary 
Level of education completed 
Portion of total deviations from the average 
of maximum sentence which is explained by these 
PREDICTING SENTENCING 
TO STATE PRISON 
Because so few burglary ants 
were sent to state prison. 
predictive method could not be 
validly applied for these cases. 
.15 
5 
beta weight is a statistic which indicates how standardized ge in 
being 
predictive 
percentage of maximum sentence at conviction (or in the probabili 
sentenced to prison) is explained by a standarized 
after all other predictive factors in the equation 
they can. 
all 
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TABLE XXVI 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF MOST SIGNIFICANT 
FACTORS FOR PREDICTING ROBBERY SENTENCING OUTCOMES 
IN COUNTY B 
PREDICTING PERCENTAGE 
OF MAXIMUM SENTENCE 
AT CONVICTION 
PREDICTIVE CRITERIA 
(In order of relative importance) 
# of Prior Felony Convictions 
Age 
Hispanic 
# prior mi ons 
Had charges pending in other cases 
Level of education completed 
Had a public defender 
Black 
Portion of total deviations from the average percentage 
of maximum sentence which is explained by these predictors: 88.7% 
PREDICTING SENTENCING 
TO STATE PRISON 
# of Prior Felony Convictions 
Age 
Hispanic 
Level of education completed 
Had no history of drug abuse 
Had a public defender 
Comnitted a daytime robbery 
Had charges pending in other cases 
Did not use a weapon 
Percentage of cases sentenced to state prison correctly 
predicted by these predictors: 68.8% 
Percentage of cases not sentenced to state prison correctly 
predicted by these predictors: 90.0% 
-.79 
.43 
.30 
.20 
.14 
.12 
.83 
-.53 
.36 
.28 
.25 
.17 
.13 
.10 
*The beta weight is a statistic which indicates how much standardized change in 
percentage of maximum sentence at conviction (or in the probability of being 
sentenced to prison) is explained by a standari change in each predictive 
after all other predictive factors in the equation have explained all the change 
they can. 
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PREDICTING PERCENTAGE 
OF MAXIMUM SENTENCE 
AT CONVICTION 
TABLE XXVIII 
PREDICTIVE CRI IA 
(In order of relative importance) 
On probation at time 
# of prior felony con 
Race other than Hispanic 
Committed a daytime burglary 
Committed a residential burglary 
Portion of total deviations from the average percentage 
of maximum sentence which is explained by these predictors: 47.7% 
PREDICTING SENTENCING 
TO STATE PRISON 
#of Prior Felony Convictions 
On Probation at Time of Arrest 
Unemployed at time of arrest 
Committed a daytime burglary 
Percentage of cases sentenced to state prison y 
predicted by these predictors: 50.0% 
Percentage of cases not sentenced to state prison correctly 
predicted by these predictors: 96.2% 
.43 
.23 
.20 
.10 
.47 
.21 
.18 
.12 
*The beta weight is a statistic which indicates how much standa ized change in 
percentage of maximum sentence at conviction (or in the probability of being 
sentenced to prison) is explained by a standarized change in each predictive factor 
after all other predictive factors in the equation have explained all the change 
they can. 
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XXIX 
METHOD OF PREDICTING 
PERCENTAGE OF MAXIMUM SENTENCE AT CONVICTION 
ROBBERY - COUNTY A 
CALCULATI INITIAL VALUE= .619 
or conv1 ions? I ,add (# ions) x.099 = 
x. 
tme 2 x.2 
Xo? X ::: 
~ . 
:::: 
1 
max mum 
• 
PREDICTIVE FACTOR 
XXX 
METHOD OF PREDICTING 
PERCENTAGE SENTENCED TO PRISON 
ROBBERY - COUNTY A 
CALCULATION INITIAL VALUE= .793 
1.Does the defendant have prior felony convictions? 
2.Was the defendant on probation at the time of arrest? 
If yes,add (# of convictions) x.127 = 
3.Is the defendant employed? 
4.Does the defendant have charges pending in other 
cases? 
5.Does the defendant have a history of drug abuse? 
6.0id the defendant use a weapon? 
If sum is greater than .642, the prediction is for a 
sentence to state prison. If less than or equal to 
.642, the prediction is for no state prison. 
If yes, 
If no, 
If yes, 
If yes, 
If no, 
If yes, 
no, 
If yes, 
subtract 1 X .179 -
subtract 2 X .179 = 
add 1 X .188 = 
subtract 1 X .136 = 
subtract 2 x.136 = 
subtract 1 X. 098 = 
subtract 2 x.098 = 
subtract 1 x.065 = 
TOTAL(T) = 
ate prison T > .642 
state prison T < .642 
., 
BURGLARY - COUNTY A 
PREDICTIVE FACTOR 
l.Does the defendant have or felony convictions? 
2.Does the have charges pendinq in 
i 
• 
ION 
CALCULATION INITIAL VALUE=l.l86 
If yes.add (# of convictions) x.085 = 
subtract 1 x.298 = 
subtract 2 x.298 = 
X. /X :::: 
1 X. ! IU. :::; 
x.! 11£1 :::: 
• • 
TABLE XXXII 
METHOD OF PREDICTING 
PERCENTAGE OF MAXIMUM SENTENCE AT CONVICTION 
ROBBERY - COUNTY B 
PREDICTIVE FACTOR 
l.Does the defendant have prior felony convictions? 
2.What is the defendant•s age? 
3.Is the defendant Hispanic? 
4.Does the defendant have prior misdemeanor convictions ? 
5.Does the defendant have other charges pending? 
6.What level education has the defendant completed? 
7.Is the defendant represented by a public defender? 
8.Is the defendant Black? 
Sum equals the predicted percentage of maximum to 
which defendant was actually sentenced. 
CALCULATION INITIAL VALUE= .663 
If yes,add (# of convictions) x.l83 = 
Subtract (years of age) x.036 = 
If yes, add 1 x.379 = 
If yes, add(# of convictions) x.041 = 
If yes, subtract 1 x.213 
If no, subtract 2 x.213 = 
Add (l eve! education) x.099 = 
If yes, add 1 X .130 ·-
If yes, 1 x.1 1"' = 
TOTAL = 
• 
PREDICTIVE FACTOR 
l.Does the defendant have prior fel 
2.What is 's 
3. I c? 
Did 
9.Did the nt use a 
If n .579, 
me 
• 
I I 
ROBBERY - COUNTY B 
convictions? 
If 
CALCULATION 
,add (# 
le 
• 
INITIAL VALUE= .368 
convict ons) x.219 = 
of age) x. 1 = 
1 v 1.1.!11 ::::: 
1 
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TABLE XXXIV 
METHOD OF PREDICTING 
PERCENTAGE OF MAXIMUM SENTENCE AT CONVICTION 
BURGLARY - COUNTY B 
PREDICTIVE FACTOR 
l.What is the defendant's age? 
2.Is the defendant Hispanic? 
3.Does the defendant have a history of drug abuse? 
4.0id the defendant commit a nighttime burglary? 
5.0oes the defendant have prior misdemeanor convictions? 
6. the defendant represented by a public defender? 
?.Does the defendant have prior felony convictions? 
Sum equals the predicted percentage of maximum 
which defendant was actually sentenced. 
CALCULATION 
Add 
If yes, 
If yes, 
no, 
If yes, 
If no, 
If yes, 
If yes, 
If yes, 
• 
INITIAL VALUE= .031 
(years of age) x.Ol8 = 
add 1 x.170 = 
subtract 1 X .164 = 
subtract 2 x.164 = 
add l x.181 = 
add 2 x.181 = 
subtract # of 
convictions x.024 = 
add 1 X 
s # 
ions x.008 = 
---
TOTAL = 
r-
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TABLE XXXVI 
METHOD OF PREDICTING 
PERCENTAGE SENTENCED TO PRISON 
BURGLARY - COUNTY C 
PREDICTIVE FACTOR 
1.Does the defendant have prior felony convictions? 
2.Was the defendant on probation at the time of arrest? 
3.Is the defendant employed? 
4.Did the defendant commit a nighttime burglary? 
If sum is greater than .633, the prediction is for a 
sentence to state prison. If less than or equal to 
.633, the prediction is for no state prison. 
CALCULATION 
If yes, 
yes, 
If no, 
If yes, 
If yes, 
If no, 
• 
INITIAL VALUE= .202 
add # of 
convictions x.117 = 
subtract 1 x.204 
subtract 2 x.204 = 
subtract 1 x.l80 = 
add 1 x.147 = 
add 2 x.l47 = 
(T) = 
ate prison T >.633 
state prison T <.633 
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ndent 
ahead of the remaining criteria in the equation. The remaining 
predictive factors do differ somewhat from those for robbery 
sentencing. History of drug abuse is more important, and having 
a public defender is apparently disadvantageous. It is also 
interesting to note that better educated burglary defendants get 
off lighter, just the opposite for robbery defendants. 
The degree of accuracy of the predictions in County A 
is still far short of perfect, even with combining all of the 
predictive power of the multiple criteria. If one were to 
predict whether individual robbery defendants went to prison or 
not using these predictors only 57.1% would be correctly 
predicted. Similarly, using all the (linear) information in 
these predictors allows us to reduce the amount of (squared) 
error (if we were to use the average percentage of maximum 
sentence for all plea bargained cases as our "best" guess) by 
only 34.4%. Again, these predictions illuminate definite 
"tendencies" in the sentencing of plea bargained cases, but they 
also leave a great deal unex a 
Coun B 
Prior felony convictions and years of age are the two 
most important predictors of both state prison and percentage of 
maximum sentence for robberies in County B. When other criteria 
are accounted for, younger defendants get stiffer sentences. 
While the multiple criteria analysis puts the impact of 
being Hispanic into a slightly different perspective, the racial 
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factor remains the third most discr ina ing pred ti criter 
for state prison or percentage of maximum sentence for s 
in County B. 
The next two most tant tive factors for 
percentage of maximum sentence are again cr 1 his fac 
(prior misdemeanors and charges pending), but for ed icti 
ison they are personal characteristics (education and history 
of dr abuse). Clients with publ defend s tend to et 
slightly less favorable barga with respect to both 
ind tors 
The res ts of the multiple criteria pred tion for 
burglary defendants Coun B is of unique terest. It 
provides the single stance in which cr history ctors 
are not t most important criteria for determ ing outcomes. 
Indeed, most important edictor of centage of max 
sentence for burglary defendants is age. older the de ndant 
the stiffer the sentence. The second most important ind ator 
• was race. span s tend to rece a h her percentage of 
max , even with the other criteria taken to account. 
Proceeding through the predict cr iter in er of 
• tance, th history of drug abuse and the time of 
burglary are more tant than prior misdemeanors. Indeed, 
more prior misdemeanor convictions a defendant has the 1 hter 
the sentence at conv tion. Statist ally, pr lonies no 
independent effect on sentence outcomes. 
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The latter points are interesting. The very limited 
f uence of criminal history in this case is at least partly 
table to the uth and the lack of significant crim 1 
stor for burglary defendants in County B. 
The predictive criteria for burglaries in Coun B do 
not account for even one-third of the (squared) errors in 
edicting the percentage of maximum sentence at conv t n 
Pred tive accuracy is much better for robberies, but this cou 
be partly a statistical artifact caused by the small number of 
robbery cases in the analysis. 
County C 
In County C relatively few variables were effective 
ictors of either a state prison sentence £E the percentage of 
maximum sentence in plea bargained burglaries. The most 
important predictor of the percentage of the maximum sentence at 
conv tion was being on probation at arrest. The second most 
important was the defendant's number of prior felony convictions. 
The same two variables were most powerful for predicting a state 
prison sentence, but in reversed order. The number of prior 
felony convictions was most important. Probation status was 
second. 
The defendant's personal characteristics were less 
important. Defendants of Hispanic descent tended to get a lower 
centage of the maximum sentence at conviction, and employed 
defendants were less likely to go to state prison. 
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19 
that the deal would differ 15%-25% of the cases and one public 
defender asserted that there was a "tremendous difference in 
deals you might get" between different distr at tor 
Thus, even though this anal is has identified some 
relatively clear criteria influencing sentence outcomes there 
remains a great deal of unexplained variation in plea barga 
In a system of one to one negotiation much of this var t n is 
likely to be explained by personal dif ences tween the 
participants. 
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IV 
THE PROCESS OF BARGAINING 
The preceding chapters have described the nature and 
results of the informal exchange between prosecuting and fe 
at which constitutes plea bargaining in three Cali 
count s. This process is complex, involving the exc e of 
unts, charges, enhancements, or direct guarantees of 
or length of incarceration for a plea of guilty. Within this 
exity the factors which affect the result are many and 
var Analysis of the predictors of sentence outcomes in plea 
cases has demonstrated that only a portion of these 
factors are related to the nature of the crime or the crim 
ecord of the defendant. 
by the expectations of the participants, and by the 
reements that they fashion. In this chapter the times in the 
ud ial process at which bargaining occurs are described and 
In addition, the ways in which the judges, victims, 
fficers orient themselves to the process of barga 
to each other as part ipants in the bargaining process are 
scribed. 
in the Judicial Process: When Does Bargaining Occur? 
Plea bargaining may occur in a variety of forms and 
n of different points in the progress of a case throug 
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I 
urts Indeed, one o the 
ining is that ins 
eb rea 
ers prov e a descr 
a 
n of 
a ing their exper 
In all three counties 
involve themse s 
charges are filed 
indication that 
nment, when 
somet 
a tor 
f st 
s occur 
1 
reac s the sec tor, 
n 
tions, however, are 
ace dur screen 
t es. Thus, 
extent of the nse the 
A 
i the fili 
e dif y 
distr t at 
e ser us 
court. In 
a 
are "occas nally di 
arr 
of 
s n 
12 
di 
an 
j 
a sua 
in 
of 
a 
to 
de nse 
nd t 
f icers 
t to trade 
earl s e 
ittle negot 
t 
a 
po 
ns. 
ed 
n 
rnun 
t at 
t 
the 
t 
If t feelers 
It 
observed that "discuss s [ e] 
e un is r 
tial contacts for "discus 
ferenc ich 
cases the pretrial 
rna ea a in 
i coun a 
ion e in an effort 
hout urther proceedi s The prosecutor a 
disc s ffers beforehand. t ted 
l 
arg that "if someone offers 
ence] and [it's] not accepted, court 
lower at tr 1. This is to encour e 
ea and not to 
try 
to trial." 
t t ns betwee 
one process. 
strat 
secut n 
Comments 
the ar iest s would be 
y hear ing gets 
hold out 
elim 
original c 
ti 
d 
s 
to 
I 
"Some before charging ... and every other stage. 11 
"Begins whenever deputy has f st contact ith 
defendant or counsel." 
"Can happen at any stage, de 
flexible." 
"At any time .•. " 
i 
There was some indication that the 
on case ... very 
st "de s" are 
offered in municipal court. As put by one deputy district 
attorney: 
"As [the] trial approaches, dispositions [pleas] 
become rougher, in order to encourage public defenders 
and court appointed attorneys to settle early; don't 
want to encourage everyone to go all the way to 
pretrial conference." 
Coun C 
In County C "it is only rare that plea bargaining will 
before charge filed." Most of the plea bargain 
tiations occur at the readiness and settlement conference, 
which in County C is the pretrial conference. From the time 
charges are filed, according to one deputy district attorney, 
" involvement [in the settlement process increase] as the case 
moves along, [with the] greatest involvement at the readiness and 
ttlement conference." While cases may be bargained out earlier 
124 
i the process, particularly misdemeanors, and disc s ns 
the defense and the prosecut are r at ely 
iness set ement 
ting us to bargaining d scuss Even 
een ittle d scussion earl , "at least a the read 
se ement conference is a discuss n to h] 
pr " 
iscussion and 
In Counties A and C is a rmal pretrial 
conference at which bargaining becomes serious 
agreements are reached. This conference 
and at wh h most 
e d ec y the barga discuss 
y invo s 
ns, scenar 
fits well 
un A. 
th the emphasis on complete sentence barga ing 
County B does not have a formal pretrial conference, 
nding on the case, successful bargaining occurs t 
stages of the pretrial procedure. This more flu 
ss coinc es th the relative emphasis in Coun 
ing which does not require as much jud 
t as sentence bargaining. 
B n 
TABLE XXXVII depicts the average time that was re ed 
y and b lary defendants to move through the jud 1 
ss each of the three jurisd tions. Tables XXXVIII and 
d ct the same time per 
se that were plea barga 
s for cases that went to tr 
This t 
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s 
• • 
TABLE XXXVII 
AVERAGE TIME IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS FOR 
THREE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (IN DAYS} 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
1. Total Time from Arrest 
to Disposition 
(mean) 85.5 65.1 109.2 87.3 167.6 116.4 
(median) 81.6 64.5 102.5 79.8 164.0 100.3 
2. a. Time from Arrest to 
First Appearance before 
a Judicial Officer 
(mean) 4.0 3.0 
(median) 3.5 2.9 
b. Arrest to Receipt of 
Case by the Prosecutor 
(mean) 1.9 2.1 6.2 4.4 3.8 5.0 
(median) 1.6 1.9 2.7 2.5 1.1 2.3 
c. Arrest to Filing of 
Complaint 
(mean) 3.3 3.8 8.3 7.4 5.7 11.8 
(median) 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.8 1.3 1.8 
3. a. Time from Receipt of 
Case by Prosecutor to 
Filing Complaint 
(mean) 1.3 2.6 3.4 2.9 1.3 8.8 
(median) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 .7 0.0 
b. Receipt by Prosecutor 
to Filing Information 
(mean) 24.6 42.1 39.3 48.9 45.6 52.8 
(median) 30.0 30.5 32.8 34.3 34.0 39.2 
4. Time from Filing of 
Complaint to Filing 
Information 
(mean) 
(median) 
• 
5. Time from Filing Information 
to Disposition 
(mean) 
(median) 
TABLE XXXVII (Continued} 
AVERAGE TIME IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS FOR 
THREE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (IN DAYS) 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
• 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
37.2 
30.2 
50.9 
46.5 
38.2 
29.5 
34.8 
33.4 
35.9 
32.0 
77.5 
62.8 
47.1 
34.2 
46.2 
48 9 
COUNTY C 
ROBBERY 
46.7 
23.0 
113.8 
82.0 
BURGLARY 
48.1 
39.2 
86.9 
81.5 
• • 
TABLE XXXVII I 
AVERAGE TIME IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS FOR JURY TRIAL 
CASES IN THREE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (IN DAYS) 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
1. Total Time from Arrest 
to Disposition 
N/A* 183.5 (mean) 86.4 83.0 131.9 N/A 
(median) 86.0 78.0 119.0 N/A 164.0 N/A 
2. a. Time from Arrest to First 
Appearance before a 
Judicial Officer 
(mean) 4.1 2.4 ---- N/A --- N/A 
(median) 3.3 2.3 ---- N/A --- N/A 
b. Arrest to Receipt of Case 
by the Prosecutor 
(mean) 1.4 1.4 6.1 N/A 11.0 N/A 
(median) 1.7 1.0 1.5 N/A 4.0 N/A 
c. Arrest to Filing of 
Complaint 
(mean) 3.5 5.4 10.3 N/A 14.7 N/A 
(median) 1.7 2.3 3.3 N/A 12.0 N/A 
*The time differences between burglary cases which went to jury trial and those which were plea bargained 
is not discussed because there was only one burglary jury trial in each of Counties B & C. 
• • 
TABLE XXXVIII (Continued) 
AVERAGE TIME IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS FOR JURY TRIAL 
CASES IN THREE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (IN DAYS) 
3. a. Time from Receipt of Case 
by Prosecutor to Filing 
Complaint 
(mean) 
(median) 
b. Receipt by Prosecutor 
Filing Information 
(mean) 
(median) 
4. Time from Filing of 
Complaint to Filing 
Information 
(mean) (median) 
5. Time from Filing Information 
to Disposition 
(mean) 
(median} 
COUNTY A 
ROBBERY 
0.3 
0.2 
31.0 
30.0 
33.1 
30.3 
58.5 
.8 
BURGLARY 
2.5 
1.5 
51.3 
30.5 
41.8 
29.8 
43.9 
45.0 
COUNTY B 
ROBBERY 
3.0 
1.5 
32.9 
35.3 
25.2 
29.0 
95.7 
80.0 
BURGLARY 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
COUNTY C 
ROBBERY 
0.0 
0.0 
69.5 
35.0 
82.0 
88.0 
104.3 
80.5 
BURGLARY 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
• • • 
TABLE XXXIX 
AVERAGE TIME IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS FOR PLEA BARGAINED 
CASES IN THREE CALIFQRNIA COUNTIES rrN DAYS} 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
1. Total Time from Arrest to 
Disposition 
N/A* 161.2 (mean) 85.4 62.9 101.4 N/A 
(median) 79.3 63.8 89.0 N/A 108.5 N/A 
2. a. Time from Arrest to First 
Appearance before a 
Judicial Officer 
(mean) 4.0 3.1 --- N/A --- N/A (median) 3.7 3.0 --- N/A --- N/A 
b. Arrest to Receipt of Case 
by the Prosecutor 
(mean) 2.0 2.1 5.5 N/A 0.9 N/A 
(median) 1.6 1.9 1.5 N/A 0.9 N/A 
c. Arrest to Filing of 
Complaint 
(mean) 3.4 4.0 7.2 N/A 2.7 N/A 
(median) 2.3 2.4 1.7 N/A 1.1 N/A 
* time differences between burglary cases which went to jury trial and those whi were ea ned 
is not discussed because there was only one burglary jury trial in each of Counties B & C 
" " " 
TABLE XXXIX (Continued 
AVERAGE TIME IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS FOR PLEA BARGAINED 
CASES IN THREE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (IN DAYS} 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY ROBBERY BURGLARY 
3. a. Time from Receipt of Case 
by Prosecutor to Filing 
Complaint 
(mean) 1.4 2.8 2.8 N/A 1.8 N/A 
(median) 0.1 0.2 0.2 N/A 1.0 N/A 
b. Receipt by Prosecutor to 
Filing Information 
(mean) 22.5 41.8 36.2 N/A 35.0 N/A 
(median) 29.9 31.3 32.8 31.0 
4. me from Filing of 
Complai to Fil i 
Information 
(mean) .2 38 .2 N/A 33.5 
(median) .2 .7 32.5 28.5 
5. me Filing 
Information to Disposition 
(mean) 49.1 .6 68.9 N/A 118.1 (median) 44.5 33.4 51.0 N/A 82.0 
II 
• 
another perspective on the effect of plea bargaining on the 
progress of felony cases through the courts. 
For robberies in County A the average t arrest 
to disposition in plea bargained cases (median= 79.3 days)l3 
differed from that for jury trials (median = 86.0 days) by less 
than a week, in a process which typically required almost three 
months. The difference for burglaries was approximately two 
weeks (14 days). Furthermore, this ent difference can 
attributed to the final stages in the process (i.e., the time 
between filing the information and disposition}. 
In County B, there was greater disparity in time from 
arrest to disposition between robbery cases which are plea 
bargained and those that go to trial.l4 The typical difference 
is approx tely one month (30 days). As with County A this 
difference occurs between the filing the inforrnat n and 
disposition. 
In County C, the disparity in time from arrest to 
disposition between robbery cases which are plea bargained and 
those that go to trial is nearly two months (55 days).l5 This 
13The median is the "middle case, "i.e., as many cases took 
longer as took less time. This is a desirable measure because it 
is not affected greatly by a few "extreme" cases which took very 
short, or very long periods of time. The "mean" reflects these 
extreme cases, and therefore, sometimes differs from the median. 
14The time differences between burglary cases which went to 
jury trial and those which were plea bargained are not discus 
because there was only one burglary jury trial in each of 
Counties B and c. 
15see footnote 2. 
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discrepancy between robbery cases that are tried and those that 
are plea bargained is attributable to the delay in the filing of 
the information in jury trial cases. 
Finally, it is notable that the disparity in the time 
required to move a typical robbery or burglary through the courts 
varied as much between jurisdictions as it did between plea 
bargained and jury-tried cases within the counties. Indeed, on 
the average, it took over five weeks longer for the typical 
burglary case to move from arrest to conviction in County C as in 
County A. The robbery cases, on the average, took 82 days 
longer. Clearly, time in the process is affected by many factors 
in addition to plea bargaining. 
Judicial Participation 
How the Judges View Themselves in the 
Plea Bargain1ng Process 
In each county three superior court judges assigned to 
criminal matters were interviewed. Of the nine only one was 
currently on master calendarl6 assignment and two others had 
previously served as master calendar judges. The remaining 
judges were on trial assignment. Of the judges interviewed 
approximately half indicated they viewed their role as one who 
16The master calendar judge arraigns all criminal defendants in 
superior court. He assigns matters out to trial and for hearing 
on motions. Although he hears pretrial conferences, he does not 
try any cases while on master calendar assignment. 
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• 
actively participates in the settlement of cases. Only two 
voiced strong preference for ing i the settlement 
process as early as poss e. were 
had master calendar experience, and act y encour 
counsel to involve them as early as poss le. 
All the judges interv ind t 
function included listening to the ts ati a 
sentencing preference (whether it be s no tate 
prison or, as in County A, the actua se tence) based on those 
facts pres en ted. However, the ones who perce their role as 
one of active involvement actually enter to the negot tions 
other judges and try to hammer out a set ement; 
only indicate acceptance or reject of a sentence sed 
the prosecution defense. not i ndently s st 
an alternative sentence sal. 
County A 
In County A two the s terv wed pre to 
become actively involved in the settlement ss. In re 
to the question, "When and do u involved in the 
negotiation process?", Judge 2 i a ted that liked to rev 
e 
w 
the transcript and discuss his tho 
attorneys during the early phases of 
hts about sentencing th the 
process hopes of 
expediting case settlement. 3 s a dif ent v of 
the plea negotiation process. n the st n 
stated: 
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"I don't know if there a t t n 
process. If the defendant is dis , I 
listen to the facts, the de ant 
district attorney and defense counsel r 
and indicate which sal e e or est a 
third possibility of own. !I 
All the judges give the f un an nd t 
of either the specific term sentence the sentence range 
they would impose upon disposit a ea of guil Whether 
they indicate the sentence term or a if e depends upon 
the type of case 
In County A it is the stated pract of j es not 
to see either the deputy district attorney or deputy ic 
defender separately s. 1 ex the 
the pretrial conference wh is ld the j e's s 
approximately one week be tr 1. However, Judge 3 will low 
the defendant on the day of tri to at tri discussions 
in his chambers on the day of tr 1. 
County B 
The majority of 
prefer to become actively 
was expressed in Judge l's re 
how do you become involved 
j s 
se 
the 
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terv Coun B 
case set ement. Thi v 
the II and 
ea t t ess?": 
• 
• 
"I read the transcr of the pr l inar 
ask quest of counsel sha 
i proper 
of se and 0 t de ant 
of e' case 
Judge 3, his a 
make recommendations y 
In Coun B the 
term or e. y ind at whe 
disposed to se a state ison sentence upon t 
ea of guil 
the v of is 
II nee 
as to ind 
jus to 
j s s 
occas nally 
In rare 
district a tor 
exc ude 
al 
Coun C 
in 
The j 
ea negot at 
e 
e 1 1 s comment on tenc 
ue 
sentenc 
' 
the j e It 
te a term of a sentence. A j 
ate loc vs. ta 
ifyi terms ut t 
the distr t at tor s . n 
tances the j es do see 
nse counsel s se 
con ences 
s 
Coun fer a s 
n es 
0 
ar 
s 
ndant' 
ly reflects 
is 
a tel 
are st 
i s. 
e 3 scr ed t his case settlement du are: 
1 
" ..• to give a tentative decision on what the 
penalty will be if the defendant pleads to the crime." 
He always reserves his right to change the sentence if 
the facts in the presentence report are different from those 
presented to him at time of the plea. Judge 1 responded: 
"The role of the judge is that of sentencing as 
opposed to getting involved in the direct 
negotiations." 
Two of the three judges will indicate their sentencing 
preference by giving a specific sentence term or sentence range, 
if requested to do so. The other judge will only indicate a 
sentencing preference of state prison or no state prison. 
In County C the deputy district attorney and the deputy 
public defender are seldom seen in chambers se a tely. Pretr 1 
conferences are held in chambers and the defendant is exclud 
from these conferences. 
How the Central Participants View the Judges' 
Rol·e 1n the Plea Bargaining Process. 
County A 
In County A the deputy district attorneys and the 
deputy public defenders perception of judie 1 involvement in the 
plea bargaining process mirrors the opinions of the j s. 
However, there are some discrepencies in Counties Band c. 
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• 
Coun B 
Judge 1 v ws h f as act 
set ements. The deputy distr t t 
Judge 1 exerts some influence 
is "more aloof" n some of 
district attorney stated, " 1 
district attorney who refuses to of 
of the deputy public defenders stated 
the process. As one deputy 
completely aloof and un lved." 
believe he , but not to 
All part i are 
j 
a 
0 
ex n 
of himself as actively involved case set 
typical deputy distr t at comment wa 
should and somet tr s 
attorney. II A typ al 
terrific .• complete vement 1 
part ipa ting in this study, er 
in ea negotiations. 
Everyone was also eement 
himself as more pass y 
One deputy district attorney crit is 
One stated, "He will ar t and 
suggestions, but he sn't 
The deputy public er criticized t 
terribly concerned ut sing t istr 
2 
ca 
h 
he 
lf 
i 
ted, "He 
f percent 
be. 
's v 
is correct. A 
He dec t 
i 
was, "He s 
the j es 
st uence 
3's v of 
a process 
f i vernent 
some 
s II 
II is 
t n 
Judge 1 who voiced 
involved in the plea negotiat 
deputy district attorneys and 
sit tting d ectly 
s f the 
fenders as exerti 
his influence into the process. The th was agreement 
with the judge that he rarely in uences t ea bargain. 
is unanimous agreement that Judge 2 s an active role ea 
negotiations and exerts his influence over 
Two-thirds of the deputy distr t a 
that Judge 3 exerts more influence over 
thinks he does. However, the 
Judge 3's view of himself as one r y 
negotiating process. 
In order to ga s 
the plea bargaining process the terv 
secutors rna 
s a 
set ement 
e of nion 
ss he 
ers agree 
the 
th 
s af t 
the judges in 
sentence each of the counties, "If 
recommendations as part of 
them?" 
ea reement do u low 
County A 
In County A answers a of consistency 
among the judges. Judge 1 ind never goes h 
but may go lower than the utor's rec a The 
1 3 
• 
district attorneys usually recommend too h h a 
district attorneys are off the 1." e 2 
he, " •.. may h her or than 
recommendation." He doesn't y 
determination that it's a just dispo 
tence .. some 
that 
s h s own 
ther tes, 
"sometimes the recommendat are y ut of 
Judge 3 responded 
deputy district at 
Judges 2 and 3 
t recommends a 
more often than 
in that 
recommendations for a higher sentence 
agreement, they allow the defe t to 
guil and go to tria 
her 
h s 
All j es in Coun A did not hesi ta 
in deputy distr t at 
d di tr t at 's 
Judge 1 commented that f a 
of the 
a of 
distr t at 
gives recommendations that are out of 1 he 11 
tell deputy's supervisor of this 
district attorney to try case if e his 
doesn't agree 
e 
ea of 
to 
f the 
ant 
consisten 
the 
is still correct even though 
Judge 2 indicates that after a tr ls s y 
learn to evaluate a case 
district attorney when 
action in the matter 
Judge wi 
"off base" but ta 
T\'lo of j es Coun A d 
case th the attorneys during tr con 
13 
tell 
s no fur 
of the 
e po out 
key items and evidence for the parties to consider; but they will 
not make a recommendation as to whether t case shoula settle or 
go to trial. Judge 3 stated that on occasion 
defense attorney when he feels the offer is gooa 
11 tell the 
recommends 
that the defense should take it. However, this same j e 
only one who has a hard and fast rule against acce ing a guilty 
plea if the defendant insists on his innocence. The o two 
will accept such pleas on rare occasions. 2's response was 
that he will not accept the plea if the defendant continues to 
insist on his innocence but that he delves deep to show the 
defendant the risks involved. He usually won't take the plea, 
but if the defendant changes his mind he will accept the 
"grumbling guilty plea." 
In County A less than one-third of the cases enter the 
pretrial conference with the deputy district at and the 
deputy public defender in agreement as to the settlement value of 
the case. Judge 2 indicated that if the cases are negotiated 
earlier (at superior court arraignment) the percentage of cases 
where the deputy district attorney and the deputy public defender 
agree on settlement is somewhat higher. However, all judges 
agree that in County A a very high percentage of cases settle via 
plea bargaining. One judge stated that as high as 95% are plea 
bargained; however, this estimate is much higher than the actual 
combined plea bargaining rate for robberies and burglaries (77%) 
(see Table V) • 
13 5 
• 
• 
County B 
In County B the j es are gener ly 
in the vast majority of cases wi 
recommendation if one is made. However 
out that in County B recommendat 
the term of sentence. In most cases the 
reemen 
secutor 
ick 
r 
t 
t 
prison or no state prison. l j 
this type of bargain, and let ant 
nor 
raw his guilty 
plea if the judge is going to sentence to state ison tead 
following a county jail recommendat n Judge po ted out that 
he will not always let a defendant h s guilty plea 
the recommendation as to term sentence ll dif 
the sentence actually imposed. 
Two of the three j es 
deputy district attorney if his r 
and one will even go to the deputy's 
Coun B ll tell 
are 
recommendations persist ing consisten y ut of l 
IS 
remaining judge never tells the di tr attorney when 
he's being unrealistic in his of because in i deputy 
district attorneys are se consi ten y unr ist 
If asked, all the j s Coun B will vo 
y i ant 
2 is 1 t 
recommendation, whether 
plea bargain. However, 
to trial if they are hav 
All the judges discuss 
ree a se 
t s 
ement 
ts of ca at tor 
13 
and point out what they feel are the 
weaknesses in the case. Only one j 
against accepting guilty pleas 
innocence. 
County C 
areas of strengths or 
an 
the de an 
ute rule 
sists on s 
In County C one judge cons ers 
bargain recommendation as one factor of 
secutor s 
term i 
ea 
the 
ultimate sentence imposed. Ano j e cons ers the 
prosecutor's recommendation, but states he g 
the presentence report. The third judge 
more weight to 
ates that he defers 
to the prosecutor's recommendat because the prosecutor has 
more knowledge of the facts of the case than he s. 
All of the judges interviewed in County C will tell the 
deputy district attorney when they ink the is making an 
unreasonable recommendation as to sentence Two of the judges 
will go so far as to report to s isor. The 
other will stop giving the part recomrnendat s 
any consideration when de term in to impose. 
Two of the judges never s st t the de ant 
should plead guilty. Judge 1 will est a de ndant plead 
guilty in cases where the defendant is a first time offender, and 
he wants to go all the way to trial on the h her 
there is a good chance of conv t 
accept a guilty plea where 
innocence. 
137 
None of the j 
ant sists on h s 
e, and 
es will 
• 
Upwards of 75% of cases are settled at 
readiness and settlement conference. However the j 
it is rare that the part s come to the read 
conference in agreement as to case settlement. 
s stated 
tlemen 
Victim Involvement 
There is no legal requ ement t t 
into the decision to plea bargain, nor to t t 
surrounding the settlement. Victims, howev , can 
input through the probation department's sentence 
investigation report (PSI), or by talking d ectly to the 
prosecutor. 
s 
ect 
The probat n departments 1 three count s, as a 
matter of policy, telephone or write to the v t The purpose 
of this contact is to determine the extent of the or 
psychological harm to the v t , and to term 
restitution is appropr te. Any written or y rece 
from a victim is normally included the sentence 
investigation report (PSI). 
Although in most cases the data ind tes the probat 
officer knows the terms of 
received to indicate the viet 
ea barga , no t n was 
is formed of the barga by the 
probation officer. The victim's responses in w PSI r ts 
reviewed showed no such notification. The data, however, s 
not permit a conclusion that probat n officers never the 
victims of the existence of the plea barga and its terms. 
8 
In all three counties the responses by prosecutors on 
victim input and its effect varied greatly. To answer the 
question of how often victims provide input to the plea a 
prosecutors were asked: "How often do the victims convey to 
what they believe the appropriate bargain [or disposition in 
general] should be?" 
The results of those interviewed were: 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
Rarely 45.5% 90.0% 
Occasionally 9.0% 
Routinely 27.3% 
In special circumstances 18.2% 10.0% 
Total Number Interviewed 11 10 
"How much weight do you give to victim's wishes?" 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
-
Serious 9.0% 10.0% 
Some 36.4% 70.0% 
Little 27.3% 10.0% 
Very little 27.3% 10.0% 
"In deciding the terms of a plea bargain does it 
substantial difference to you to know that the v 
objections to the terms of the deal?" 
County A 
County B 
County C 
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YES 
54. 5% 
60.0% 
60.% 
COUNTY C 
60.0% 
10.0% 
20.0% 
10.0% 
10 
COUNTY C 
40.0% 
20.0% 
20.0% 
make a 
tim has no 
NO 
45.5% 
40.0% 
40.%% 
I 
Does the answer to the above 
victim is? 
County A 
County B 
County C 
stion 
54.5% 
.0% 
0 0% 
"In how many cases do you meet with the 
terms of a plea bargain (Note: not "get 
Never 
Rarely 
Routinely 
Occasionally in 
special circumstances 
The above data 
to prosecutors about a 
do not contact victims 
contact the victim, the 
the plea is negotiated, 
completed bargain. 
COUNTY 
shows 
ea b 
about 
terv 
and 
9.0 
63.6% 
18.2% 
9.0% 
t 
in, 
ea 
wees 
s 
ta 
y to 
nd 
g 
sec 
it 
In those few instances where a v t 
the bargaining, the effect ear. One pro 
victim's influence "depends on t 
victim." 
Supervisi personnel a ar 
involvement, than deputy distr t attar 
attorneys seek approval primarily from 
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whom the 
NO 
4 5. 5% 
40.0% 
3 0 0 % 
ly do t 
tors, as a r 
secutors 
1 
ually after 
do 
v t the 
u tor stated the 
I g more 
to v t 
d str 
te 
supervisor. The majority of the deputy district attorneys 
interviewed stated their supervisor is the person who most 
influences their decision outs e of the own ss nal 
judgment. 
As professionals, some deputy distr t attor 
it was their duty to try to view the case from the victim's 
perspective in reaching a settlement; even though they don't 
lt 
discuss the settlement with the viet felt tims were 
"out of touch with the criminal justice 
biased." 
Peace Officer Involvement 
tern, emotional, and 
An arrest by a peace off er constitutes the b inning 
point of the progress of a case through system The 
arresting officer initially sets gro for ea bargaining 
by recommending the charges that 
writing the pol ice report. This sect 
y to the case, and by 
establishing charge recommendations, and 
officer input into the bargaining scenar 
County A 
descr methods of 
nature of ace 
The peace officers Coun A have no formal screening 
process before turning a case over to the distr t attorney. 
However, in practice, some common disposit ns have developed 
such as: ( 1) no charges for bad checks under $200; first time 
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checks over $200 result in a letter only; (2) gas station 
driveouts without paying also are handled letter. 
Of course, where an arrest warrant is used, a district 
attorney must first be consulted. Otherwise the peace off ers 
simply depend upon their own experience to evaluate the evidence, 
"hanging on good charges" and "kicking out bad arrests. 11 
doubt, they will consult the district attorney. Some cases are 
reviewed by a police lieutenant prior to trans 
attorney. 
the distric 
Only occasionally are the peace officers approached by 
defense counsel for purposes of dropping the case, discovery or 
plea bargaining. public defenders are seldom involved in 
negotiations th the peace officers regarding charge dropping 
because they are not appointed prior to the defendant's 
arraignment. Efforts here are rare, even reta attorneys, 
although restitution is sometimes offered at is s 
exchange for not filing charges. 
At least a preliminary consultat over charges 
usually occurs when the investigating officer brings the matter 
to the district attorney's office for the filing of the 
complaint. Generally the case is brought to a deputy on the 
district attorney's team which has jurisdict over the most 
serious charge being alleged by the peace officer. Addit ns or 
deletions are either made then or shortly thereafter. Good or 
bad, continuing or not, working relationships Although 
the peace officer believes that it is the distr t attorney's 
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policy "that peace officers are supposed to be consulted before 
bargains are made", subsequent consultat an off er on 
charge changes or a plea bargain vary the t 
teams and the individual deputy distr t attorne Cons tat 
is dependent upon the respect and good feel s between the 
individuals involved, and the general relat ip between 
specific police "detail" and the district attor am handl 
the case. 
County B 
Peace officers have a quasi-formal screeni 
County B. It is a two-step process. The first is 
process in 
customary 
one in which the peace officer exercises the initial discretion 
in making the arrest. Once the arrest is e, however, the 
officer turns the case over to a detect ant. The 
detective sergeant then reads the report and determines if there 
is "enough to take to the district attorney." This ividual 
may screen out cases that will be " ear losers" 
blatantly illegal searches or cases where a 
incomplete. The detective sergeant can also d 
such as 
t is obviously 
t disputes 
where the legal process seems inappropr te such as situations 
where domestic disputes can be better assis ily 
counseling; or psychiatric problems that can best be de t with 
by mental health authorit s. 
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While the position of teet sergeant is a formal 
step in the screening process, screening 
guidelines. In evaluating a case uch s: 
veracity of witnesses, the willingness to testify (avoid 11 
victims who won't show") and the str f the entification 
of the defendant. The district at "won 1 t issue a a t 
for robbery just on the identification of one ted 
witness." The general rule is to see if rea e 
I chance the district attorney will ue a t." However, 
detective sergeants "don't screen too m t distr t 
attorney decide." 
The detective sergeant y 
information to a deputy distr t d usses it 
him with respect to evidence, c tnesses, etc Contact 
with the arresting officer m un ess se 11 s 
political overtones, the ssib i f , or is a 
really serious case." Some deputy distr t will 
interview the arresting off er pre t 1. 
' 
s 
do not. However, where the crime ser us ation can 
become fairly detailed. 
I Peace officer contact de se counsel also 
minimal, and if it takes ace it s to private 
counsel rather than with a publ er. 
Of all peace officer most contact a 
defense lawyer would have, if , is tective 
sergeant. This communication usually 1 to inqu s 
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counsel of what plea bargain would satis the detective 
sergeant, so that counsel can transmit information to the 
deputy district attorney in an at to suade the district 
attorney to settle on a plea. 
Very little interchange eas takes place 
between the peace officer and the defendant. Peace officer 
practice is not to advise the defendant what to do court and 
not to talk with the defendant after ation. th 
respect to informants the peace officers are authorized to make 
them offers of leniency regarding minor matters such as disposing 
of warrants for traffic violations or 1 drug busts for 
informing on a seller, without checking district 
attorney~ but, "the distr t attorney must be consulted before 
any heavy crime can be dealt away." 
Most peace officers have attitude that after the 
s i to do arrest and screening the "dis tr t 
whatever he wants regardless of the ace off er's views." Some 
make recommendations regarding disposit 
usually not asked. There are no guidel 
recommendations. 
even though they are 
s or policies for such 
The district attorney's perception of the peace officer 
function coincides with that of the ace off er. Even where 
the district attorney relies on the peace officer to investigate, 
bring in the evidence, and to some extent make recommendations 
(e.g., witnesses credibili , "street itions," suggested 
charges, etc.) the charging discretion rema exclusively within 
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the hands of the deputy district attorney and the peace officer 
input is not controlling. The deputy district attorney 
ultimately relies on his own opinion. 
County C 
There is no formal official screening process 
by the peace officers in County C. The peace off ers generally 
simply review the evidence to see whe it sufficient to 
obtain a conviction. Within the purview of this general standard 
individual peace officers employed additional criteria, e.g., 
file a case if evidence is suff ient to get to the preliminary 
hearing. If the complaining peace officer needs help, he can 
approach the filing deputy district attorney. 
Although there is some indication of a policy favoring 
peace officer input in the charging decision, any such contact 
appears to be usually at the instigation of the peace officer and 
may be met by a patronizing attitude. The contact definitely 
varies depending on the division. The major crime division 
contacts the district attorney's office on every case. Peace 
officers generally have no contact with the district attorney. 
Most peace officers will not engage in ea bargaining 
at the time of arrest or prior to filing charges with the 
district attorney. If however, the evidence warrants it, they 
will urge the defendant to plead. As one means of protecting 
their informants, detectives in sex crimes, major crimes and 
burglary/fraud may negotiate cases involving the informant. 
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Discussion and Summary of Counties A, B & C 
The above discussion ind tes ace f ers 
have contact with deputy distr t at 
and impact of their input to plea bargain wi 1 depe y 
on the orientation of the deputy, who ult tely rema s " the 
driver's seat" with respect to negotiating the bargain 
To evaluate the receptiveness of is 
attorneys to peace officer input and i 
it, they were asked several quest These questions the 
responses were: 
"How often do the peace officers to u what they bel 
the appropriate bargain (or disposit in general) should be?" 
Rarely 
Occasionally 
Routinely 
In special circumstances 
How much weight do you give 
Serious 
Some 
Little 
Very little 
It Depends 
COUNTY A 
to 
9. 0% 
18.2% 
45.5% 
.3% 
the 
COUNTY 
0.0% 
20.0% 
10.0% 
30.0% 
40.0% 
A 
ace 
COUNTY B 
40 0% 
10.0% 
40.0% 
10.0 
off cer 
COUNTY B 
0.0% 
40.0% 
0.0% 
20.0% 
40.0% 
s 
COUNTY C 
40.0% 
10.0% 
30.0% 
20.0% 
she 
COUNTY 
40.0% 
0 0% 
20.0% 
0.0% 
40.0% 
c 
In deciding the terms of a plea a , does i a 
substantial difference to you to know that the peace officer has 
no objections to the terms of deal?" 
County A 
County B 
County C 
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YES 
45.4% 
60.0% 
60.0% 
NO 
54. 5% 
40.0% 
40.0% 
• 
• 
• 
"Does the answer to the above question depend upon whom the peace 
officer is?" 
County A 
County B 
County C 
YES 
81.8% 
66.7% 
80.0% 
NO 
18.2% 
33.3% 
20.0% 
"In how many cases do you meet with the ace off er to disc 
the terms of a plea bargain?" 
Never 
Rarely 
Occasionally 
Routinely 
In Special Circumstances 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
0.0% 
63.6% 
9.1% 
27.3% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
40.0% 
10.0% 
30.0% 
10.0% 
0.0% 
40.0% 
0.0% 
40.0% 
20.0% 
The responses indicate that in Coun A 
communication of beliefs about appropriate by the peace 
officers is more frequent than in Count s B C, though there 
is at least occasional commun tion nee of most 
deputy district attorneys. Several deputies noted that is 
communication was most pronounced in certa crimes such as 
homicide or sex offenses. 
Though deputy district attorneys in County C tended to 
place greater weight on peace officer opinions and des es than 
in the other counties, it was commonly noted in all jurisdictions 
that the weight of an peace off er's opin "depends". the 
peace officer is "credible" and has a genu interest in the 
case, or if the crime is particularly "ser us" (e.g., 
injury to the victim) deputy district attorneys tend to be more 
attentive to peace officer input. 
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There was a fairly even split 
assessments of whether peace off er 
"substantial" difference in establishi 
ect 
prosecutors' 
a 
There was mutual concensus, however, t 
terms of deal. 
"we h of the 
objection depends on who the peace officer is The comment of 
one deputy in County C is typical, some peace off ers are 
always after the toughest sentence, others are II Another 
observed that "some peace officers are 
others, and they understand the ro e 
enced than 
distr t attorney." 
Still another deputy district at no that "some peace 
officers show a better sense of j t than others." 
The considerat ace off er reaching a 
plea bargain depended mostly on the at nship between the 
peace officer and the deputy distr t attorney. This finding 
reinforces a characterist c ea 
which has manifested itself re 
study. In an informal 
face-to-face interaction of ind 
ties and relationships between the 
facilitate, or create barriers to, 
deputy district attorney in County B s 
a environment 
course of this 
t n wh h depends on 
s, the personal 
ts are going to 
ing of a deal. One 
up, 11 (you) 
respect some people's opin 
Finally, despite 
more than o s." 
of to the 
bargain in certain crimes, or by "trus " off ers, discussion 
of the terms of the bargain th ace officers is, by and large, 
the exception. Almost two-thirds of distr t 
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attorneys in County A reported that "discussions of the terms" 
occured only "rarely", and one-half of those in County B reported 
that discussions occured "rarely" or "never". Only Coun C 
did as many as 40% of the deputies report "routinely" discussing 
terms with peace officers, and even then an equal number claimed 
that discussions with peace officer were "rare". 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING 
AND THE PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSE TO IT 
The practice of plea bargaining has a tro ed story 
in the criminal justice system. Though the incidence o ea 
bargaining has grown steadly since the l tter part of the 19th 
century, it has not been readily accepted s consistent with 
public policy principles and intent. Indeed, an examination of 
the history of the actice reve s a constant, but failing 
resistance to negotiating pleas of guilty. 
Anglo-American courts have histor discouraged any 
plea of guilty as a procedure case re ut n. bert W 
Alschuler,l7 in recounting the historical roots of plea 
bargaining cites numerous cases in which j ial decisions have 
discouraged or refused guilty pleas by cr defendants. This 
traditional judicial discouragement of guilty eas was bolstered 
by a deep distrust of the validity of the ea In 1771, William 
"[W]e have known instances of murder 
avowed, which ever were commit ; of things 
confessed to have been stolen, which never 
had quitted the possession of the owner ••. rt 
is both ungenerous there, and unjust, to 
suffer the distractions of fear, or 
misdirected hopes of mercy to eclude that 
negative evidence of disproof, which may 
l7Albert W. Alschuler, "Plea Bargaining and Its story", Law 
And Society Vol 13 No. 2, Winter, 1979, pp. 21 -245. 
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possibly, on recollection, be in 
the party: we should never admit 
be avoided, even the sib 
the innocent to destruct 
The lack of counsel for 
proceedings further prompted judge 
their best advice in their as 
advisor. Thus, judicial discour 
concerns about the protection of 
process. 
Whatever the reasons, it s 
"not guilty" was historically ed 
practice. Until the m teenth cent 
ar tha 
gu 
of 
it rna 
d 
tr 
lis 
as 
leg 
flee 
ue 
plea of 
leg 
were 
entered in the extreme minori case • As documen by 
Alschuler, cases of plea ing b an to 
appelate court reports only after 
judicial response was overwhe 
the following decisions. 
"No sort of 
bring the party to 
advantage however 
suffer the least weight to 
scale against him." 1 Hara vs 
Mich. 623, 624; 3 N.W. 
"As the plea of g 
because the defendant s 
thereby receive some vor 
the sentence, it is the 
to receive such a plea 
in by the de ant after i 
such plea will make terat 
punishment ••• [J] ud d scret 
always be exercised of 
liberty. All courts s 
18Quoted in Alschuler, op cit, p. 6. 
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ar in American 
War. The immediate 
i ted to 
or 
not 
4 
law •.• as to secure a hearing upon the merits 
if possible." [Deloach vs State, 77 Miss. 
691, 692, 27 so 618, 619, 1900] 
"The profess n of is not one of 
indirection, circumvention, or tr ue ••• 
Professional function is exerci the 
sight of the world .•• Private preparation s 
to to this, ony as sharpen the goes 
battle. Professional 
only in open contest. No weapon 
professional which strikes 
dark ••. Justice will always bear 
litigation is •.• the safest test 
[Wight vs Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 3 
1877] . 
"The law favors a trial on 
[Griffin v. State, 12 Ga. 
S.E. 1132, 1136, 1913] 
II 
merits. 11 
615, 622, 77 
Despite these jud al denouncements, ea bargaining 
practice increased steadily ugh late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. During the 1920 1 s, "in icago, 85% of all felony 
convictions were by guilty plea; Detroit, 78%; in Denver, 76%; 
in Minneapolis, 90%; in Los Ang es, 81%; in tt urg, 74%; and 
in St. Louis, 84%."19 er serves its infancy 
the practice of plea negotiation undoubld uced many 
satisfied customers as it does and ser us judicial review 
of the process was rare.20 fact, co th the corrupt 
atmosphere of urban criminal just in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, may to expla the growth of plea 
negotiation despite its condemnat llate courts." 
l9Moley, Raymond ( 1928) , 11 
California Law Review 97, ~~--------~~--~ 
Southern 
20Alschuler, op cit., p.229. 
l 
Again, this upward trend in negotiated pleas of guilty 
was met with criticism. Alschuler reviews commen from 
the comprehensive surveys of criminal just e which were 
conducted in many states and cities during the 1920's. The 
surveys provided the first uniform documentat n of extent of 
plea bargaining in felony cases; and, more importantly, 
raised serious questions about the effects of the practice. 
Several of the surveys documented the extent of 
sentencing disparities between guilty pleas and jury convictions, 
and pondered the implications for crime control. 
"[plea bargaining] gives notice to the 
criminal population of Chicago that the 
criminal law and the instrumental-ities of 
its enforcement do not mean business. This, 
it would seem, is a pretty direct encourage-
ment to crimes." Illinois Association for 
Criminal Justice (1929), The Illinois Crime 
Survey, p 318. 
"[Persons who boast of their real or 
fancied bargains] are the best and most 
persistent advertizers .• for the bargain 
counter. Surely this does not make for 
deterrence." Fuller, H. (1931) Criminal 
Justice in Virginia, p. 154. 
Other reports noted the crucial role of the 
prosecutor in plea bargaining, and worried about the implications 
for the accuracy and quality of proceedings. 
"[T]he interpretation of the 'best he 
can get' is left to the [prosecutor]. Such a 
course ••• may ••• be used to excuse weak and 
careless prosecution 11 • The Illinois Crime 
Survey, 1929: 262. 
11 Many prosecutors have an inordinate 
fear of trying a weak case. As a matter of 
fact, the case may be weak because the 
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prosecutor himself is weak." Missouri 
Association for Criminal Justice, Survey 
Committee (1926), The Missouri Cr S 
p. 150. 
"[When the prosecuting attar accepts 
a guilty plea to a lesser offense, he] is no 
compelled to carry through an onerous and 
protracted trial. He does not run the ri 
of losing the case in court. He runs no risk 
of having to oppose an appeal to a higher 
court in case he wins in the trial ... Most 
important of all to the prosecutor is the 
fact that in such record as most prosecutors 
make of their work, a plea of g il of any 
sort is counted as a co When he 
goes before the voters for reelection he can 
talk in big figures about the number of 
convictions secured. In reality these 
'convictions' include all sorts of 
compromises ••• [I]t is ea for a prosecutor 
to avoid labor in this way merely for the 
purpose of expending his best energies upon 
sensational and politically advantageous 
exploits in court .•. It is not surprising, 
then, that prosecutors have indulged in the 
politically profitable enterprise of making 
friends among the friends of accused persons 
while at the same time and by the same acts 
they were building a record of us and 
successful prosecutions." ssouri 
Association for criminal Justice, (1926) p. 
150. 
Other observers expressed reservat ut the 
implications of the newly revealed practices of plea bargaining 
with respect to "fa ness" the cr justice system. 
''There can no do t that [our 
undercover system of criminal law 
administration] is dangerous, both to the 
rights of individuals and to orderly, stable 
government ••• [T]he poor, friendless, helpless 
man is most apt to become the one who helps 
swell the record of convictions. 
necessity for maki a record .• may 1 
result in prosecutors overlooking the rights, 
privileges and immunities of the poor, 
ignorant fellow who ..• is induced to con ss 
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crime and plead guilty through hope reward 
or fear of extreme punishment. Dean Justin 
Mill, (1929) "The Compromise Criminal 
Cases," 'Southern Cali a Law Rev 
22-23. 
Still, plea bargaining wea se criticisms and 
has continued to dominate the cr cases 
throughout this century. Indeed, this Joint 
Committee for Revision of the Penal common 
wisdom that guilty plea conv t rates 
beyond the already high rates of the 1920's recent events 
have strengthened reliance on the a ini process. 
Most importantly, revolution" of the 
1960's heightened the appeal and i plea bargaining. 
The revolution strengthened the rights of fendant and 
increased the burden on the tor s a case to tr 1. 
Clearly, the incentives each to negot te a settlement were 
heightened. In the words of Publ c De D. 
Muntz, "rights are tools to work wi ra insist on 
a hearing on a motion to suppress illegal obtained evidence, a 
defense attorney ••. [is] likely to use a c il lity to 
exact prosecutorial concess 
Conn, a Massachusetts Assistant 
pleas are cheaper today, it s 
Supreme Court decisions have given 
shot at beating us."21 
2lquoted in Alschuler, op cit. p. 239. 
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a Donald 
said, "if guilty 
cause [Uni States] 
nse at an excellent 
The changing nature of the prosecutor's office has also 
been cited as an impetus to routine plea bargaining. As 
prosecutors staffs have grown, "the atti es of bureaucracy, 
emphasizing the maximization of production and the minimization 
of work" ,22 may help explain the acceptance and reinforcement of 
plea bargaining practices. Some observers have argued that plea 
bargaining perpetuates itself largely through the socialization 
of new attorneys into the system23 --its the way things are 
done." 
Thus, through its history, plea bargaining has survived 
in the face of normative criticism. In recent years California 
has provided some limited reversal of the traditional official 
nonacceptance of plea bargaining and has codified some plea 
bargaining practices.24 Nonetheless, this legal recognition does 
not signal a resolution of uative dif ences concerning plea 
bargaining as a criminal justice procedure. One indicator of the 
current discomfort with plea bargaining in California, is the 
evaluation given plea bargaining the terv wees in this 
study. (See Chapter VI.) 
22Alschuler, op cit, p.236. 
23Milton Heruman, Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense Attorneys, Chic : University 
of Chicago Press (1978). 
24see Chapter I, part D. 
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VI 
THE PARTICIPANTS' EVALUATION OF PLEA BARGAINING 
During the interviews, deputy district attorneys, 
deputy public defenders, judges and peace officers were asked to 
evaluate plea bargaining by identifying it's advantages and 
disadvantages to the criminal justice process. Answers were 
open-ended and reflected the respondents' own perspectives. The 
following synopsis of their responses reflects the normative 
evaluations of the interviewees themselves, and does not 
represent any conclusions of the Joint Committee members or staff 
about the desirability of plea bargaining. 
The Criteria used by Prosecuting and Defense Attorneys 
1n Evaluating Plea Bargaining 
The study of plea bargaining practices in three 
selected California counties has documented the central function 
of prosecuting and defense attorneys. The attorneys more than 
any other participants determine the plea agreement. 
Accordingly, they are in a unique position to evaluate the 
advantages and disadvantages of the process. Criteria used by 
the attorneys in determining the advantages and disadvantages of 
plea bargaining fall into four principal categories: Efficiency, 
Justice and Individual Rights, The Process, and Public Opinion. 
The following paragraphs summarize the criteria in each category. 
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l. Efficiency 
Criteria in this category tended to emphasize the 
operating requirements of the system; numbers of 
personnel, time, numbers of cases, and dollars. 
2. Justice and Individual Rights 
Criteria in this category emphasized the basic 
issues of justice and (in the words of one respondent) 
the "integrity" of the system. Criter tended to 
focus on the outcome or result. For example, criteria 
mentioned included "appropriateness" of the sentence, 
implications for basic constitutional rights such as 
the presumption of innocence and jury trial, and the 
right of the public to adequate protection. 
3. The Process 
Criteria in the process category related to 
specific implications for the procedures and tactics 
through which criminal cases are resolved: the 
strategies employed by attorneys, the roles of 
attorneys, judges, and witnesses; and effects on 
the quality and completeness of evidence. 
4. Public Opinion 
Criteria in this category emphasi the effects 
of plea bargaining on the "image" or "reputation" of 
the criminal justice system. 
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Advantages of Plea Bargaining--Prosecuting and Defense 
Attorneys 
The advantages that deputy district attorne and deputy 
public defenders perceive in plea bargaining are summarized in 
Table XXXX which displays the pattern of distribution among and 
within the four principal response catagories. Clearly, in all 
three counties, the major perceived advantage by prosecutors was 
the effeciency derived from plea barga ing. though defense 
attorneys in all three counties mentioned efficiency as an 
advantage, only defense attorneys in County C mentioned 
efficiency as the primary advantage of plea bargaining. 
According to a deputy district attorney, plea 
bargaining brings "'judicial economy', avoids wasteful trials, 
and [saves] taxpayer dollars." A deputy district attorney argued 
that plea bargaining "disposes of cases without expensive 
litigation" and a deputy public defender observed that 
"bargaining may speed things up." Another source of efficiency 
frequently mentioned by deputy district attorneys was the 
clearing of the courts through avoiding court trials. 
Finally, a number of respondents found plea bargaining 
to be advantageous simply because the "system requires it". In 
these cases, interviewees did not argue for particular 
efficiencies, but assumed that the "system could not function 
without it", [deputy public defender]. One deputy district 
attorney stated the theme forcefully, "It is necessary for the 
justice system to run. In essence, it is a necessary evil." 
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TABLE XXXX 
PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES OF PLEA BARGAINING: 
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY 
DA'S PO'S DA'S PO'S 
EFFICIENCY 
Savings in time, money, and personnel (7)* (2) (7) (2) 
Reduction in court load, eliminates 
unnecessary trials (3) (1) (4) (1) 
System requires it. prevents "breakdown" (1) (1) (1) (2) 
TOTAL % FOR CATEGORY 52. 30. 75.0% 33.3% 
PROCESS ISSUES 
Strengthens prosecution (4) --- ( 1) ---
Strengthens defense 
---
( 1) 
Benefits witnesses/victims (1) (1) 
% FOR CATEGORY 23. 15.4% 6.3% 6. 
* Actual number of persons who commented. 
tpercentage of total County A Deputy District Attorneys who mentioned the category 
advantage of plea bargaining. 
COUNTY C 
DEPUTY DEPUTY 
DA'S PO'S 
(2) (2) 
(4) (3) 
(1) (2) 
63.6% .0% 
{l) 
9.1% . 
ci " as an 
TABLE XXXX (Continued) 
PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES OF PLEA BARGAINING: 
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY 
DA'S PO'S OA'S PO'S DA'S PO'S 
JUSTICE/INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
Results in justice, or carefully 
considered sentences (3) (2) (3) (1) (1) 
Avoids excessive sentences/benefits 
defendant (2) (4) --- (8) (1) (3) 
TOTAL % FOR CATEGORY 23.9% 46.2% 18.8% 60.0% 18.2% 30.0% 
PUBLIC OPINION/MORALE 
Positive effect on individual perceptions 
of the criminal justice system 
---
(1) 
--- ---
( 1) 
TOTAL % FOR CATEGORY 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 
TOTAL MENTIONS (N) (21) (13) (16) 15) (11) ( ) 
• 
• 
For defense attorneys, the most frequently mentioned 
advantage of plea bargaining was justice and individual rights. 
This category for presecutors was the second most equently 
mentioned advantage. In contrast to efficiency criter h 
emphasize the "pragmatic" operating requirements of the system, 
criteria in this area reference the sic principals and 
objectives of the criminal justice system. 
Ten of the respondents, usually ty distr t 
attorneys, argued that plea bargaining produced just and 
reasonable sentencing results. Other respondents, usually deputy 
public defenders, felt that plea bargaining serves the ends of 
justice because it obviates the severe sentences faced by many 
defendants, and provides certainty. 
In ascribing "justice" to plea bargaining the 
participant's own personal role and objectives make a great 
difference. Deputy public defenders frequently cited sentences 
which were advantageous to the defendant as more "appropriate" or 
"just". The prosecution often did not concur. 
A small minority of the interviewees in each county 
found plea bargaining to have a positive effect on the process 
for resolving criminal cases. A prosecutor, for example, argued 
that plea bargaining was a "great tool for the prosecutor". On 
the other hand, a deputy public defender felt that plea 
bargaining allowed the defense attorney to "manipulate and 
maximize the 'goods', and minimize the 'bads'." 
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Finally, only two respondents, one prosecutor and one 
defense attorney, felt that plea bargaining was advantageous 
because it has a positive effect on the public's perception f 
the system. The defense attorney argued that plea bargaining 
"shows the defendant that the government is lenient." 
Disadvantages of Plea Bargaining--Prosecuting and Defense 
Attorneys 
The disadvantages that deputy district attorneys and 
deputy public defenders perceive in plea bargaining are 
summarized in Table XXXXI. Both prosecuting and defense 
attorneys mentioned justice and individual rights as the major 
disadvantage. Within this category there was a substantial split 
between the concerns of defense attorneys and prosecutors. 
The greatest concern of the deputy public defenders 
was that plea bargaining interfered with the right to a jury 
trial. In the words of one deputy public defender," [Plea 
bargaining] punishes [a] defendant for going to trial". 
A second major concern of public defenders and some 
prosecutors within the catagory of justice and individual rights 
was the degree to which plea bargaining may pressure factually 
innocent or "minimally" culpable defendants to plead guilty. 
"People who are relatively not guilty plead in order to have a 
predictable future." The majority of prosecutors on the other 
hand expressed considerable concern about potentially "unjust" 
sentences primarily because they are too lenient. One deputy 
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TABLE XXXXI 
PERCEIVED DISADVANTAGES OF PLEA BARGAINING: 
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY 
DA'S PO'S DA'S PO'S DA'S 
EFFICIENCY 
Time consuming --- --- (1) (1) 
TOTAL % FOR CATEGORY 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 6.7% 0.0% 
PROCESS ISSUES 
Dependence on individual discretion/ (2)* ( 1) (3) (2) confuses roles ---
Reduces quality/quantity of evidence (2) (1) 
Protects/encourages incompetent trial 
lawyers --- --- ( 1) --- ( 1) 
TOTAL % FOR CATEGORY 28.6%t 11.1% 16.7% .0% 37.5% 
* *Actual number of persons who commented. 
tPercentage of total County A Deputy District Attorneys v1ho mentioned the category "process issues" as a 
disadvantage to plea bargaining. 
PO'S 
0.0% 
( 3) 
30.0% 
Ill • 
TABLE XXXXI (Continued) 
PERCEIVED DISADVANTAGES OF PLEA BARGAINING: 
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY 
DA'S PO'S DA'S PO'S DA'S PO'S 
JUSTICE/INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
Interferes with right to jury trial/other 
constitutional rights --- (3) --- (3) (1) (5) 
Jeopardizes the factually innocent/ 
minimally culpable (3) (3) --- (2) --- ( 1) 
Unjust sentences/too lenient ( 5) (2) (5) (2) (2) 
% FOR CATEGORY 57.1% 88.9% 41.7% 46.7% • 5% • 0% 
PUBLIC OPINION/MORALE 
Undermines public i ef in 
system/misunderstood (2) --- (3) (2) (2) 
Participants perceive that they are 
"playing games" 
--- ---
(1) (2 --- ( 1) 
TOTAL % FOR CATEGORY 14. 0.0% 33.3% 26. 25.0% 10.0% 
TOTAL MENTIONS (N) (14) (9) (12) {15) {8) (10) 
viewed with suspicion by the public," and that it g s 
"appearance of justice compromised." 
Judges 
Judges were also asked to specify the "pros'' and "cons" 
of plea bargaining. Their opinions confirmed the tende of 
prosecutors and public defenders to see effie y and 
necessity of handling a large case load as the princi 1 
compelling advantage of plea barga ing. The nine judges who were 
interviewed (3 in each county) volunteered fourteen specif 
comments about the advantages of plea bargaining; six of these 
referred to efficiency concerns. 
A second major set of advantages cited by the judges 
referred to the increased certainty for the de ndant which 
resulted from plea negotiations. "[If u] tell de ant in 
advance no state prison, which is what they're scared of, most 
will plead." A few of the judges believed plea barga 
results in more appropriate sentencing. 
With reference to disadvantages, four of the judges 
opined that plea bargaining "isn't hurting [the] processes of 
justice one bit when done properly." These four saw no 
"necessary" disadvantages. 
Others, however, did see some problematic cts in 
the process. Three of five specific comments reg ing 
disadvantages referred to the unfavorable lie react n to the 
process. As stated by one judge: "It causes the public to have 
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an unfavorable impression of the criminal justice system." Two 
judges also cited excessively lenient sentenci as a 
disadvantage of the system. 
Peace Officers 
Peace officers in count were also ked to 
express their assessment of the value of barga 
However, rather than being asked to en and 
"disadvantages", peace officers were Ar you for or 
against plea bargaining? Why?" Responses of the 21 peace 
officers interviewed in the three count s are displayed in Table 
XXX XI I. 
To appropriately interpret the re 
officers, it was necessary to add finer dist 
simple distinction between " " 
s of peace 
tions to the 
se "aga st". 
Many of the respondents, for instance, expressed support of plea 
bargaining only under certain conditions, or assuming certain 
results. Another set of respondents ac ed that plea 
bargaining was "necessary", even though they did not necessarily 
approve of it. 
A minority of peace off ers each coun (12.5% to 
ea b 37.5%) were clearly "in favor" of 
experienced it. The reasons cited 
scattered across several areas. Most 
acknowledged the efficiency of the 
ing as they 
favorable assessments were 
inently, ace officers 
ess, acknowledging that 
"Plea bargaining is OK. Costs of trials are so prohibitive and 
court calendar[s] so crowded." 
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TABLE XXXXII 
FAVORABLENESS OF PEACE OFFICERS 
TOWARD PLEA BARGAINING 
COUNTY A COUNTY B 
In Favor of Plea Bargaining 37.5% 20.0% 
In Favor with Conditions 25.0% 40.0% 
Plea Bargaining is Necessary 25.0% 20.0% 
Against Plea Bargaining 12.5% 20.0% 
TOTAL RESPONDENTS (8) ( 5} 
COUNTY C 
12.5% 
0.0% 
37.5% 
50.0% 
(8) 
I 
• 
I 
One-fourth of the peace off ers 
five in County B expressed favor as 
bargaining only under certa condit ns 
Coun A and two of 
of ea 
sence, the 
"conditions" which concerned the 
the results of the negotiations; 
ace off were related to 
t f es are 
dropped or what is "given in terms of sente ing. 
Six peace officers stated that ea 
"necessary"; but five of those 
desirability, considering it a nece 
was most frequently ascribed to court 
efficiency. Put simply " ea 
practical shortcut." 
Several advantages 
mentioned, but with much less 
that plea bargaining can an 
prosecution, and others 
bargaining in matchi r 
or criminal. One peace off 
n 
er Co 
t about its 
ev The 11 necessi ty" 
ads and need for 
necessary as a 
effie ncy were 
Peace o ficers noted 
i plea 
partie ar crime 
A no that 
"Overall, bargaining is good: each case un each defendant 
plea unique." A further able acteri 
bargaining cited by the ace off ers was 
the necessity of testifying. 
Finally, a small minori 
A and B (12.5% and 20.0% res t 
early 
of ac 
y) a 
sed to officers in County C were 
most common reason for sition was concern 
16 
ing 
f ic 
v t 
Counties 
a ing. The 
the fact that 
charges were often changed through negot t ns, and "people 
should be charged with what committed." Another reason 
mentioned for opposition was concern about excessive leniency 
given the defendant. Finally one peace officer argued that ea 
bargaining "is used for court load and [the] district attorney's 
win/loss record, and these aren't good reasons." 
Discussion and Summary 
Several conclus ns 
assessments of plea bargaini 
above participant 
First, it is clear that the 
respondents were not of one mind about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the process. th the exce of peace officers, 
participants tended to be support of plea bargaining; judges 
most enthusiast ally and deputy ic de ers least 
enthusiastically. Still, there was subs 1 difference of 
opinion regarding the desirab i of ea a ing within each 
of the groups of respondents. 
The "efficienc cr ter was y centr to the 
reasoning of many favorable evaluations of bargaining. 
Expectations of savings in t and , and the conviction 
that the justice system wo "gr to halt" without 
bargaining, were most prominantly cited as "pros" for plea 
bargaining by each group of re ents. For peace off ers, 
these pragmatic considerat also ed rea sons for 
accepting plea bargaining as a necessary ev 
other effects. 
ardless of its 
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Indeed, excluding the argument that plea bargaining is 
a necessary response to limited resources, there were more 
negative comments about the process than positi e Many 
respondents argued that plea barga ing weakened the just e 
system in the eyes of the public and contr uted to public 
cynicism. Virtually no one interv wed believed that plea 
bargaining has a positive image. 
Critics also tended to focus on t discrepancies 
between plea bargaining practice and our basic principals of 
justice. In the view of many respondents, the right to a jury 
trial and the presumption of innocence are both compromised 
through the coercion of plea argaining. These concerns were 
largely voiced by de nse attorneys. Prosecutors and peace 
officers, on the other hand, were much more likely to feel that 
the compromising of prescribed sentences esented a lapse of 
justice. Many defense attorneys viewed the same phenomenon, 
reduced sentences, as a positive attribute of the system. 
A fundamental po t is raised. Many participants 
evaluated plea bargaining on the basis of the results they 
believed it produced, not on the basis of the nature of the 
process itself. In their eyes, the "justness" of the system 
hinges on outcomes rather than procedure. The same factual 
characteristic of the plea bargaining process (e.g., a "break" in 
sentencing) may be perceived as an advantage by some participants 
and a disadvantage by others. It depends upon their personal 
convictions and goals. 
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This phenomenon is most clearly represented 
comments regarding the process. Ga ing co t ak 
cases was seen as an advantage prosecut 
ability to emphasize the defendant's " 
advantageous by de se attar 
" po ts 'was cons ered 
The responses of peace off ers reflected a s i ar 
perspective. Many peace officers favored ea a II if 11 i 
accomplished certain res ts which they favored 
Given is focus on the result, it fol that some 
participants justify plea bargaining because they believe it 
allows them to accomplish results which y or which 
benefit them (e.g., the successful prosecut of a "weak" case 
for a prosecutor, or ng his or her client out of state 
prison for a defense attorney). On the other hand, a substantial 
number of respondents saw increased "discret n" of 
individual attorneys and judges as major di plea 
bargaining. 
In summation, support ea bargaini rests largely 
on two sets of perceptions. First, the pragmatic bel f t it 
accomplishes necessary eff nc s cr just 
process. Second, the perception that it ilitates results 
which the perceivor cons ers favorable. Crit ism s ilarly 
rests on two major sets of ceptions. rst barga ing 
is perceived as contradicting bas princi s edural 
justice and discrediting the justice system. Second, ea 
bargaining may be perce to ilitate re ts wh the 
perceivor considers unfavorable. 
169 
I 
VII 
PUBLIC POLICY: DOES PLEA BARGAINING CONFLICT WITH THE 
---GOALS OF CALIFORNIA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM? 
The three county study has provided a detailed descript 
of plea bargaining practices and results robbery 
cases. Even though the practices and consequences of tern 
are clear, whether plea bargaining Cali nia good or bad 
depends on the goals that the public policy makers set for 
California's criminal justice system. 
Goals of the Criminal Justice tern 
Opinions set forth in Chapter VI mirror the public 
controversy which surrounds the practice of plea bargaining. The 
current profile of reasons supporting or criticiz plea 
bargaining show a marked continuity wi evolving 
controversies of the past. bargaining sustained in the 
face of criticism largely because s t 1 work 
advantages to the criminal justice system, and the ind iduals 
who work in it. 
The description of plea bargaining presented in this 
report can aid the Legislature in assessing the merits of the 
controversy; and, in deciding if legislation on plea bargaining 
is necessary to improve the performance of the criminal justice 
system in California. However, if the tions plea 
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bargaining for the criminal justice system are to be clear 
understood and assessed, it is important to clarify the co lict 
which surrounds plea bargaining by relating it to explicit goals 
which provide the standards for assessment. Goals of the 
criminal justice system may be stated in a variety of ways, but 
the important task here is to arrive at a comprehensive set of 
widely acknowledged goals which can provide a framework for 
analyzing the implications of plea bargaining. Four societal 
goals of the criminal justice system (as tified in a recent 
major study of criminal justice performance by the Rand 
Corporation) serve this purpose well.24 
As presented in Table XXXXIII, the Rand study 
identified broad general goals; and, in some instances attached 
more specific subgoals to them. The list requires some 
discussion. 
1. To Control Crime. The first major societal goal 
is basic, to insure public security and safety 
through preventing or stopping crime. At least 
four major ways of accomplishing this objective 
are implied in criminal justice theory and 
practice. 
24The four goals and their associated objectives have been 
adapted from the RAND Corporation study Indicators of Justice: 
Measuring the Performance of Prosecution, Defense, and Court 
Agenc1es Involved in Felony Proceedings, authored by Sorrel 
Wlldhorn, Marv1n Lavin, and Anthony Pascal (Lexington, Mass: 
Lexington Books, 1977}. Their study identified "retribution" as a 
fifth goal. This goal has not been included here because it is 
not widely accepted as a legitimate goal and does not aid in 
clarifying the issues before us. 
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TABLE XXXXIII 
OOAIS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
GENERAL GOAlS 
CONI'ROL CRIME 
ACCORD FAIRNESS 
CONSERVE RESOURCES 
PR~ PUBLIC 
TRUST AND 
CONFIDENCE 
SUBGOALS 
( Control Criminals 
( 
( 
( Achieve general deterrence 
( 
( 
( Achieve specific deterrence 
( 
( 
( 
( accurate proceeding 
( 
( Accord procedural process 
( 
( Administer justice evenhandedly 
Redress 
( Limit public 
( 
(Expend system resources efficiently 
( 
(Use external resources efficiently 
II 
(a) First is incapacitat of convicted 
criminals incarcerat and 
supervis 
(b) Second the use of pr scr i nts 
for criminal activ as a deter 
would be criminals. 
(c) Third is the use of prescribed 
deter repeat 
(d) Fourth 
offenders. 
2. Fairness. The 
fairness in the 
of 
ilita 
ini trat 
fundamental to American juri 
icted 
accord 
j stice, 
udence. Our 
to 
system of justice ha 
due process. To 
subgoals must 
d vy is on 
fairness, s ral 
z 
(a) First is to Accurate Proceedi s 
for conviction of the legal guil and 
acquital of 1 innocent 
(b) Second to ire that fendant be 
accorded Procedural Due Process ri ts 
Every defendant must aware and have the 
opportunity to exer se his or her i t of 
redress, and to have a 1 ures carried 
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out in accordance with the letter and spirit 
of the law. 
(c) Third is to Administer Jus ice evenhandedly. 
Defendants must be trea equally regardless 
of ethnicity, age other personal 
attributes, and outcomes must be equi 
(d) Fourth 
Fairness as a 
fairness to the v 
public the d 
the system includes 
, as 1 as to the 
t. 
ird major 
resources. S t, 
3. To Conserve Resources. 
is to conserve socie 
the goals of the cr ju ice tern must be 
pursued vli th some 1 i 1 of ic 
"ac expenditure wh 
citizenry. The ficient use 
external resources necess 
ternal and 
to further the 
subgoal 1 i i i expenditures 
4. To Promote Public Trust and Conf e 
fourth major goal of c inal justice 
is to promote public trust and conf e 
goal can be ach if re an 
7 
tern 
This 
• 
acceptable level of achievement of the other 
three goals. A criminal justice system which 
serves society and is responsive to the citizens 
needs will inspire public trust and confidence. 
While this listing of goals is neither exclusive nor 
exhaustive, it does present a useful and order classi icat 
of the things that citizens and practit expect of the 
criminal justice system. It is also ear that these goals and 
subgoals are not necessarily complimentary. Punishment and 
rehabilitation, for instance, might work at cross purposes. 
Similarly, resource constraints may hamper the pursuit of other 
system goals. The incompatability some goals and subgoals 
means that different jurisdictions may emphasize different goals 
and subgoals. 
This classification of goals and subgoals may direct 
our attention to another point. Each of these goals and subgoals 
may be pursued through a variety of procedures and activities. 
Indeed, the subgoals for controlling crime can achieved 
through a variety of strategies. It follows that jurisdictions 
will differ in the means by which they seek to attain their 
objectives. A brief examination of recent trends in California's 
criminal justice legislation will clarify California's current 
priorities and strategies. 
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Recent Priorities for California's Criminal Justice tern 
California has long a p crim nal justice 
practices, and recent major in the state s laws continue 
this tradition. California is among a ful of state 2 i 
have adopted Determinate Sentenci Laws. Pas of the Uni 
Determinate Sentencing Law in 1976 made ing es the 
goals of California's criminal justice system. 
Under the prior indeterminate sentenci law 
incarceration time was indicated onl s at the 
time of sentencing. For example, the terminate Sentencing 
Law term for first degree burg was 5 s to life; 
assault with a deadly term was 6 months to li . The 
actual decision about sentence time within is was made by 
the Adult Authority or Women's The decis on the date 
of release depended upon an "evaluation assessments 
the inmate's institutional behav IS) 
judgement about his/her ture da to soc n26 The 
important point for this d cuss that the Inde nate 
Sentencing Law reflected certain ses i 
goals and subgoals of the criminal justice tern. 
1. Rehabilitation, probat , and paro were viewed 
as plausible and preferred forms of cr 
control. 
25rndiana, Illinois, Arizona, Alaska, and Nor 
have varying forms of determinate sentencing. 
Carolina a so 
26source: A.J. Lipson and Mark A. 
Under Determinate Sentencing: A Review 
A report prepared for the State of Cali 
Terms, June, 1980, Page 3. 
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nia Jus ice 
and for Research." 
ia, Board of Prison 
2. "Fair" sentencing was seen relation to the 
individual inmate, h or her needs 
progress" rehabilitat 
circumstances of his or her cr 
3. The Parole Board and the cr 
nal act. 
justice 
professionals were e ted to have the nece 
information and experti to ict t lease 
"danger to socie II re 
4. Criminal just ce s than 
Legislature, were conside to the appropriate 
decision makers arding sentence severity. 
The passage of the Uni 
in 1976 was prompted by an ace 
challenged the basic ass t 
De nate Sentenc 
ich 
Law 
Sentencing Law, and i 
Indeterm 
ss the 
Indeterminate Sentencing 
crime control, fairness, and 
confidence: 
1. Doubt about use 
rehabilitation 
criminal behav 
2. The lack of ev nee 
could be predic 
3. Evidence that 
inmates comm tti s 
ls 
ng trust 
lness coercive 
or reducing 
tha as behav 
vari w 
lar of fens 
4. Arbitrary release decis s which "repu ly 
diminished the deterrent effect of a prison 
sentence." 
5. A variety of concerns about fairness and 
impact of the uncertain ing tes. 
Though enactment of the Determinate Sentencing Law 
a variety of changes in criminal u (see e XXXXIV), 
the basic reform involved the leg s ative specification of exact 
"mitigated", "mid-term", and " 
criminal charge in the Penal Code e 
" sentence terms for each 
. , 
Sentencing Law term for wa 2,3 or 4 
time of sentencing the judge must assign one 
terms and publicly state reasons the 
California's Dete nate Sentenci 
"enhancements" of the base term 
years for the use of weapon tent 
bodily injury, extraordi 
terms. 
Law so 
ll 
los , 
Dete nate 
ars27) • At the 
the designated 
ection. 
ific rs of 
lie ing great 
prison 
These procedural 
alteration of the goals and 
reflected a f amen tal 
the Cali s iz ia 
criminal justice system " Cali ia Dete nate Sentencing 
Law is part of a national trend in sentencing, movi away from 
reliance on a 'medical model' i length of 
incarceration is based on ividual 'needs' a ilitat 
27The term has since been to 2, 3 or 5 years. 
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toward a system designed more to promote equity, procedural 
fairness, and just punishments.n28 
The change in goals implicit to the De nate 
Sentencing Law can be clarified by relating them to the four 
major societal goals of the criminal justice system as set forth 
in the beginning of this chapter 
Control Crime. 
The Determinate Sentencing Law r 
emphasis on control through incarcerat 
sents an 
rather than 
parole, and on control through general and specific 
deterrence based on the sure ication of specific 
punishments for cif cr s. Incarceration, and 
deterence through punishment, rather than rehabilitation, 
have become the focus of crime control. 
Section 1170 of the Penal code states: 
"The Legislature finds and declares that the 
purpose of imprisonment for crime is 
punishment. This purpose is best served by 
terms proportionate to the seriousness of the 
offense." 
The focus on punishment has been reinforced by subsequent 
legislation which has increased the length of sentence for 
most major crimes, and which has added mandatory prison 
sentencing provisions for many crimes. 
28Lipson and Peterson, op cit., p.l. 
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Fairness. 
A major thrust of e Determ te Sentenc Law has 
been to insure the "evenhandedness of sen outcomes. 
"Persons who commit or at ast are convicted of s il 
crimes should suffer similar penalt s. The law 
specified sentences inte to reduce sentenci dispar 
and provide offenders with a known release da The law 
also seeks to promote equity by mandati the deve nt 
of sentencing rules by the icial Co il and rnandati 
their use by judges. 
The criteria for assessi irness under 
Determinate Sentencing Law is marked dif nt than for 
assessing fairness under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law. 
Fairness under Determinate Sentencing based on having 
persons convicted of s cr s receive s milar 
punishments. "Fairness" under the Indeterminate Sentencing 
Law was having the length of sentence based on the 
individual rehabilitation needs the inmate. 
Conserve Resources. 
The conservation of resources not an emphas of the 
Determinate Sentencing Law. ing costs of 
administering the criminal justice system have been 
increased by the Determinate Sentencing Law (state and local 
increases are estimated at around $5 mill annual 
in the Rand report29). much greater significance are 
29Lipson and Peterson, cit. 
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the increased costs assoc ted with 
populations (the Rand 
institutional costs at $1 
t es 
i 1 
Public Trust nee 
The Determinate Sentenc 
sentencing decisions more accoun 
According to the t, 
should be increased the De 
because the "bas a 
liberty [is] made ted 
Law 
s 
decisions are] 
in open court with s 
for their cis II 
Thus, the De te 
embody significant sh fts 
California's criminal just ce 
bargaining practices and outcomes 
subgoals which have 
Legislature. The current 
F st, the con 
determinant puni 
li 
s are: 
t 
i 
cr 
acts, and terrence 
puni 
Second, 
certain, equi 
i 
, and 
1 
ne 
cur a 
ed prison 
19 a 19 
seeks make 
to 
i 
te Sentencing Law 
tion of 
Sentencing 
elec j 
i sta reasons 
Laws 
1 
these ls 
Cali n 
h 
nal 
h 
i 
and through procedural requirements for 
judicial sentencing. 
Third, the strengtheni 
trust and confidence 
legislative sentencing decis 
effective crime control. 
ic 
ive 
Fourth, the conservat of resources 
is not addressed se 
Plea Bargaining and Criminal Justice ______ s 
While plea bargaini has recei re ition 
and sanction in California statutes,(see pp. 16-19 above) the 
practice is primarily a product cr i 
no 
uri 
t 
ct 
justice 
will 
sses behavior. Given this, there 
and outcomes of plea bargaini 
reflect goal priorities set by 
of the report, the implicat 
Legis ture. In this sect 
of 
found in this study are discussed wi re 
ining practices 
to each of the 
four major goals of the cr nal justice tern as ioritized 
the Determinate Sentencing Law. 
Control Crime 
The preceding discuss 
of crime through incarcerat and 
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trates 
terrence 
t 
ugh 
control 
• 
punishment, are major priorities of California's criminal justice 
system. Plea bargaining embodies basic cr control assumptions 
and practices which diverge significant from cr control 
based on incarceration, and deterrence through ishment. 
1. The direct control of cr at 
of convicted offenders is reduced. It was the consensus of those 
interviewed, and the empirical data in this s 
plea bargaining results in reduced incarce a 
shows, that 
particularly serves to avoid the state prison terms which are 
specified by the Determinate and Mandatory Sentencing Laws. The 
analysis of case files revealed great di ity in rates of 
sentencing to state prison and sentence severi ( L e., 
percentage of maximum). (See pp. 53-57 above). 
2. Plea bargaining serves to increase the use of 
probation and parole as a means of crime control, while the 
Determinate and Mandatory Sentencing Laws discourage or prohibit 
these methods. In every county substituting " it sentences" 
(i.e., jail plus probation) for state prison was the single most 
frequently made sentence concession. (See pp. 66-70 above). 
3. It might be argued that plea bargaining does 
contribute to effective criminal control through incarceration 
because it produces "swift" resolution of the case and reduces 
possible "street time" for the defendant awaiting tr 1. The 
data in this study suggests that any such ef ct would be minimal 
in robbery and burglary cases because there no great 
reduction of arrest to disposition times in plea bargained 
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robbery and burglary cases compared with those that go to jury 
trial. (See pp. 121-125 above). 
4. To the extent that if 1 deterrence 
depend upon sure and predictable sentences for a given cr nal 
act, plea bargaining weakens deterrence because the d ink 
between the criminal act, charges, sentence n 
The findings in this study clearly trate that 
similar criminal acts (e.g. robberies or b ar es) result i 
negotiated pleas of guilty to a var of charges. Furthermore, 
the "typical" substitute charge varies between jurisdictions 
(e.g., "felony assault" for robbery Coun A grand ft 
for robbery in County B). 
Mandatory sentencing 
for their underlying premise 
are particular 
t incarcerat 
and surely to the criminal act regard ss other 
considerations. For the plea bargained cases 
t 
teres i 
direc 
is s 
is premise was not clear implemented. For Coun A, 9 of 5 
(60%) use of a firearm enhancements (which carried a rnanda 
state prison term) charged the informat were not part of 
the guilty plea. Similarly, 3 of 4 Coun use of a f 
enhancements charged the information were at 
conviction. Even in County B, where were dropped much 
less frequently, 3 of 10 (30%) of the use of a firearm 
enhancements were dropped as part of a ea 
Legislature's intent to ensure ison terms 
usi a firearm was not early n 
negotiated settlements. 
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in. The 
if 
se 
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The findings also 
acts produce sentences which 
length of incarceration, or bo 
only conclude that a skillf 
tra 
ti 
circumstances can produce a sentence 
prescribed for a given cr i act 
Sentencing Law. 
Fairness 
eat 
that sim lar criminal 
terms of ace or 
can 
the r 
tanti lly less than that 
e Uni De nate 
The second major 
Sentencing reforms was to 
i of Cali ni 's De nate 
criminal justice i 
in this report raise numerous s 
Interviewees themselves most often ci 
individual rights as "di 
bargaining affects ea the fa s 
(a) Prov Accurate Proceedi 
the "fairness" goal to convi t 
the legally innocent. One 
regarding plea bargain 
guilty plea from an 
It is clear 
considerations other 
guilty. In essence 
the chances of conv t 
was 
t 
of pleading guilty. Interv 
8 
1 
irness 
ss 
in 
equity of the 
ces as ntified 
s. 
justice and 
in 
ls as 
ea 
!lows: 
1 
it 
induce a 
uces 
ision to ad 
the s 
isagreed as to 
whether, and how often, this calculus resulted in a "false" 
conviction. 
Deputy district at ng y to deny 
that they had any direct knowledge of cases in which innocent 
persons had plead guilty a ne t (only one 
29 deputy district at the 
personal knowledge). However, near y 2 of 
even though they had not ri 
happen. 
Interestingly, 
happen tended to base this j 
prosecutor to positi identi 
counties t s 
6 5 ned 
i could 
that it could not 
ili of 
or guilt. As one 
County A deputy prosecutor "goes over case ••. and 
is sure of guilt before 
Deputy public de nders had 
the incidence of false guil eas 
defense attorneys interviewed in the 
personal knowledge of cases 
guilty. The explanations 
predominately of two types. Fi st 
"conviction" was acceptable so tha 
immediate release. 
"Defendant couldn't 
out" 
"The secret words 
1 
II 
fferi 
f 
essment of 
9.3%) 
count s a 
nnocent 
de 
or 
i 
rsons ead 
as were 
lt that 
in 
wanted 
e 
I 
• 
Or, defendants felt that the possible consequences of a 
conviction at jury trial were not worth the risk. 
"Yes, it happens. Example: fe 
charge comes up in Municipal Court--of ed a 
misdemeanor to settle rather than a felony . 
... Makes sense to avoid even the chance of 
felony probation, because v t of 
probation can lead to state prison." 
(b) P~ocedural Due Process. Fa nes the cr na 
justice system is ensured te 
opportunities for redress and rev dec is , and adherence 
to the letter and spirit of the law. Plea bargaining is 
inherently a departure from strict adherence to formal procedure. 
While the resulting "flexibili " in cr nal justice procedures 
may be desirab some perspectives, it raises important 
issues regardi the guarantees of "fairness" wh are embodied 
in procedural due process. The findings th study emphasize 
several of these issues. 
One of the disadvantages of plea bargaining most frequently 
cited by interviewees in this study was ference with the 
right to jury trial. The data in this study c ly indicate 
that jury trial's have become the rare exception in robbery and 
burglary cases. More important, the data the study clearly 
indicate that defendants with similar culpability risk greater 
punishment if they exercise their right to jury trial than if 
they do not. This is ticularly true the case of offenders 
without a serious prior criminal history. 
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Procedural due process requires that the decis 
ints, decision criteria, and rev and redress c iter be 
clearly set forth. Due process ires that ures 
accessible to all participants. The very comp xi of 
ining decis , and the "inv s le" 
behind them, run counter to the clarity required for due 
For instance, this study has documented the 
"styles" of negot tion which are available to 
and defense. 
--In one county "sentence bargai ing" was the 
predominate form. Charging patterns this county were 
characterized by extreme d ies between 
information and those to which the defendant 
s. 
c 
i at 
--In two counties, sentence ining was seen as an 
interference in the judicial funct 
state prison" were accepted. 
, but to "no 
--In all counties, were numerous adjustments of 
charges in plea barga cases. ions included ing 
additional counts of the primary charge, ch the 
charge, and dropping additional charges and enhancements. 
The very complexi of the many negot ti options 
makes guarantees of due process problematic, and the i nt 
difficulty of reviewing and evaluating the process ther 
exacerbated by the ct that many are exercised 
through " f the re " discuss between counse , and tween 
counsel and the judge in the judge's rs. 
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Finally, due process be affec the ng 
the roles and responsibilities of i ual 
bargaini process. The findings 
the particular contribution of sentence ining to 
confusion. The negotiation of sentences the 
the separation of prosecutorial and sentenci funct 
enhances the prosecutors influence on case disposit 
Several judges in the study acknowl tance 
prosecutor's recommendation for the sentenci dec is The 
data on charging patterns indicated greatest alterat 
charges at different points ss for county which 
relied most heavily on sentence bargainin (Coun A ; the st 
alteration for the county th the least sentence barga 
(County B). An emphasis on bargaining sentences 
careful and meaningful negot tion of charges. , a 
number of prosecutors in the study complained that informal 
'indicated sentences' by judges undercut their charging funct 
In summation, it can be argued that plea bargaining 
obfuscates criminal justice procedures through a x set 
options and a negotiating style which largely i 
"off the record". An inevitable result to 
30The Rand report on the effects of determinate sentenci 
California notes that power in the process has shifted to 
prosecutors and the resolution cases through a 
The report goes on to report criticisms of this 
Critics believed that the procesutor's "broadened discret 
will confound attempts to gain sentencing equity will 
and 
perpetuate sentencing disparities between plea bargains ju 
trials. (Lipson and Peterson, op cit, p. 17). 
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importance and discretion of the men or women who do the 
negotiating, and to lessen the adherence to and 
procedures. In the words of a Depu Public Defender Co 
B, the "system is as good as the people in it". 
(c) Administer Justice Evenhandedly. One of the 
striking findings of this study has been the degree of diversi 
of opinion and practice which characterizes 
process for resolving criminal cases. 
ea bargaining as a 
Prosecutors and defense attorneys, the persons closest 
to plea bargaining practices, offered a variety of definitions of 
the process a they experienced it. Different definitions implied 
different objectives. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the 
preceding chapter, deputy district attorneys, deputy public 
defenders, and judges displayed considerable disagreement 
the advantages and disadvantages of the process. 
There was considerable disparity in sentencing outcomes 
related to similar crimes in the three jurisdictions studied. As 
few as 7.2% of the burglary defendants recei state prison 
terms after plea bargaining in County C. 
There were large disparities in outcomes between plea 
bargained cases of burglary and robbery, and cases that went to 
jury trial. In all three jurisdictions, jury trials produced a 
much greater percentage of state prison sentences, and a much 
higher percentage of the maximum legal sentence at conviction. 
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There was considerable disparity in 
by offenders who plea bargained in s cr 
characteristics the ticular cr i 
term received 
Even when 
defendant's personal background, and de ndant's cr inal 
record were taken into account, mu 
sentences was not explained. 
of the variat between 
In some counties defendants different rae 1 
ic background, or defendants with dif 
characteristics (e.g., education, 
differing sentence results when they plea 
t status), received 
ined. These 
differences persisted when criminal records and crime 
characteristics were accounted 
Certain types 
disparities than others. 
XXXXV and XXXXVI, "dea 
defendants face greater sentencing 
Specif lly as demonstrated in Tables 
" de ts with lesser 
criminal records (i.e., fewer prior convictions) to be 
much more substant 1 than those made by de ts with more 
extensive prior s. In juri ict where were 
sufficient jury trials for comparison, there was great disparity 
between the percentage of ts with no prior felony 
convictions sentenced to state prison in jury tr 
sentenced to state prison after a plea bargain. 
ls, and those 
Similarly, there 
was a substantial difference in the percentage of maximum 
sentence received by first t nders who plea bargained 
compared to those who were convic a j either 
indicator, sentenc differentials were much ss for 
defendants with four or more prior felon s. 
1 
TABLE XXXXIV 
COMPARISON OF INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE SENTENCE LAWS 
ITEM ISL 
Primary purpose of imprisonment Rehabilitation 
Offenses included All felonies 
Sentence determi ion Courts decide whether to i 
Legislature s wi 
prison terms. 
P e 
-e 
range 
son. 
son 
No public statement of reasons for 
sentence decision. 
DSL 
Punishment 
Excludes serious crimes resulting in 
life terms (principally first degree 
murder). 
Courts whether to imprison 
s 1 narrow range 
Community 
of sentence 
Public st 
sentence 
increme 
cases 
sentence 
ease Board sets h 
1 ifers. 
reasons 
Parole Boards determine sentencing Legislature ng licy. 
poli within wide ranges set by the 
Legislature. 
ITEM 
Sentence review 
Parole 
I s procedural 
• • • 
}ABLE XXXXIV (continued) 
COMPARISON OF INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE SENTENCE LAwst 
ISL 
Appellate Court (cruel 
punishment) 
unusual 
Parole Boards are Adult Authority 
and Women's Board of Terms and 
Paroles. 
Parole Boards set length within 
ranges set by Legislature. 
DSL 
Appellate Court (cruel and unusual 
punishment) 
Community Release Board reviews 
parity of sentences. 
Parole Board is Community Release 
Board now renamed Board of son 
Terms) 
Parole limited to one year (amended 
to years). 
Parole Boards determine revocations. Commun Release Board determ1nes 
Corrections' 
requirements 
icy subject to 
court decisions. 
revocat ons. 
legisl i 
heari 
represent 
established system of 
appeals with right to 
tsource: A • Lipson and Mark A. Peterson, "California Justice Under Determinate i : A a 
p.3. Agenda Research," A report for the State Ca 1 i forni a Board of Prison 
• • 
TABLE XXXXV 
COMPARISON OF JURY TRIAL AND PLEA BARGAINED SENTENCES 
FOR ROBBERY DEFENDANTS WITH DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS (% SENTENCED TO STA!E PRISON) 
COUNTY A COUNTY B COUNTY C 
Jury Trial Plea Bargain ~ry Trial Plea Bargain Jury Trial Plea Bargai_n 
# Of Prior Felony Convictions 
# 
0 
1 
4 or more 
0 
1 
3 
or 
4 or more 
i ons 
75.0% 19.1% 
100.0% 25. 
75.0% 71.4% 
66. . 
A 
50.0% 
.0% 
---
100.0% 
B 
87. 
14.3% 
66.7% 
66.7% 
100. 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
• 
• 
I 
(%Sentence to State Prison) 
J 
#Of Prior Felony Convi ions 
0 
1 
2-3 
4 or more 
# Of Prior Felony 
0 
1 
2-3 
4 or more 
mum 
ct ons 
50. 
100.0% 
7% 
85.3% 
75.0% 
i ion) 
PLEA BARGAIN 
6.8% 
16.7% 
40.0% 
70.6% 
PLEA BARGAIN 
15.4% 
33.3% 
49.8% 
66.2% 
• 
This data indicates that the 
prior record does not get 
ining. However, the 
prosecutors suggests that the 
directly, but serve as a " 
This data also revea 
f t time of who 
himself to be minimally 
choice between a 1 
possibility of a much more se 
trial. 
Thus, De 
es lish a "base" pun t 
II 
to enhance" by if amounts 
altered in the plea i 
record usually res ts 
"enhancements" are rge 
the case of defendants with lit 
gi 
l 
pr 
no 
a 
cho 
extensive 
not 
1 
and the 
at jury 
ntent to 
convict is 
of "no state prison" or sentences well below the De 
In 
, the offer 
nate 
Sentencing Law's II 
In summat 
report, contributes to 
substantially simi 
"predictability" 
It are to 
i ities 
i 
se 
cr 
the gu 1 ty, 
this 
outcomes for 
sentence 
(d) Redress Viet 
bargaining is that the victim does 
s. One concern t 
consideration the ss. 
plea bargains to reduce statu puni 
i 
of 
can be 
te 
use of 
ete 
as diminishing the "appropriate" redress for ict 
More subtly, the st 
bargaining entails adequate cons 
victim. In this study a major rat 
sentences at jury trial was the 
of the case and to the extent of in 
bargained settlements were character 
"insulated" sett 
The study fi i s so 
on whether 
the in u to the 
more severe 
of e ure to the details 
to viet Plea 
as occuring in a more 
that viet d not 
typical have into the 
tances when 
ea negot t Even in 
relatively few 
concerns often did not 
Public Trust and Confidence 
While it is not an 
that recent reforms in Cali 
we 
ici 
cr 
(including the Determinate sentenci 
the responsiveness and 
system to the public. 
When asked about 
plea bargaining, several j 
volunteered that a major di 
ili 
ad van 
s, 
9 
t 
sta it clear 
ustice system 
Law have 
the cr 
es a d 
cutor and 
of 
t to improve 
nal justice 
cess 
ntages of 
ic de 
the 
s 
• 
I 
• 
negative public attitudes 
indicated that the public's 
the process. Respondents 
worked to dis it the 
Much public criti ism 
plea bargaining prov s a tantial 
the defendant. Even rna terv 
considered the public's t ve i 
"misunderstanding", fi i 
basic percept of the ic 
The belief that plea ini 
of 
lea 
ntenci 
ining 
ce system. 
ion that 
advan to 
this s 
a bargain be 
tenc s t this 
lps put convicted 
criminals back "on 
public trust in a t 
sentencing and i 
street 11 rticular 
has 
destructive of 
terminate 
i ts a varie crimes. 
The discrepancies tween the results of ea bargaining and the 
intent the Uni De nate Sentencing Law contribute 
to public frustrat 
accountability in 
at the 1 of responsiveness and 
criminal justice 
Ironically, the frustration 
determinate sentencing and accoun e 
attributab to the of the 
criminal justice 
findings of s 
tern. 
the people's demand for 
ure partly 
cutor, the "peoples 
edings in a 
amply demonstrate 
representative" in 
bargained cases. 
the ways in which 
prosecution in de 
a bargaining contributes to the power of the 
ning case resolut 
The prosecution has the 1 
to determine the criminal charges which 
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t and re 
iate 
ility 
reflect a 
crime, and this study documents varie 
enter into the ing decision. 
constra the sentence wh ch a 
F st, th s the e nt 
prosecutor's use the power to adjus counts, 
enhancements to induce guil the 
judges indicated the typical w li 
to accept the sentence 
tying specif s more to terms 
s ch 
t 
cerat 
and by specifying enhancements, Cali 
Sentencing Law has str thened 
negotiations. 
nia s Determinate 
tor's hand 
De ite 
decision, this s 
that iv 
out their duties. 11 
range, and the indiv 
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has documented 
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sentencing outcomes 
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California's Determinate Sentencing Law tant 1 constrains 
judicial sentencing decis the 1 se tence 
a 
structure, the manda sentencing , and the irement that 
the judges public 
decisions. The 
state reasons certa sentencing 
decisions or sentenc 
publicly visible or ac 
, d nothi to make 
the 
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utor more 
• 
and 
Sentencing Law. 
stions about 
"accountability" 
The contrary 
bargaining and the Uni 
serious quest i 
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equitable punishment 
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the need for testimony. The maj conserva , however, is 
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criminal justice system. 
The most t 
cited by interviewees in th 
trials. Anticipated savings 
resources, and a 
trials. The fi i s 
savings would large 
process time between 
to be the time the 
t 
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trial 
One major ass t 
trial-related savings to 
that a decrease in tia 
directly into a substantial 
has not been empirical 
t 
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casts some 
tween di 
The exper 
Program (CCP) in Cali n 
a directly inverse relat 
bargaining and by jury tr 
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Criminal Justice Planning notes:31 
"A primary concern of the judie a with th type 
of program was that it would result an increased 
burden on the court. It was lt that a 
bargaining" posture by the District Attorney 1 s fice 
would result in more cases going to trial. This has 
occurred with a reported trial rate incident of 
approximately 20% for the current ation in 
comparison to a repor 16% the baseline group. 
However, given the number of cases involved tr ls 
in relation to the overall case docket e twelve 
jurisdictions examined it can be sa the 
Career Criminal Prosecution Program to 
posed a significant lem court rna 
Though infrequent alluded to ts in this 
study, the implications of a reduction in a ining for 
costs of incarcerating of nders be of ter 
magnitude. If a reduct of ba ini prod a dramatic 
increase the inc and length of prison sentences, the 
cost implications would be substantial.32 
3l"california Career Criminal Prosecut n Program: Second 
Annual Report to the is ture, "Office of Criminal Justice 
Planning and MetaMetrics, Inc. January, 1980. p. 3.26 
32The problems associated with balancing costs determinant 
sentencing objectives are many. To avoid exhausting limited 
state prison space and strengthen local alternatives to prison 
the California Legis ture passed AB 90 (1978) which created the 
County Justice System Subvention Program. The program annually 
allocates "prison slots" among the state's counties and penalizes 
the counties through withholding state funds if more than the 
allocated number of defendants are sentenced to state prison 
during the year. The incarceration of serious offenders is 
ostensibly not affected because a number of categories of serious 
offenses (or offenders) are "exludable" from the quotas. In the 
first year of the program (1978-79) 21 count s -- containing 
most of the state's populat n --exceeded the quotas. Though 
all successfully petit against the lties for that year, 
many are facing overruns the second year as well. 
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Conclusions 
The discuss th conclud has 
the scr t a ba i the 
jurisdictions studied to cons the of thos 
tices t sent gi 
the Cali cr nal justice tern A icture tens 
contradict emer s. 
nt need to re c i n 
the tern is not ical of decis tha have 
policy reg ing plea bargaining the st The findi are 
consistent with the his ini and cr 1 
justice li Just as ng has been cri ized 
confl ti with basi the cr 1 justice tern 
the t, i confl cts wi bas objectives of the 
criminal justice stem in li n Part c s 
themselves perceive these contradict criticize plea 
bargaini on matters justice and iv 1 r ts and for 
its impact on opin 
Still, participants Californ s cr inal just 
32con't. Los les sor Baxter Ward expres 
the frustration of a county the s ili of a 
($1.5 mill ) penal "The islature talks to 
be tough on cr nals. even enact manda sentenci 
bills, and other so-cal and order actions. Lost 
the rhetor , however ish local nment for ca 
prosecuting, and sentenci e Los 
Thursday, July 10, 1980, a 
problem because lowering s or 
exchange a convict a case out 
priors, in 
"excludable" 
categories. Thus, the ts of i 
t must i costs 
"excludables 11 
cutor l 
lties due 
tern accept and general support 
has two pillars. First, plea 
ides them with f x 
jectives in the criminal s 
a barga n 
as 
of this study, part nts see a var 
bargaining. Second, partie ts e 
fear) that the criminal justice system 
wou collapse without bargaining. It 
s the 
over 
"belief" has not been empirically 
above). 
See P·l98 
Furthermore, as 
California today can flouri 
nature. Negotiations go on 
the 
part 
tween 
st, a ing 
because of its "pr te" 
1 a and 
judges and are largely invisible to the public, particularly in 
the "routine" felonies such as robbery 
Another reason for the acceptance of plea barga ing 
emerges from this study. In a sense, a barga ing serves as 
"sa ty valve" with respect to cr nal justice pol Wi 
Determinate and Manadatory Sentenci 
taken a step toward increased "puni 
through incarceration. This decis 
re the Legislature 
n of convicted of 
carr the ial 
greatly increased criminal justice costs people 
California. One could argue t plea bargaining, by 
circumventing the Determinate and Manda Sentencing Laws, has 
mitigated these costs. At st this t inevi 
compromises the crime control and ss the law 
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